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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 20일

by Summa posted Apr 21, 2025
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아가 제안한 부활절 휴전은 모든 당사자가 사전에 공식적으로 합의하고 강력한 모니터링 메커니즘을 포함하는 정전 또는 평화 협정의 텍스트를 공개적으로 공개해야 할 필요성을 강조합니다.
  • 젤렌스키는 러시아군이 4월 19일부터 20일 밤과 4월 20일 낮에 우크라이나에 장거리 공격을 가하지 않았으며 민간인 인프라에 대한 장거리 공격을 일시적으로 중단할 것을 제안했습니다.
  • 우크라이나 관리들은 러시아가 기독교인을 포함하여 점령된 우크라이나 전역에서 종교 공동체를 체계적으로 박해하고 있다고 계속해서 강조하고 있습니다.
  • 크렘린은 러시아 관리들이 우크라이나 침공을 정당화하는 데 반복적으로 사용한 서사를 계속해서 재활용하여 장기적으로 러시아 사회를 더욱 군사화하고 있으며, 이는 나토와의 잠재적인 장기 갈등에 대비한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 러시아군은 부활절 휴전이 시작되기 전에 쿠르스크주와 토레츠크 근처에서 진격했습니다.

분류: 국제정치, 전쟁, 외교
관련된 주요 국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국
향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 것으로 예상되며, 양측 모두 상당한 인명 및 물적 피해를 입을 것으로 보입니다. 전쟁의 결과는 유럽의 안보 질서에 큰 영향을 미칠 것입니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko with William Runkel


April 20, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new biweekly product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.


Click here to read the latest "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update," a new weekly product line on Russian recruitment efforts, force generation, force reconstitution, and technological adaptations.

The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported at 2000 local time April 20 that Russian forces in "all main frontline directions" conducted ground attacks and drone and artillery strikes against Ukrainian forces in violation of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 30-hour unilateral truce from 1800 Moscow time on April 19 to 0000 Moscow time on April 21. Zelensky also stated on April 20 that Russian forces conducted attacks in the Siversk, Toretsk, and Zaporizhia directions and are conducting offensive operations most intensely in the Pokrovsk direction. Zelensky’s statement from 1600 local time April 20 also reported Russian truce violations in Kursk Oblast, although Zelensky stated earlier at 0000 local time April 20 that Putin did not extend the truce to Kursk or Belgorod oblasts. Zelensky reiterated that an effective ceasefire agreement must provide monitoring mechanisms of potential violations and that Ukrainian forces will respond "symmetrically" to Russian assaults. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 20 that Russian forces had "strictly" observed the truce and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against Russian positions and Russian-occupied settlements since the truce began. Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that fighting abated but did not fully cease in some directions, including the Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk directions, and that fighting in other directions temporarily ceased around 1800 on April 19 but has since resumed with variable frequency and intensity. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data shows satellite-detected heat anomalies along the frontline on April 20 that may suggest military activity, but ISW is unable to independently verify the specific reports of violations made by Russian or Ukrainian sources.


Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure. Zelensky stated that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and such a ceasefire is the easiest to extend. Zelensky proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire, but Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the March 13 joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal over the last five weeks. A temporary civilian infrastructure strikes ceasefire agreement — and especially a general ceasefire agreement — would require robust monitoring mechanisms, public and formal terms, and a clearly defined time frame. The Kremlin may continue to leverage any vague future ceasefire agreements to obfuscate Russia's rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals and to accuse Ukraine of violating such ceasefire terms.


Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 20 that Russian forces have killed or tortured 67 Ukrainian priests, pastors, and monks and destroyed 640 religious sites, most of which are Christian sites, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022. ISW has previously reported on Russia's religious oppression in occupied Ukraine, including arbitrary detention and assassinations of Ukrainian clergy or religious leaders and the looting, desecration, and deliberate destruction of places of worship. ISW has also reported at length on Russia's systematic repression of Orthodox Church of Ukraine and other religious minorities, particularly Ukrainian Protestants and Baptists, who have faced Russian brutality and other repressions throughout Ukraine.


Key Takeaways:


  • The snap Russian-proposed Easter truce underscores the necessity that the text of any ceasefire or peace agreement be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and include robust monitoring mechanisms.


  • Zelensky reported that Russian forces did not conduct long-range strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 19 to 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.


  • Ukrainian officials continue to highlight Russia's systematic persecution of religious communities throughout occupied Ukraine, including against Christians.


  • The Kremlin continues to repurpose narratives that Russian officials have repeatedly used to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine in an effort to further militarize Russian society in the long term, likely in preparation for a potential future protracted conflict with NATO.


  • Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk before the start of the Easter truce.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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