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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 23일

by Summa posted Aug 24, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약 body { font-family: Arial, sans-serif; line-height: 1.6; margin: 20px; } h1 { color: #333; text-align: center; } ul { list-style-type: disc; padding-left: 20px; } li { margin-bottom: 10px; } a { color: #007bff; text-decoration: none; } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } .warning { color: red; }

주요 내용 요약

  • 러시아 외무부 (MFA)는 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴이 미국 대통령 도널드 트럼프가 선호하는 일정에 맞춰 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키와의 회담을 거부하고 있음을 계속해서 명확히 밝히고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 외무부의 "라브로프가 평화 프로세스를 훼손하지 않는다. 라브로프는 푸틴의 외교 정책 지시를 실행하고 있기 때문이다"라는 주장은, 푸틴 자신이 평화 프로세스의 걸림돌임을 정확하게 지적하고 있습니다.
  • 푸틴은 우크라이나 평화 프로세스에 실질적으로 참여하지 않으면서, 미-러 양자 관계에서 미국으로부터 양보를 얻으려는 노력을 지속하고 있습니다.
  • 트럼프는 우크라이나 전쟁 종식을 위한 현재의 평화 협상 상황에 대해 불만을 표시했습니다.
  • 우크라이나의 장거리 공격이 러시아 정유 시설을 타겟으로 하고, 서방 제재와 정유 시설 현대화 노력의 어려움이 겹치면서, 러시아의 연료 비축에 영향을 미치고 있으며, 이는 석유 수입을 위협할 수 있습니다.
  • 크렘린은 러시아와 국경을 접한 NATO 국가에 대한 GPS 및 통신 방해를 포함하는 하이브리드 작전을 강화할 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 전직 러시아 군인은 전장에서 러시아 군 지휘부의 계층이 우크라이나 전쟁 포로 (POW)의 처형을 부하에게 직접 명령하고 있다는 ISW (Institute for the Study of War, 전쟁연구소)의 평가를 확인했습니다.
  • 최근 러시아군은 토레츠크와 포크로브스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크


경고: 위의 링크는 현재 시점의 정보를 기준으로 하며, 상황은 빠르게 변동될 수 있습니다. 최신 정보를 확인하려면 각 링크에서 제공하는 추가 자료를 참고하는 것이 좋습니다. 또한, 모든 출처가 완전히 신뢰할 수 있는 것은 아니므로, 여러 출처를 통해 정보를 검증하는 것이 중요합니다.

```

[원문]

August 23, 2025

Information Cutoff: 11:30 am ET

Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan 

TOPLINES

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump's preferred timeline. The Russian MFA rejected on August 22 Western media accusations that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is undermining the peace process with his recent statements, including by rejecting Western security guarantees for Ukraine. The Russian MFA explicitly stated that Lavrov's statements represent the Kremlin's position, which the MFA stated is "distinguished by consistency" and has not changed following the August 15 Alaska Summit. The Russian MFA reiterated Lavrov’s statements from August 20 and 21, which stated that any serious discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine that do not "take into account" Russia's own "legitimate concerns" are a “road to nowhere.” The Russian MFA also reiterated Lavrov's August 21 statement that Russia favors collective security guarantees that are “truly reliable” and cited the Russian demands presented to Ukraine during the 2022 Istanbul Ukraine-Russia negotiations as containing such guarantees. Those demands would have permanently prohibited Ukraine from joining NATO, imposed severe limitations on the Ukrainian military, and banned Ukraine from receiving Western military assistance without imposing any restrictions on the size or capability of Russian forces. The Russian MFA stated that Lavrov's August 20 and 21 statements are consistent with Putin’s August 15 demand that any peace agreement address the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine, which the Kremlin has repeatedly defined as NATO's eastward expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers. The Russian MFA emphasized that Lavrov’s "statements confirm the theses" about the war in Ukraine that Putin has "repeatedly voiced." The Russian MFA stated that Putin sets Russian foreign policy and Lavrov, as the foreign minister, implements Russian foreign policy according to Putin's directive, and that Lavrov is therefore not undermining Russian foreign policy objectives.


The Russian MFA's statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin's foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains uninterested in pursuing serious peace negotiations and maintains his long-standing war aims that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation.


Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine. Putin stated on August 22 that Trump's assuming the presidency in 2025 was a "light at the end of the tunnel" in US-Russian bilateral relations and that his meeting with Trump in Alaska was "very good and meaningful." Putin stated that he hopes this meeting is part of "first steps" for the "full-scale restoration" of US-Russian bilateral relations and that the onus is now on the United States to restore relations because the United States is bound by certain international agreements. Putin has long sought to restore bilateral US-Russian negotiations to divert attention from the war in Ukraine, obtain concessions from the United States, and continue his war in Ukraine without further sanctions or other penalties. Putin continues to emphasize the prospects for improving bilateral US-Russia relations even as the Trump administration insists that Putin meet Zelensky to conclude a peace before restoring relations. Putin evidently still hopes that Trump will engage economically with Russia even if he offers no meaningful concessions to make peace. Putin's concern is likely growing under the threat of further US sanctions on Russia and its allies that could hinder Russia's war effort.


KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) continues to spell out Russian President Vladimir Putin's rejection of a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on US President Donald Trump's preferred timeline.


  • The Russian MFA's statement that Lavrov is not undermining the peace process because Lavrov is executing Putin's foreign policy directives is an accurate assertion that Putin himself is the impediment to the peace process.


  • Putin continues efforts to obtain concessions from the United States in the US-Russian bilateral relationship without meaningfully engaging in the peace process in Ukraine.


  • Trump expressed frustration with the current state of peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian long-range strikes campaign targeting Russian oil refineries, Western sanctions, and struggling refinery modernization efforts in tandem are impacting Russia's fuel reserves and could threaten oil revenues.


  • The Kremlin is likely escalating its hybrid campaign involving GPS and communications jamming against NATO states bordering Russia.



  • A former Russian servicemember confirmed ISW's assessment that echelons of the Russian military command on the battlefield are actively ordering subordinates to execute Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).



  • Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk.


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