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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 16일

by Summa posted Aug 17, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약:

  • 다양한 미국 관리들은 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령이 일부 전쟁 종식 요구 사항에 대해 타협할 의향이 있을 수 있다고 밝혔지만, 푸틴의 발언과 러시아 관리들의 성명은 이러한 주장에 모순됩니다.
  • 푸틴이 트럼프와의 회담에서 도네츠크주 요구를 반복하고 자포리자주와 헤르손주에서 기한이 없는 제한적인 휴전을 제안한 것 외에 무엇을 제안했는지는 불분명합니다.
  • 푸틴의 도네츠크주 전체에 대한 요구는 알래스카 정상회담에서 나온 가장 명확하고 일관된 요구 사항입니다.
  • 그러나 우크라이나군은 푸틴의 요구에 따라 점령되지 않은 도네츠크주에서 전체 전역에 걸친 완전한 휴전 없이는 안전하고 질서 있는 철수를 수행할 수 없을 것입니다.
  • ISW(Institute for the Study of War, 전쟁연구소)는 우크라이나가 도네츠크주에서 철수할 경우 우크라이나의 방어 능력과 방위 산업 기지(DIB, Defense Industrial Base)가 약화되고 수십만 명의 우크라이나 민간인이 러시아 점령 하에 놓이게 될 것이라고 계속 평가합니다. 우크라이나는 향후 러시아의 침략을 억제하기 위해 강력한 국제 안보 보장과 국제 평화 유지군을 즉시 배치해야 할 것입니다.
  • 도네츠크주의 나머지 지역을 점령하는 것은 푸틴이 묘사하려는 것처럼 러시아군에게 빠른 노력이 아니라 수년이 걸리는 어려운 노력이 될 것입니다. 러시아군은 작전적으로 중요한 진격을 확보하거나 발걸음보다 빠르게 진격할 수 없는 상태입니다.
  • 푸틴이 우크라이나에서의 완전한 휴전을 거부하고 하르키우주와 수미주에서 러시아의 공세를 지속하고 있다는 것은 푸틴이 협상이 진행되는 동안 우크라이나 전쟁을 계속하려는 의도를 나타냅니다. 이는 드미트리 메드베데프 러시아 안전보장이사회 부의장이 환영한 점입니다.
  • 크렘린은 러시아 언론에 알래스카 정상회담을 두 초강대국 간의 회담으로 묘사하고, 우크라이나에서의 장기적인 전쟁 가능성에 대비하도록 러시아 사회를 지시한 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 우크라이나의 주권과 평화 협상을 훼손하고 러시아의 우크라이나 전쟁을 정당화하기 위한 수사적 캠페인을 계속하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 도브로필리아 북동쪽 러시아 침투 지역 내 여러 정착지를 정리한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 포크롭스크와 벨리코미하일리우카 인근에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 시베르스크 인근에서 진격했습니다.

분류:

국제 관계, 군사, 우크라이나 전쟁, 외교

관련 주요 국가:

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 미국

향후 전망:

