Andie Parry, Ben Schmida, Ria Reddy, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Alexandra Braverman, Kelly Campa, and Brian Carter 



Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Click here to view ISW–CTP's interactive control-of-terrain map of Syria.

Click here to view ISW's complete portfolio of interactive maps.

Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson Noureddine al Baba said that ISIS activity has spiked in the period since the fall of the Assad regime due to ISIS cells’ seizures of former Assad regime weapons stocks. ISIS cells have since attempted to “infiltrate” MoD positions and recruit regime remnants. The transitional government has conducted three large-scale raids targeting ISIS cells in Aleppo, Rif Dimashq, and Deir ez Zor provinces since May 17, compared to a single counter-ISIS raid between December 2024 and early May. Interior Ministry forces seized ammunition, explosive devices, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and suicide vests on May 25 from the ISIS cell in Rif Dimashq. The ISIS cell reportedly seized this weapons stockpile during the fall of the Assad regime, which demonstrates that ISIS has the capability to rebuild and arm its cells even in areas currently under firm transitional government control in western Syria. ISIS has also recently developed the ability to conduct attacks in the Middle Euphrates River Valley with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, which require significant logistical tails and support zones. ISIS announced in mid-May that it has a growing presence in the “countryside and [city] outskirts” in Syria. The Islamic State has also attempted to use discontent with the Syrian transitional government among Salafi-jihadi hardliners to undermine the government and expand recruitment.

Key Takeaways:

• ISIS in Syria: Salafi-jihadi groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have increased their activity in Syria in May 2025. A Syrian Interior Ministry spokesperson noted the increase in activity after three recent raids targeting ISIS cells in May.

• Syrian IDP Camps and ISIS: The agreement between the Syrian government and Kurdish-dominated authorities in northeastern Syria to transfer internally displaced persons (IDPs) from al Hol camp may create an opportunity for ISIS to recruit new fighters and reengage supporters. Iraq began to repatriate thousands of ISIS-affiliated families and IDPs in 2021 and has faced immense challenges doing so since. The transitional government is still attempting to build a state with functioning institutions after Assad’s collapse, meaning it faces additional challenges that Iraq does not.

• Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran appears to be evaluating some offers regarding uranium enrichment following the fourth and fifth rounds of talks with the United States. US President Donald Trump warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu against taking any action to potentially jeopardize the US-Iran nuclear talks in a phone call on May 22, according to Axios.

• Syrian Insurgencies: Pro-Assad Alawite insurgent attacks targeting the Syrian transitional government and Sunni communities have become increasingly rare compared to the height of insurgent activity in March 2025. Multiple factors, including a lack of Alawite support, government pressure, and poorly executed insurgent operations, have probably contributed to the decrease in insurgent activity.

• Houthi Drone Capabilities: The Houthis may be attempting to increase the speed of their drones, which decreases the flight time of the drones and gives less warning to the target. The increased speed of Houthi drones is unlikely to meaningfully increase the likelihood they penetrate Israeli air defenses, given the distance involved. The increased speed could increase the threat to maritime shipping if the Houthis resume their attack campaign, however.

• Iran, Russia, and North Korea: Iran is continuing to strengthen ties with revisionist actors such as Russia and North Korea. An Iranian delegation led by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian arrived in Moscow on May 27 for the three-day 13th Moscow International Security Conference.

• Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Shia Coordination Framework announced on May 27 that it will run in the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections in Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al Din provinces in “unified alliances,” likely to ensure it does not split the vote between its constituent parties. The Framework probably feels less pressure to run as a unified list in the southern, Shia-dominated provinces, because there are fewer alternatives that could beat them.

Click Here to Read the Full Update

Website | Jobs & Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.