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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 21일

by Summa posted Aug 22, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약

다음은 기사의 주요 내용을 요약한 것입니다.

  • 크렘린은 2022년 이스탄불 협상이 우크라이나 전쟁에 대한 향후 협상의 유일하게 수용 가능한 출발점이라고 지속적으로 주장하며, 러시아와 그 동맹국이 우크라이나에 대한 서방 군사 지원을 거부할 권리를 보유하고, 우크라이나가 향후 러시아의 공격에 무력하게 남겨지도록 요구하고 있습니다.
  • 크렘린은 미국이 지원하는 우크라이나에 대한 안보 보장을 계속해서 전면 거부하고, 우크라이나 전체를 장악하려는 지속적인 목표를 드러내고 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 인도를 포섭하기 위해 상당한 외교적 노력을 기울이고 있으며, 이는 크렘린이 2차 제재의 영향을 여전히 두려워한다는 것을 시사합니다.
  • 러시아는 8월 20일 밤부터 21일 사이에 우크라이나를 상대로 전쟁 중 세 번째로 큰 규모의 공격을 감행하여 우크라이나 서부 지역을 목표로 삼았으며, 민간 기반 시설에 상당한 피해를 입혔습니다.
  • 우크라이나 국방 산업 기반(DIB)은 장거리 무기의 생산을 지속적으로 혁신하고 확대하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 국방부는 전 북부군 및 레닌그라드 군관구 사령관인 알렉산더 라핀 대령을 러시아 육군 참모총장인 예브게니 니키포로프 대령으로 공식 교체했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 노보파블리우카 인근에서 진격했고, 러시아군은 최근 차시우 야르 인근에서 진격했습니다.

분류

전쟁, 외교, 군사

관련 주요 국가

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 미국
  • 인도

향후 전망

러시아는 우크라이나 전체 장악 목표를 포기하지 않고 있으며, 협상 조건으로 이스탄불 협상안을 고수하며 우크라이나를 무력화하려 할 것입니다. 2차 제재 회피를 위해 인도를 비롯한 국가와의 외교적 노력을 지속할 것입니다. 우크라이나 국방 산업 기반의 성장은 러시아와의 군사적 대치 구도를 강화시킬 것으로 보입니다. 전쟁의 장기화는 민간 기반 시설에 대한 공격과 전선에서의 교착 상태를 심화시킬 수 있습니다.

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[원문]

August 21, 2025

Information Cutoff: 6:15 pm ET

Olivia Gibson, Daria Novikov, Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Jennie Olmsted, Karolina Hird and Frederick W. Kagan

TOPLINES

The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated during a joint press conference with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on August 21 that Russia will proceed on the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine based on its experience with the 2015 Minsk II agreement and 2022 Istanbul negotiations. Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations were based on the concept of "eliminating the root causes" of the war in Ukraine, referencing the Kremlin’s oft-evoked accusation that the "root causes" of the war include NATO’s eastward expansion and Ukraine’s alleged discrimination against Russian speakers and the Moscow-linked Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Lavrov claimed that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have ensured Ukraine’s security "honestly and collectively" via a group of guarantor countries including United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members, Germany, and Turkey. Lavrov similarly stated on August 20 during a meeting with Jordanian officials that Russia was ready to sign on to an agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations and that those negotiations are a “good example” of a way to negotiate an end to the war.


Lavrov’s recent statements lauding the 2022 Istanbul negotiations suggest that the Kremlin has selected Lavrov to be the predominant amplifier of the longstanding Russian narrative that the Istanbul negotiations are the necessary starting point for negotiations. An agreement based on the 2022 Istanbul negotiations would have crippled Ukraine by permanently banning it from joining NATO, imposing draconian limitations on the size of the Ukrainian military, and prohibiting Ukraine from receiving any Western military assistance. The draft agreement also demanded that Russia and the UNSC, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC, a key Russian ally), be granted the status of guarantor states and that guarantor states must act in concert in the event of a violation of the agreement, which would allow Russia to veto Western military assistance for Ukraine. The draft Istanbul agreement notably imposes no limitations on Russia’s military capabilities—effectively neutering Ukraine politically and militarily while protecting Russia’s ability to reinvade Ukraine in the future on much more favorable terms even than it faced in 2022. The Kremlin likely understands that the 2022 Istanbul framework is a non-starter for Kyiv and therefore continues to invoke it in an effort to paint Ukraine as unwilling to negotiate while Moscow continues to delay good-faith peacemaking efforts.


The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev explicitly rejected US- and European-led efforts to provide Ukraine with reliable security guarantees by reiterating on his English-language X (formerly Twitter) account on August 20 that "[Russia has] explicitly stated: No NATO troops as peacekeepers" and that Russia will not accept such a security guarantee. Medvedev claimed that Ukraine does not need such security guarantees, contrary to the Trump administration's position on Ukraine's need for robust security guarantees. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on August 21 that Ukraine should emulate Finland's negotiation model following World War II and become a neutral state and cede part of its territory and that negotiations will be based on battlefield dynamics. State Duma Deputy Dmitry Belik echoed Zhuravlev's sentiments by claiming that Ukraine's attempts to alter its own territorial borders ignores the realities on the ground. Kremlin officials often use the idea of "realities on the ground" to claim that Russia is in a superior position on the battlefield and to demand that Ukraine concede to Russia's demands. Chairperson of the Russian Federation Council Committee on International Affairs Grigory Karasin claimed on August 21 that stakeholders must understand that Russia is concerned about its strategic security vis a vis Europe and NATO and that this raises questions about the overall viability of the entire negotiation process. Several Kremlin officials claimed that Russia is defending new territories that are enshrined in Russia's Constitution and therefore international recognition of Russia's annexation is unnecessary, obfuscating the fact that Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea and Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts is illegal under international law. Kherson Oblast occupation governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that Donbas and Novorossiya – which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine – are original Russian lands and cannot be part of any territorial concession to Ukraine. Russian reserve Colonel Viktor Baranets claimed on August 20 that Russia may allow European peacekeeping troops in Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine ceding all of its southern oblasts, including Odesa, Mykolaiv, and perhaps Kharkiv, to Russia. Russia notably does not occupy any part of Odesa Oblast and occupies slivers of Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Kremlin continues to insist that the 2022 Istanbul negotiations are the only acceptable departure point for potential future negotiations on the war in Ukraine, thereby demanding that Russia and its allies reserve the right to veto any Western military assistance to Ukraine and that Ukraine be left neutered and defenseless against future Russian aggression.


  • The Kremlin continues to categorically reject US-backed security guarantees for Ukraine and reveal its continued objectives of seizing control of all of Ukraine.


  • Russia is expending considerable diplomatic effort to court India, suggesting that the Kremlin continues to fear the impact of secondary sanctions.


  • Russia launched the third largest strike of the war thus far against Ukraine on the night of August 20 to 21, targeting Western regions of Ukraine and causing significant damage to civilian infrastructure.


  • The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to innovate and scale production of long-range weapons.


  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) officially confirmed that it replaced former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar.

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