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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 19일

by Summa posted Aug 20, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약

  • 러시아 외무장관 세르게이 라브로프는 크렘린의 우크라이나 목표가 도네츠크주와 같은 특정 우크라이나 영토를 점령하는 것이 아니라, 우크라이나 전체를 정치적으로 통제하는 것이라고 정확하게 언급했습니다.
  • 러시아는 다른 수단을 통해 우크라이나를 장악하는 데 실패한 후 2022년 전면적인 침공을 시작했습니다.
  • 러시아는 마찬가지로, 북대서양 조약 기구(NATO, 나토) 국가를 포함하여 다른 구소련 국가들의 내부 통치에 영향력을 행사하여, 사실상 그들의 주권을 부인하고 독립적인 통치를 위협하는 조건을 설정하려 합니다.
  • 라브로프는 러시아가 우크라이나에 대한 서방의 안보 보장을 수용할 수도 있다는 제안을 암묵적으로 거부했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나군이 도브로필랴 인근에서 러시아 침투를 정리하는 데 대응하여 반격을 시도하는 것으로 보이며, 우크라이나군이 침투 기지를 점점 더 위협하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아의 침투 전술과 포크롭스크 방향의 낮은 병력 밀도는 러시아군이 적어도 일시적으로 도브로필랴 동쪽 및 남동쪽에서 제한적인 전술적 기동을 회복하도록 허용한 것으로 보입니다.
  • 우크라이나와 러시아는 8월 19일 전투에서 사망한 군인(KIA, 전사)들의 시신을 교환했습니다.
  • 우크라이나 당국은 2024년 여름 하르키우주의 보우찬스크에서 두 명의 우크라이나 전쟁 포로(POWs, 포로)를 처형한 혐의로 러시아 제82기계화소총연대 소속 군인을 연루시켰습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 포크롭스크 인근과 벨리코미하일리우카에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 차시우 야르와 토레츠크 인근에서 진격했습니다.

