Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani gave an interview on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s website on August 22 in which he discussed Iran’s post-war defense and considerations for future conflicts. Larijani warned that adversaries may seek new opportunities to attack Iran and that Iran must correct its defensive flaws and rebuild deterrence. Israel’s strikes during the 12 Day War severely damaged Iranian nuclear and military facilities and killed nuclear scientists and senior commanders. The Israeli campaign and US strikes demonstrated Iran’s defensive gaps and inability to deter its adversaries. Larijani stated that the Defense Council works as a subsidiary body tasked exclusively with military readiness and fixing deficiencies in the armed forces. The SNSC established the Defense Council on August 3 to address systemic operational failures during the Israel-Iran War and to take “rapid, balanced, and coordinated” steps against future threats.” Larijani stated that Iran is focusing on improving air defense and radar systems and strengthening its missile force. Larijani added that Iran relies mainly on domestic production but also buys some military equipment from abroad. Iran previously sought to strengthen defense cooperation with China following the war, including by showing interest in acquiring PRC systems such as the J-10 fighter jet and AWACS to compensate for wartime losses and upgrade air defense capabilities. Larijani also highlighted that Iran must recognize the war has not ended but has only paused.
Larijani reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to support the Axis of Resistance and framed resistance groups as natural responses to “foreign aggression.” Larijani stressed that Iran considers the Axis of Resistance a genuine and strategic asset. Iran previously used the Axis as a key deterrent against the United States and Israel, but the Axis of Resistance has been badly degraded over the past two years of fighting with Israel. Larijani compared Iran’s support for regional allies to US support for Israel and warned that abandoning them would be “political insanity.” Larijani rejected the idea that Hezbollah or other groups burden Iran and insisted that they both assist Iran and rely on Iranian support. Larijani characterized the relationship with Hezbollah and other partner groups as “brothers” rather than “subordinates.” This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Axis of Resistance is an unconventional alliance that Iran leads. Some groups in the Axis are proxies, while Iran exerts more limited influence over other groups. Larijani’s inaugural visits to Lebanon and Iraq attempted to demonstrate that Iran has not abandoned its partners in the Axis, but Larijani offered very little visible, tangible support during those visits.
Larijani criticized international pressure on Iran from Western countries and accused the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of "partisanship” against Iran during the 12 Day War. Larijani accused IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi of giving a “blank check” to the United States and Israel during the 12 Day War. Larijani claimed that Grossi “completely gave up and surrendered” and called the agency’s silence after Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities “truly disgraceful.” Larijani questioned the value of continued cooperation with the IAEA but stopped short of calling for withdrawal from the NPT, saying instead that the treaty has had “no value” for Iran. Iranian officials repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the NPT if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback sanction mechanism at the end of August. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments. The snapback mechanism expires on October 18, 2025, but the E3 would need to initiate the snapback process at the end of August in order to meet the October 18 deadline. | 
[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 22일
[ISW] 중국-대만 주간 업데이트, 2025년 8월 22일
