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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 16일

by Summa posted Apr 17, 2025
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```html Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 백악관은 러시아가 휴전에 동의할 때까지 러시아와 경제 협정을 체결하지 않을 것이라고 거듭 강조했습니다. 러시아는 계속해서 휴전 거부에 대한 책임을 우크라이나로 돌리려 하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 북한의 포병 탄약에 크게 의존하고 있는 것으로 알려졌으며, 북한은 러시아의 우크라이나 전쟁에서 계속해서 교훈을 얻고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 당국은 최근 쿠르스크 주지사였던 알렉세이 스미르노프를 구금했습니다. 이는 크렘린이 쿠르스크 주 당국자들에게 2024년 8월 우크라이나의 쿠르스크 주 침공에 대응하지 못한 것에 대한 책임을 전가하려는 노력의 일환으로 보입니다.
  • 우크라이나 당국은 러시아군이 최근 로즈돌네(벨리카 노보실카 북동쪽) 근처에서 무장하지 않은 우크라이나 전쟁 포로(POW)를 최소 한 명 처형했다고 보고했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 토레츠크, 포크롭스크, 벨리카 노보실카 근처에서 진격했습니다.

분류: 국제 정치, 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 계속해서 우크라이나에 대한 군사적 압력을 가할 것으로 보입니다. 또한, 러시아는 북한과의 관계를 강화하여 경제적, 군사적 지원을 확대할 것으로 예상됩니다.
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[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros



April 16, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.


ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine. The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the United States. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's "unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress towards ending the war. The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions, and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.


Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. Reuters published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces. Reuters and the OSC tracked 64 shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently as March 17, 2025. Reuters and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the Angara, Maria, Maia-1, and Lady R cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. Reuters reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or more of their shells used in daily fire missions. Reuters reported that an unspecified Russian unit fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100 percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Reuters that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.


Key Takeaways:


  • The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire.


  • Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.


  • Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine’s August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.


  • Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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