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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 21일

by Summa posted Apr 22, 2025
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키가 4월 20일에 민간인 인프라에 대한 장거리 공격을 일시적으로 중단하자고 제안한 것을 거부했고, 젤렌스키가 제안한 푸틴의 30시간 부활절 휴전을 연장하자는 제안도 거부했으며, 최근 우크라이나 민간인을 표적으로 한 러시아의 공격을 정당화하려고 했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 젤렌스키와 미국이 제안한 전면적인 휴전을 거부한다는 입장을 되풀이했습니다.
  • 러시아 국영 언론은 헤르손 주 점령 수장 블라디미르 살도가 러시아가 아직 공식적으로 영유권을 주장하지 않은 지역에서 우크라이나에 추가 영토 양보를 요구한 것을 확대 보도했습니다.
  • 살도가 드니프로 강을 따라 추가 러시아 영토를 요구한 것은 다른 크렘린 관리들의 성명과 일치하며, 러시아는 우크라이나에 광범위한 영토 요구를 계속하면서도 자체적으로는 어떠한 양보도 하지 않고 있습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 리만과 토레츠크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
### 분류: 전쟁, 정치 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 ### 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 우크라이나에 대한 영토 요구를 계속할 것으로 보입니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter


April 21, 2025, 6 pm ET

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Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on April 20 that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days. Putin announced the end of the Easter truce on April 21 and rejected Zelensky's proposed temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure while speaking to journalists, stating that Russia would need to "sort out" the proposed civilian infrastructure strikes moratorium. Putin attempted to soften his rejection of Zelensky's ceasefire proposal by claiming that Russia and other unspecified actors need to study strikes against civilian targets where military personnel are operating and "make appropriate decisions." Putin did not suggest the possibility of creating independent monitoring mechanisms to determine the legitimacy of such strikes, and Russian officials have previously expressed disinterest in Western-led monitoring mechanisms as a condition of future ceasefires in Ukraine. Putin also attempted to justify Russia's recent missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to obfuscate his ongoing rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces recently struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City — likely referring to the April 13 Russian missile strike against Sumy City — but suggested that the reported presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Sumy City constituted a legitimate military target. Putin claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian military personnel during a recent Russian strike against Odesa City.


Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered. Zelensky reiterated on April 20 Ukraine's readiness to agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days. Putin rejected the full ceasefire proposal on April 21, claiming that Ukraine was attempting to "seize the initiative and talk about expan[ding]" the ceasefire, and alleging that Russia would need to "carefully evaluate everything." Ukraine and the United States initially proposed a full ceasefire on March 13, and Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal over the past five weeks. The US Department of State told Reuters on April 20 that the United States would welcome the extension of the Easter truce, however. US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to respond to Trump's statement by stating that the Kremlin is not ready to discuss a time frame to end the war. Putin's continued rejection of the US-Ukrainian March 2025 proposed general ceasefire and the Kremlin's refusal to commit to any time frame to end the war highlight Putin's disinterest in ending the war via peace negotiations in the near term. Putin's continued rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals runs counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.


Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim. Saldo stated on April 21 to Kremlin newswire TASS that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority" for Russia. Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces will continue efforts to use the east (left) bank of the river as a "lever of pressure" against Russia and that the presence of Ukrainian forces on the west bank hinders the resumption of shipping along the river. Saldo concluded that "the segment of the [Dnipro River] that passes through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts must be completely under [Russian] control" so as to guarantee the development of infrastructure "associated with the river." Russian forces only currently occupy positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia. Saldo appears to be calling for additional Russian territorial claims along the river in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. It is unclear how much territory along the banks of the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Saldo is claiming must be under Russian control or if Saldo is implying that Russian forces must occupy extensive territory east and northeast of the river such that Russia "completely control" the river and its immediate surrounding areas. Russian forces may want to control a minimum 25 kilometers of territory on both banks of the Dnipro River so as to prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery strikes against the area.



Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine.


  • Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered.


  • Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim.


  • Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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