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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 23일

by Summa posted Apr 24, 2025
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Key Takeaways: 요약

요약

  • 미국은 최근 우크라이나에 우크라이나 전쟁을 종식시키기 위한 7개 항목의 제안을 제시한 것으로 알려졌으며, 이 제안에서 미국은 크림 반도를 러시아의 일부로 인정하고 러시아군이 우크라이나 남부 및 동부의 상당 부분을 계속 점령하도록 허용할 것입니다. 미국의 제안 내용에 대한 현재 보고에 따르면, 이는 우크라이나 전쟁을 종식시키기 위한 트럼프 행정부의 전략에서 갑작스럽고 상당한 변화를 의미합니다.
  • 우크라이나 관리들은 지속적인 평화를 달성하기 위한 노력의 일환으로 2025년 3월에 미국이 제안한 전면적인 폭격 중단에 대한 우크라이나의 지속적인 의지를 재확인했습니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 트럼프의 보고된 평화 계획의 측면을 거부했습니다.
  • 미국, 우크라이나 및 유럽 고위 관리들은 4월 23일에 런던에서 우크라이나 지원 및 전쟁 종식에 대한 양자 및 다자간 회담을 가졌지만, 외무장관 수준에서 예정된 다자간 회담은 취소했습니다.
  • 미국과 우크라이나는 공동 광물 거래에 서명하기 위한 조치를 계속 취하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 러시아가 이란에서 제공한 샤헤드 드론을 조립하는 타타르스탄 공화국의 알라부가 특별 경제 구역(SEZ)에 드론 공격을 감행한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 러시아는 러시아가 가입한 화학무기 금지 조약(CWC)을 위반하여 우크라이나군과 민간인에게 화학무기를 계속 사용하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 보로바와 토레츠크 근처에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 쿠르스크주와 토레츠크, 포크롭스크, 쿠라호베 근처에서 진격했습니다.
### 분류: 정치, 국제 관계 ### 관련된 주요국가: 미국, 우크라이나, 러시아 ### 향후 전망: 우크라이나 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 미국과 러시아는 우크라이나에 대한 영향력을 확대하기 위해 경쟁할 것입니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Anna Harvey, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel



April 23, 2025, 8:30 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


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Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new biweekly product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.


Click here to read the latest "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update," a new weekly product line on Russian recruitment efforts, force generation, force reconstitution, and technological adaptations.

The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. The Telegraph and Axios reported on April 22 and 23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23 multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal. There have been no official statements about the reported US proposal. The Telegraph reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations. Axios and The Telegraph reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and "de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy. Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. Axios stated that the plan would grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with The Telegraph reporting that Ukraine would gain “unhindered access to the mouth” of the river. The Telegraph noted that the proposal states that Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast. The proposal calls for the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US operation. The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.


The reported US proposal suggests that the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the [war] must stop" is a "necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" — demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement. Ukraine agreed to the March 18 US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21 — in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires. The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war — in contrast to the reported US proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia, and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.


Significant details about the territorial swaps in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part of Mykolaiv Oblast — the Kinburn Spit — and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern Sumy Oblast — two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address. It is unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area along the river‘s left bank given differences between reporting from Axios and The Telegraph. Details about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River’s east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth. ISW previously conduced a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines — particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts — enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.


Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal. Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire. Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace efforts. Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.


Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine. Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression. Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea.


Key Takeaways:


  • The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace.



  • Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.


  • Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level.


  • The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal.


  • Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones.


  • Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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