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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 19일

by Summa posted Aug 20, 2025
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```html 핵심 요약

핵심 요약

  • 이라크 국내 정치: 시아 코디네이션 프레임워크는 미국이 이란이 지원하는 인민동원군(PMF)을 해체하려는 노력에 대해 분열된 것으로 알려졌습니다. 시아 코디네이션 프레임워크 내의 분열은 2021년 이라크 총선에서 이란이 지원하는 그룹 간의 파벌 싸움이 다른 이라크 정당에 유리하게 작용하면서 두드러졌으며, 이는 다가오는 선거를 앞두고 더욱 주목할 만합니다.
  • 이란 내부 균열: 강경 언론과 관료들은 이란 정권 내 개혁파의 변화 요구에 부정적으로 반응하고 있습니다. 이는 전후 환경이 이란을 어떻게 통치하고 서방과 어떻게 관계를 맺을 것인지에 대한 개혁파와 강경파 간의 기존 균열을 심화시켰음을 보여줍니다.
  • 레바논 재건: 레바논 정부와 세계은행은 다음 주 초에 레바논 재건을 지원하기 위해 2억 5천만 달러 규모의 대출 계약을 체결할 것으로 알려졌습니다. 이 대출 계약은 레바논 정부가 재건을 통해 헤즈볼라가 국내 지지 기반을 유지하는 능력을 약화시키려는 노력의 일환일 가능성이 높습니다.

분류

정치, 국제 관계, 중동

관련 주요 국가

  1. 이라크
  2. 이란
  3. 레바논

향후 전망

중동 지역의 정치적 긴장과 분열은 계속될 것으로 예상됩니다. 이라크에서는 시아파 간의 갈등과 이란의 영향력 축소를 위한 미국의 노력이 복합적으로 작용하여 불안정성이 지속될 수 있습니다. 이란에서는 개혁파와 강경파 간의 갈등이 심화되면서 내부적인 혼란이 발생할 수 있으며, 이는 대외 정책에도 영향을 미칠 것입니다. 레바논의 재건 노력은 헤즈볼라의 영향력 약화를 목표로 하지만, 재건 과정에서의 어려움과 외부 지원의 불확실성으로 인해 성공 여부는 불투명합니다.

```

[원문]

August 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Carolyn Moorman, Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, Ben Schmida, Katherine Wells, William Doran, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

TOPLINES

The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose coalition of Shia political parties, some of which Iran backs. A source close to the Shia Coordination Framework told Iraqi media on August 19 that Shia Coordination Framework members are divided into two “camps,” with the first in support of challenging US objections to the PMF and the latter concerned about the threat of US sanctions and strikes targeting Iraq. The United States has repeatedly pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the PMF and reportedly threatened to sanction PMF leaders. The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. This report of Shia Coordination Framework divisions comes amid a broader debate within Iraq about limiting the transfer of arms to the Iraqi state and efforts by Iranian-backed Iraqi political actors to pass the Popular Mobilization Authority Law. CTP-ISW assessed on August 6 that this law, which the Iraqi Parliament has yet to vote on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key PMF structures, like the al Muhandis General Company, as part of the Iraqi government. This company is controlled by Iranian-backed factions and acquired land along the Iraq-Saudi Arabia border that Iraqi groups used to launch drones targeting Saudi Arabia. The law nominally subordinates the PMF to the defense minister via the head of the future Popular Mobilization Authority, but the PMF has officially answered to the prime minister since 2016 without answering to the prime minister in reality. The US State Department spokesperson confirmed on August 12 that the United States opposes the law.


Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s official website said in an August 18 article that recent remarks by reformists were similar to a “quiet multimedia influence campaign” conducted by the United States and Israel, and alleged that the reformists seek to promote division within Iran over issues such as nuclear policy and uranium enrichment specifically. The article indicates that the Supreme Leader continues to reject any zero uranium enrichment demands. This statement from the Supreme Leader’s office comes after reformists have called for political reform and foreign policy shifts. The Reformist Front published a statement on August 18 outlining eleven demands, including lifting restrictions on reformist leaders, allowing free elections, reforming women’s rights laws, lifting censorship, and suspending uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. Former President Hassan Rouhani advocated on August 13 for reducing tensions with the West and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on August 19 that reformists are conceding to Western pressure, and Tasnim warned that “trusting the enemy“ could threaten regime stability. Another IRGC-affiliated outlet dismissed the Reformist Front’s statement as a “blueprint” for selling Iran’s independence and accused reformists of spreading American and Israeli propaganda. Assembly of Experts Secretary Abbas Kaabi similarly said that the statement repeated “the enemy’s narrative” and focused too narrowly on internal problems rather than external threats.


The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction. This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to decrease support for Hezbollah. Lebanese Finance Minister Yassin Jaber announced on August 13 that the Lebanese cabinet authorized him to sign the agreement, which the World Bank previously approved in June 2025. The loan agreement is dedicated to rebuilding infrastructure and clearing the remaining rubble in Lebanon from Israeli operations since September 2024. Lebanon has reportedly received an initial installment of 75 million euros from France and 20 million USD from Iraq, which the Lebanese Finance Ministry has started to allocate to reconstruction efforts in Beirut’s southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, which were heavily damaged during the Israeli campaign in Lebanon. The 250 million USD loan will serve as the initial funding for a 1 billion USD financing program that aims to launch reconstruction and recovery efforts in Lebanon. International organizations and entities will reportedly provide the remaining 750 million dollars in grants. The Lebanese Parliament will vote on the loan in early September 2025.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Iraqi Domestic Politics: The Shia Coordination Framework is reportedly divided over US efforts to dissolve the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Division among the Shia Coordination Framework is notable ahead of the elections due to the way that factional infighting between Iranian-backed groups advantaged other Iraqi parties over Iranian-backed parties in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections.


  • Iranian Internal Fissures: Hardline media and officials are negatively responding to recent reformist calls for change within the Iranian regime, which highlights how the post-war environment has deepened existing fissures between reformists and hardliners over how to govern Iran and engage the West.



  • Lebanon’s Reconstruction: The Lebanese government and the World Bank will reportedly sign a 250 million USD loan agreement early next week that seeks to support Lebanon’s reconstruction. This loan agreement is likely part of the Lebanese government’s efforts to use reconstruction fronts to weaken Hezbollah’s ability to maintain its domestic support base.

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