Iranian Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati discussed the threats that Iran perceives to its regional influence in an interview on August 9 that underscored Iran’s commitment to its strategic goals despite recent setbacks. Velayati’s statements demonstrate significant continuity between Iran’s pre- and post-war approach to the region and its use of the Axis of Resistance. Velayati reiterated Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance but notably highlighted the Houthis as a “gem” within the Iranian proxy and partner network. Velayati said that Iran will oppose US-supported efforts to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The Lebanese government, which the United States has pressured to disarm Hezbollah, agreed on August 7 to disarm Hezbollah. The United States has similarly pressured the Iraqi government to pass legislation that would disarm or reform the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which has been opposed by Iran’s Iraqi allies. Velayati held a phone call with the Iraqi State of Law coalition head and Iranian ally in Iraq, Nouri al Maliki, on August 8, in which Maliki emphasized that Iraq will not allow the United States to disarm the PMF, which suggests the pair discussed recent US efforts to undermine the PMF. Velayati also suggested that resistance groups will form in Syria to resist Israel. Khamenei and other Iranian officials have previously framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization, which is consistent with Iranian hopes before the Israel-Iran War.
Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani appears to be trying to secure Iranian interests in Iraq and Lebanon during planned visits to each country this week, amid Iranian concern about its regional influence. Larijani’s visits appear to be an effort to actualize the policy priorities outlined by Velayati. Larijani met separately with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Advisor Qassim al Araji on August 11. Iranian anti-regime media reported on August 11 that Larijani will encourage unidentified Shia parties to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law during his visit. CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, on which the Iraqi Parliament is yet to vote, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the PMF’s structures and responsibilities. Larijani will reportedly also discuss coalition formation ahead of the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections with unspecified Iraqi officials. Iran has previously encouraged Iranian-backed Iraqi parties to unite ahead of the elections to improve the likelihood that the parties will maintain control of the Iraqi parliament. Larijani and Araji also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to ”develop“ the 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement that required Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate members of Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border. This is probably an extension of Iran’s focus on internal security because Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can operate in Iran, which threatens the Iranian regime's stability. Iran has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border and may be concerned about the threat of Israel using these Kurdish groups to infiltrate Iran and transport materiel. Larijani will visit Beirut later this week to discuss “regional affairs” with unspecified Lebanese officials. Multiple Iranian officials have expressed their discontent with the Lebanese government’s initial steps to disarm Hezbollah over the last several weeks.
Larijani’s diplomatic efforts in Iraq and Lebanon strongly suggest that Larijani will take a more active approach toward implementing Iranian foreign policy in the region as SNSC secretary compared to his predecessor. Larijani’s visits after his appointment as SNSC secretary on August 5 suggest that his approach will be more hands-on compared to his predecessor, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, who served as a coordinator of Iran’s security apparatus rather than an executor. Pragmatic hardliner Larijani’s active role further suggests that moderate and pragmatic elements of the Iranian regime may begin to increase their engagement in Iranian foreign policy, particularly with its regional partners and proxies. Larijani has considerable experience engaging in Iranian foreign policy from his previous roles. | 
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