|
Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) landing ship
in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea on the night of February 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR)
published footage on February 14 showing Ukrainian maritime drones striking the Caesar Kunikov Ropucha-class landing ship off the coast of occupied Alupka, Crimea. The GUR reported that maritime drone strikes caused the ship to sink and stated that Russian
search and rescue operations were not successful. The GUR stated that the Caesar Kunikov was the largest amphibious landing ship of its project 775 type. Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged at least five BSF landing ships since the Russian full-scale
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk stated that only five of 13 BSF landing ships that Russia had at the start of the full-scale invasion remain “in service” and that “four ships are under
repair, four are destroyed, and five are still in the ranks.” Ukrainian strikes damaging and sinking BSF landing ships further reduce Russia’s ability to conduct amphibious operations, although ISW continues to assess that Russia is unlikely to conduct an
amphibious landing operation in Ukraine since Russian naval infantry are deployed across Ukraine and a Ukrainian strike campaign in summer and fall 2023 successfully sequestered the BSF to the eastern part of the Black Sea.
Ukraine reportedly continues efforts to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel
by using more advanced systems and equipment, although continued delays in Western security assistance will undermine these efforts. Ukrainian Deputy Defense
Minister Lieutenant General Ivan Havrylyuk stated in an interview published on February 14 that Ukraine cannot compete with Russia in the number of artillery shells, tanks, and soldiers that Russia can generate but that Ukraine can achieve an advantage on
the battlefield by using high-tech weapons. Havrylyuk stated that Ukrainian forces have proven that a well-trained army with more advanced weapons can defeat an enemy with numerical superiority in manpower and equipment. Havrylyuk argued that Ukrainian forces
have superior strike capabilities that have previously allowed Ukraine to degrade Russian logistics and combat capabilities. Havrylyuk stressed that Ukraine only has these superior capabilities when it has enough long-range high-precision munitions and enough
ammunition for Western-provided artillery systems that have longer ranges and better accuracy than Russian artillery systems. Havrylyuk specifically highlighted Ukrainian efforts to integrate strike drone capabilities throughout the Ukrainian Armed Forces
at scale and noted that Ukraine aims to gradually increase the proportion of machines to people on the battlefield.
Havrylyuk acknowledged that Ukrainian progress in expanding drone operations does not replace Ukraine’s
need for advanced artillery systems and other long-range capabilities, however. Havrylyuk stated that the war in Ukraine demonstrates that artillery plays a key role on the battlefield and noted that Ukrainian MLRS and artillery units have caused the majority
of Russia’s losses in Ukraine. Havrylyuk stated that drones have certain advantages over artillery, specifically in cost, but are more susceptible to external factors such as Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and natural factors, likely referencing weather. The
drones that Ukrainian forces currently possess are not able to generate certain battlefield effects that artillery can achieve, such as the destruction of field fortifications, and most Ukrainian drones cannot reliably destroy Russian armored vehicles as artillery
can. Havrylyuk argued that Ukraine needs to focus on combined operations using drones and artillery systems to increase the accuracy of Ukrainian fires and conserve artillery ammunition. Ukraine’s ability to conduct such combined operations currently relies
on Western provisions of artillery shells, and Havrylyuk acknowledged that shell shortages continue to affect Ukrainian capabilities and force Ukraine to adjust operational plans.
Key Takeaways:
-
Ukrainian forces successfully sank another Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) landing ship in the Black Sea off the southern coast of occupied Crimea on the night of
February 13 to 14.
-
Ukraine reportedly continues efforts to offset Russian advantages in manpower and materiel by using more advanced systems and equipment, although continued delays
in Western security assistance will undermine these efforts.
-
Russia is similarly pursuing battlefield advantages through technological innovation despite its focus on generating manpower and materiel in greater mass than
Ukraine.
-
Russian authorities may be generating enough new forces to sustain losses generated by the current tempo of their offensive operations in Ukraine through 2025.
-
The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) stated that the Russian military’s ongoing restructuring and expansion effort aims to intensify Russian military
posturing against Finland and the wider NATO alliance.
-
The Kremlin is conducting information operations against Moldova very similar to those that the Kremlin used before its invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022,
likely to set conditions to justify possible future Russian escalation against Moldova.
-
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenburg stated on February 14 that NATO does not see any immediate threat of military attacks on a NATO member but noted that there
is a “constant risk” of hybrid attacks.
-
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov denied recent Western reports that Russia recently proposed freezing the conflict in Ukraine.
-
Russia reportedly is developing space-based anti-satellite weapon.
-
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Marinka, and Krynky amid continued positional fighting along the entire line of contact on February
14.
-
Russia continues efforts to expand its defense industrial base (DIB).
-
Russian authorities continue efforts to militarize and culturally indoctrinate youth and students in occupied Ukraine into Russian identity and ideology.
|
[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 2월 14일
[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 2월 13일