현재 상황은 매우 유동적이며, 푸틴의 목표가 명확하지 않은 상태에서 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 높습니다. 도네츠크주를 둘러싼 전투가 격화될 것으로 예상되며, 협상은 여전히 불확실합니다. 러시아는 우크라이나의 주권을 훼손하고 여론을 조작하려는 시도를 지속할 것이며, 우크라이나는 국제적인 지원을 통해 방어력을 강화하고 영토를 지키기 위해 노력할 것입니다. 전쟁의 장기화는 우크라이나의 경제적 피해를 심화시키고, 러시아에 대한 국제 제재를 강화할 것입니다.

```

[원문]

August 16, 2025

Information Cutoff: 9:00 pm ET

Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan

TOPLINES

Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims. US President Donald Trump stated on August 16 that his meeting with Putin and subsequent call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European and NATO leaders were productive. Trump stated following that "all" determined that the best way to end Russia's war in Ukraine is to begin direct negotiations for a peace agreement, rather than a ceasefire agreement. Trump announced that he will meet with Zelensky at the White House on August 18 and that he and Zelensky may schedule a subsequent meeting with Putin if the August 18 meeting goes well. Trump did not specify whether the subsequent meeting with Putin will be bilateral or trilateral, though Trump told Fox News following the Alaska summit on August 15 that both Putin and Zelensky want Trump to attend a leader-level meeting. Axios correspondent Barak Ravid reported on August 16, citing an unspecified source who was on Trump's call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin expressed interest in a comprehensive settlement to end the war rather than a ceasefire and stated that "a quick peace agreement is better than a ceasefire." Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Trump stated on this call that Putin wants Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but noted that it is up to Ukraine to decide what to do with its territory. The sources told Bloomberg that Putin proposed to effectively freeze the front line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. The sources reported that Trump expressed the United States' readiness to contribute to security guarantees for Ukraine so long as the guarantees do not involve NATO, and that Trump suggested that Putin would accept this. Axios reported, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's phone call, that Trump informed Zelensky and the European leaders that Putin claimed that Russian forces were making significant battlefield progress and that Putin could seize all of Donetsk Oblast. The source told Axios that US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff briefed Zelensky and NATO leaders during the call on how Putin views territorial issues and what Putin is willing to give in return. The source reported that Witkoff informed the leaders that Putin is willing to end the war and commit to abstaining from seizing more Ukrainian territory and not to attack Ukraine or other countries in a new war.


It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated on August 16, after the Alaska Summit, that he did not know when Trump and Putin would meet again and that the subject of a trilateral meeting between Putin, Trump, and Zelensky has not been discussed. Ravid reported that a source briefed on Trump's talks with Putin stated that Putin proposed to freeze the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts in exchange for Ukraine's withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast and that the US delegation perceived that Putin is open to negotiations regarding Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Ravid reported that Putin requested that the United States recognize "these four oblasts" (presumably Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, although the reporting is not clear) and occupied Crimea as Russian. The Financial Times (FT) reported, citing four sources with direct knowledge of the talks, that Putin demanded that Ukrainian forces withdraw from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as a precondition for ending Russia’s war in Ukraine. Three of the sources told FT that Putin offered to freeze the frontline in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts and not to launch new attacks to seize additional territory (it is not clear if he meant in those two oblasts or elsewhere), in exchange for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Senior Russian officials and most sources speaking to Western media did not indicate that Putin mentioned Sumy or Kharkiv oblasts, which is notable because Russian forces are also conducting offensive operations in these regions. Newsmax White House correspondent Mike Carter reported on August 15, citing unspecified sources, that Putin dropped his objections to teaching the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and NATO states providing security guarantees to Ukraine that would enable NATO states to defend Ukraine if Russia violates any agreement. Carter reported that the unspecified sources stated that Russia and Ukraine still need to work out the definition and implementation of a ceasefire.


Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit. Putin may have also offered a limited ceasefire in southern Ukraine in exchange for Donetsk Oblast, but other details of Putin's offer to Trump remain unclear. Putin has established territorial demands over the remainder of Donetsk Oblast, which are typically the subject of war termination negotiations, as preconditions for any possible future ceasefire in Ukraine. A former senior Kremlin official suggested to FT that Putin is prepared to compromise on other issues, including territory, if Putin is satisfied that an agreement addresses the “root causes” of the war. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined root causes as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and has repeatedly invoked this phrase as shorthand for Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia and the resumption of Russian control over Ukraine. Putin's demand that any agreement address these "root causes" is not a compromise from his original war aims, and reports that Putin "compromised" on issues such as Ukraine's ability to teach its own language in its own country are designed to obfuscate Putin's actual unwillingness to compromise.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Various US officials indicated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may be willing to compromise on some war termination demands, but Putin's own statements and Russian official statements contradict these claims.


  • It is unclear what Putin offered in his meeting with Trump beyond reiterating his demand for Donetsk Oblast and offering a limited ceasefire with no known timeframe in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.


  • Putin’s demand for all of Donetsk Oblast is the most clear and consistent demand coming out of the Alaska Summit.


  • Ukrainian forces would not be able to conduct a safe and orderly withdrawal from unoccupied Donetsk Oblast in accordance with Putin's demand without a full ceasefire across the entire theater, however.


  • ISW continues to assess that a potential Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk Oblast would degrade Ukraine's defensive capabilities and defense industrial base (DIB) and put hundreds of thousands more Ukrainian civilians under Russian occupation. Ukraine would require robust international security guarantees and the immediate deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent to deter future Russian aggression.


  • Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would likely be a difficult and years-long effort for Russian forces rather than a quick effort as Putin likely aims to portray, as Russian forces remain unable to secure operationally significant advances or advance faster than a foot pace.


  • Putin's reported rejection of a full ceasefire in Ukraine and the ongoing Russian offensives in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts indicate that Putin intends to continue his war in Ukraine while negotiations are ongoing — a point that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev welcomed.


  • The Kremlin reportedly instructed Russian media outlets to present the Alaska summit as a meeting between two superpowers and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a protracted war in Ukraine.


  • Russian officials continue rhetorical campaigns designed to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and peace negotiations and to legitimize Russia's war in Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian forces likely cleared several settlements within the Russian penetration northeast of Dobropillya.


  • Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Siversk.

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