분류

국제 정치, 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁

관련 주요 국가

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 미국

향후 전망

러시아는 우크라이나 전체를 정치적으로 통제하려는 목표를 지속할 것으로 보이며, 이는 장기적인 분쟁의 가능성을 시사합니다. 러시아는 구소련 국가들에 대한 영향력 행사를 시도하고, 서방의 안보 보장을 거부할 가능성이 높습니다. 전선에서는 치열한 전투가 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 양측 모두 영토를 확보하기 위한 노력을 지속할 것입니다. 전쟁 포로 교환과 같은 인도주의적 노력은 계속될 수 있지만, 갈등의 근본적인 해결은 쉽지 않을 것으로 보입니다.

```

[원문]

August 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 10:30 pm ET

Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

TOPLINES

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast. Lavrov claimed in a televised interview on August 19 that the Kremlin has "never talked about the need to seize any territories" from Ukraine and that Russia's goal was not to seize Crimea, Donbas, or other areas of Ukraine. The claim seems bizarre in the context of Russia's repeated demands that Ukraine and the West recognize Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory, including territory Russian forces do not control. It reflects the deeper Russian aims in Ukraine, however, quite accurately. Lavrov reiterated that Russia's war objectives concern "protecting" the people in Ukraine from the Ukrainian government, which the Kremlin falsely portrays as illegitimate and oppressive. Lavrov's description of the Kremlin's aim to "protect" Ukrainians from their own government reflects the fact that the Kremlin seeks to remove the democratically elected Ukrainian government and replace it with a pro-Russian government that would allow the Kremlin to control Ukraine without needing to fight for physical control over territory or annex it. Lavrov notably made demands during the interview that reject Ukraine's sovereignty including that Ukraine repeal laws regarding language and religion that are the proper concern only of the government of a sovereign state. Lavrov stated explicitly "there can be no talk of any long-term [peace] agreements" with Ukraine "without respect" for Russia's security and the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, as "these are the reasons that must be urgently eliminated in the context of a settlement." The Kremlin's continued insistence on controlling Ukrainian domestic affairs reflects the arguments made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his 2021 essay arguing that Ukraine should not exist independently of Russia.


Lavrov's August 19 statement further emphasizes the Kremlin's broader objective of obtaining full political control over Ukraine before Russia ends its war. Considering Russia's territorial demands separately from demands concealed by its references to "root causes" obscures the reality that the Kremlin views its war demands as indivisible – the Kremlin aims to accomplish all of these goals and has shown no willingness to compromise any of them or sacrifice some for others to facilitate or complete a peace process. The Kremlin has repeatedly defined its war aims as Ukrainian demilitarization, government change in favor of a pro-Russian proxy government, and Ukrainian commitments barring it from joining NATO and other international alliances. Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated throughout the war and negotiations process that Russia will achieve these war aims either militarily or diplomatically in line with Lavrov's August 19 statements.


Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means. Russia has long attempted to exert control over former Soviet states through continuing cognitive warfare efforts. Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution, in which the Ukrainian people protested for a transparent Western-style government, threatened effective Russian control over Ukraine and prompted the Kremlin to launch a series of cognitive warfare efforts in order to stop and reverse the loss of Russian influence in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin accelerated his efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty following the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution that drove out Ukraine’s Russia-friendly president, Viktor Yanukovych, and in favor of a democratically elected, pro-Western government. Russia illegally occupied and annexed Crimea in response, accelerated hybrid operations, and backed separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. Putin tried to force Ukraine to legitimize the Russia-invented Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) in the 2015 Minsk II accords that established the ceasefire that Russia broke fully in 2022. The Kremlin pressured Ukraine to extend the legal limited autonomy of the regions in December 2019 and to enshrine broader autonomy for Donbas as a constituent part of Ukraine into the Ukrainian Constitution so that the DNR and LNR could serve as conduits for Russian influence in and ultimately control over the government in Kyiv, but Ukraine rejected this effort. The Kremlin ultimately launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 after this failure to bring Ukraine back under Russian control. Putin has long denied Ukrainian sovereignty and alleged that Ukrainians have always belonged to the Russian nation because of their shared "historical and spiritual space." Putin used these claims as part of his justification for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which was the culmination of eight years of failed efforts to regain control of Ukraine through hybrid warfare campaigns.


Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance. Russian officials are setting informational conditions to justify exerting control over former Soviet states, including NATO members Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, by denying the legality of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin asserts its right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Baltic States by prosecuting officials who remove Soviet-era war monuments and citizens who graffiti them within these states’ sovereign territories in absentia under Russian law that does not apply to those states. Russia notably launched one of the first ever cyberattacks against Estonia in response to the Estonian government's decision to relocate a Soviet "Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn." Russian efforts to exert control over the Baltics has failed. Russia has been much more successful in establishing control over both Belarus and Georgia, however, by launching hybrid operations in both countries and backing pro-Russian governments that are loyal to the Kremlin. The Kremlin now seeks to bring Belarus further into Russian control through the Union State framework and to eliminate the facade of an independent Belarus completely.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accurately stated that the Kremlin's objective in Ukraine is to politically control all of Ukraine rather than to seize select Ukrainian territories such as Donetsk Oblast.


  • Russia launched the full-scale invasion in 2022 after failing to secure control over Ukraine by other means.


  • Russia similarly seeks to exert influence over the internal governance of other former Soviet countries, including NATO states, effectively denying their sovereignty and setting conditions to threaten their independent governance.
  • Lavrov implicitly rejected suggestions that Russia might accept Western security guarantees for Ukraine.


  • Russian forces appear to be attempting to counterattack Ukrainian forces clearing the Russian infiltration near Dobropillya as Ukrainian forces increasingly threaten the base of the penetration.


  • Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction have seemingly allowed Russian forces to restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya —at least temporarily.


  • Ukraine and Russia conducted another exchange of the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA) on August 19.


  • Ukrainian authorities implicated a soldier of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment in the executions of two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Vovchansk, Kharkiv Oblast in Summer 2024.


  • Ukrainian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar and Toretsk.

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