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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 1월 9일

by 맘씨 posted Jan 10, 2024
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan


January 9, 2024, 7:35pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) published a survey on December 18, 2023, that it conducted between November 29 and December 9, 2023, that shows that 96 percent of respondents support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, 88 percent trust Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and 66 percent trust Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 84 percent of respondents in a previous KMIS poll conducted in December 2022 expressed trust in Zelensky, and trust in many Ukrainian institutions experienced a similar decline between December 2022 and 2023 – an unsurprising development given the protracted war. The Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU), the Ukrainian National Police, and Ukrainian volunteers did not see similar decreases in polled public trust during this time.


Ukrainian sentiments in December 2022 were likely more optimistic than in November and December 2023 because Ukrainian forces had recently liberated large portions of occupied territory in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts during successful counteroffensive operations in the fall of 2022. Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive operations in 2022 liberated the strategic regional capital city of Kherson, pushed the frontline away from several major Ukrainian population centers, and turned these cities into near rear and rear areas, which may have allowed more Ukrainians to focus on domestic issues of local governance throughout 2023 instead of the imminent existential threat of Russian military activity and occupation they faced in 2022.


The KMIS poll also shows that the majority of respondents support both Zelensky and Zaluzhnyi and that only 15 percent held polarized opinions supporting one and not the other. Russian sources have widely promoted Kremlin information operations alleging a serious rift between Ukrainian military and civilian leadership and have routinely attempted to portray domestic issues in Ukraine as significantly undermining the Ukrainian will to fight. These Russian information operations aim to break Ukrainians‘ trust in their leadership and weaken Ukrainian morale while also decreasing Western support for Ukraine by falsely portraying Ukrainian society as demoralized and divided. The KMIS poll suggests that these Russian information operations are far from reality and that the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine remains highly unlikely to break Ukrainian support for Ukraine‘s military and civilian leadership and the Ukrainian will to fight.


Key Takeaways:


  • A Ukrainian public opinion survey on Ukrainian attitudes towards the Ukrainian government and military indicates that Ukrainian society overwhelmingly supports Ukraine’s military and its leadership while experiencing tensions typical in a society fighting an existential defensive war.


  • A new independent poll from the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center (NORC) found that Russian President Vladimir Putin maintains strong domestic support for his regime and his war in Ukraine, despite relatively poor economic conditions and living standards in Russia.


  • Russian ultranationalist vitriolic responses to gender integration in the Ukrainian military highlight Russia's ongoing shift towards a cultural-ideological worldview that seeks to restore rigid and traditional gender roles and exposes gaps between Russia and Ukraine's respective abilities to mobilize their own societies.


  • Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukraine has a shortage of anti-aircraft guided missiles after several recent large Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine.


  • Russian sources continue to complain about persistent command and communication problems that degrade Russian combat capability in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.


  • Russian sources are reviving longstanding calls for a large-scale Russian offensive operation in Kharkiv Oblast to create a “buffer zone” with Belgorod Oblast despite the Russian military’s likely inability to conduct an operation to seize significant territory in Kharkiv Oblast in the near term.


  • Recent Kremlin and Russian media rhetoric aimed at threatening Moldova likely continues to embolden pro-Russian separatist leaders in Moldova to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.


  • Bloomberg reported that officials from Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries, India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other unspecified countries held a meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia on December 16 to build support for Ukrainian conditions to negotiate with Russia.


  • Russian forces made confirmed advances southwest of Donetsk City, and positional engagements continued along the entire frontline.


  • The Russian military is reportedly abusing Serbian nationals whom Russian officials have recruited to serve in Russian formations in Ukraine.


  • Russian occupation officials continue the systematic oppression of residents of occupied Crimea using law enforcement and administrative means.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



[요약]

**러시아 침공 평가** **요약** * 우크라이나 국민의 우크라이나 정부와 군에 대한 태도에 대한 우크라이나 여론 조사에 따르면 우크라이나 사회는 전반적으로 우크라이나 군과 지도부를 지지하는 반면, 실존적 방어 전쟁을 치르는 사회에서 일반적으로 나타나는 긴장을 겪고 있다. 키이우 국제 사회학 연구소(KMIS)는 2023년 12월 18일에 발표한 2023년 11월 29일부터 12월 9일까지 실시한 조사에서 응답자의 96%가 우크라이나 군을 지지하고, 88%가 우크라이나 총사령관 발레리 잘루즈니를 신뢰하며, 66%가 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키를 신뢰한다고 밝혔다. 2022년 12월에 실시한 이전 KMIS 여론 조사에서 응답자의 84%가 젤렌스키를 신뢰한다고 답했고, 많은 우크라이나 기관에 대한 신뢰도는 2022년 12월과 2023년 사이에 비슷하게 감소했다. 이는 장기화된 전쟁을 감안할 때 놀라운 일이 아니다. 우크라이나 군, 우크라이나 보안국(SBU), 우크라이나 국가 경찰, 우크라이나 자원봉사자들은 이 기간 동안 여론 조사에서 신뢰도가 비슷하게 감소하지 않았다. * 2022년 12월의 우크라이나 국민 감정은 2022년 가을 성공적인 반격 작전을 통해 우크라이나군이 하르키우와 헤르손 주의 광범위한 점령 지역을 최근에 해방했기 때문에 2023년 11월과 12월보다 더 낙관적이었을 가능성이 크다. 2022년 우크라이나의 성공적인 반격 작전으로 전략적 지역 수도인 헤르손을 해방하고, 여러 주요 우크라이나 인구 센터에서 전선을 멀리 밀어내고, 이 도시들을 후방과 후방 지역으로 바꾸었을 수 있으며, 이를 통해 더 많은 우크라이나인들이 2023년 내내 국내 문제


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