Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey,

and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter



May 24, 2025, 5:15 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.

Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the biweekly "Russian Occupation Update."

Click here to read the weekly "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update."

Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 24 that Russian forces launched 14 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from the directions of Taganrog, Rostov Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; Bryansk City; and occupied Crimea; and 250 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Iskander-M missiles and 128 Shahed drones, and that 117 drones were “lost in location.” Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike heavily targeted Kyiv City and that drones and missiles also struck Odesa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed prior to the strike on March 23 that Russian forces would respond "adequately" to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian positions and defense facilities. Russian forces have significantly intensified their nightly attacks against Ukraine over the last five months and have conducted several of the largest strikes of the entire war since January 2025.

Russian forces appear to be reducing their use of cruise missiles, indicating that increased Russian drone production and innovations to long-range drones and related strike tactics are providing Russian forces with a cheaper alternative to cruise missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yurii Ihnat stated on May 24 that Ukrainian forces are struggling to use Patriot air defense systems to down modified Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles due to recent Russian improvements, including enhancements that enable the missile to change trajectory and perform maneuvers rather than flying in a straight line. Ukrainian aviation expert Anatoliy Khrapchynskyi reported on February 11 that Russian forces had reduced their use of Kh-101 and Kh-555 cruise missiles and were increasingly using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles. ISW has observed Russian forces rarely using Kh-101, Kh-55, and Kh-555 cruise missiles against Ukraine since February 2025 and infrequently using Kh-59 and Kh-69 cruise missiles since March 2025. Russian forces most recently used almost 60 cruise missiles against Ukraine on April 24, but Russia typically uses large numbers of Shahed and decoy drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses in nightly strikes and has recently relied on small numbers of ballistic missiles to conduct more targeted strikes against Ukrainian cities. Russian forces appear to be increasing their use of long-range drones and decreasing their use of cruise missiles in strikes against Ukraine, possibly to conserve the fixed-wing airframes that Russian forces use to launch cruise missiles.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted one of the largest combined drone and missile strikes of the war against Ukraine on the night of May 23 to 24, but used fewer missiles than in previous large-scale combined strikes.

• Ukraine and Russia conducted a second round of prisoner-of-war (POW) exchanges on May 24 as part of a larger 1,000-for-1,000 exchange agreed upon during recent bilateral negotiations in Istanbul.

• Russian officials will reportedly submit a draft document of their conditions for peace in Ukraine following the conclusion of the POW exchanges, although Russia's conditions are unlikely to be anything short of Ukraine's full surrender.

• Russian forces have significantly expanded their salient southwest of Kostyantynivka in recent weeks and established sufficient positions to launch an offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka from the south or to support the envelopment of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad from the northeast in the coming weeks and months.

• The Russian salient southwest of Kostyantynivka is likely sufficient to support a future Russian offensive operation toward Kostyantynivka or Pokrovsk, but Russian forces will have to make further advances from Chasiv Yar and Toretsk and west of Pokrovsk before Russian forces will pose a significant threat to either of these towns.

• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

Click Here to Read the Full Update

Website | Jobs & Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.