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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 6월 20일

by Summa posted Jun 21, 2024
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Key Takeaways: Russian President Vladimir Putin's Visit to North Korea and Vietnam

핵심 요점: 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령의 북한 및 베트남 방문

  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 6월 18일과 19일에 북한과 베트남을 방문하여 우크라이나의 파트너들이 우크라이나에서 러시아의 불법적 정복 전쟁을 결정적으로 물리칠 수 있는 공동 전략적 목표와 전략을 명확하게 정의하려는 노력을 방해하기 위한 대규모 정보 작전을 시작했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 서방이 우크라이나가 러시아를 결정적으로 물리칠 수 있도록 지원하면 핵무기를 사용하겠다고 암묵적으로 위협하여 우크라이나에 대한 지원에 대한 국제 사회의 응집력 있는 전략적 비전을 훼손하려고 했습니다.
  • 푸틴의 핵 위협은 우크라이나의 동맹국이 러시아의 우크라이나 불법 침공을 결정적으로 물리치기로 하는 것을 막기 위한 크렘린의 지속적인 핵 블랙메일 캠페인의 일부이며, 따라서 실제 핵 확산으로 이어질 가능성은 매우 낮습니다.
  • 한국은 6월 20일에 러시아-북한 포괄적 전략적 동반자 관계 협정에 대응하여 우크라이나에 치명적인 군사 지원을 보내는 것을 금지하던 이전의 금지를 재고할 것이라고 밝혔습니다.
  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 베트남에서 열린 6월 20일 기자 회견에서 한국의 우려에 대응하여 러시아-북한 협정의 측면을 동시에 축소하려고 했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 또한 베트남 방문 중에 Tô Lâm 베트남 대통령, Phạm Minh Chính 베트남 총리, Nguyễn Phú Trọng 베트남 공산당 중앙위원회 사무총장을 만나 양국 관계와 20세기와 21세기에 베트남에 대한 소련과 러시아의 지원에 대해 논의했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 통합 계획 및 교정 모듈(UMPC)이 장착된 새로운 FAB-3000 M-54 폭탄을 사용하여 하르키우주에 있는 우크라이나 진지를 처음으로 공격하여 러시아군이 이러한 무기를 계속해서 사용할 수 있다면 파괴력이 큰 새로운 러시아 능력을 보여주었습니다.
  • 미국은 우크라이나에서 러시아 유도 활공 폭탄 사용 위협이 증가하는 상황에서 우크라이나에 패트리어트 방공 요격기를 우선적으로 제공하는 정책을 변경했습니다.
  • 미국의 정책은 여전히 우크라이나군이 미국에서 제공한 무기로 러시아 영토의 작전 및 후방에 있는 군사 목표를 공격하는 것을 금지합니다.
  • 보병 중심의 정면 돌격 전술에 대한 러시아군의 과도한 의존으로 인해 우크라이나 전장에서 다양한 러시아 전투 서비스 간의 구분이 크게 약화되어 최전선 부대의 작전 효율성이 최소화되었습니다.
  • 안드레이 벨로우소프 러시아 국방부 장관은 프리모르스키 크라이 블라디보스토크에서 동부 군사 지구를 방문하여 엄격하지만 적극적인 국방부 장관의 모습을 연출했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 6월 19일부터 20일 밤에 러시아의 최소 두 개의 석유 시설에 드론 공격을 감행했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 보브찬스크 근처에서 진격했고, 러시아군은 최근 차시브 야르, 아브디이프카, 도네츠크 시 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아 군사 지휘부가 러시아 군인들에게 싸우도록 적절한 인센티브를 제공하지 못하고 러시아의 전면 침공 목적을 군대에 설명하지 못하고 있다고 불평했습니다.
분류: 국제 정치, 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 향후 전망: 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁은 장기화될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 계속해서 우크라이나에 대한 군사적 압력을 가할 것으로 보입니다. 우크라이나는 서방 국가들의 지원을 받아 러시아에 대항하고 있지만, 전쟁의 결과는 여전히 불확실합니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Christina Harward, Kateryna Stepanenko,

Angelica Evans, Karolina Hird, and George Barros


June 20, 2024, 8:30pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine. Ukraine’s partners undertook several important steps in mid-June to cohere a common strategy and define the desired strategic outcome of the war. Over 80 Western and international officials recently established a principled position on supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity as the foundation of lasting peace in Ukraine in a communique adopted during the Ukraine-led Global Peace Summit on June 16. Ukraine also signed security agreements with the United States and Japan for 10 years on June 13, and numerous partner states reaffirmed their long-term support for Ukraine within the Group of 7 (G7) and the Ramstein formats. US President Joe Biden stated that the United States will continue supporting Ukraine so that Ukraine “has victory and that Russia does not prevail” when discussing the US-Ukraine security agreement. Putin’s strategy for winning the war relies on the Kremlin’s ability to mislead the United States, the European Union, and Ukraine’s international allies into ceasing support for Ukraine and abandoning key principles of international law – respect for state sovereignty and the inviolability of territorial integrity. Allied strategic clarity and commitment to enabling Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia on the battlefield in Ukraine greatly undermines Putin’s center of gravity – and his ability to shape the will and decisions of allied decision makers.


Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries. ISW noted on June 19 that Putin appears to be pursuing a coalition of friendly states with historically warm ties to the Soviet Union that could form the basis of an alternative to the West and the current world order.


The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine. US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 20 that the US is going to "reprioritize" the export of Patriot missiles so that the missiles "rolling off the production line" will go straight to Ukraine. Kirby characterized the decision as "difficult but necessary" to ensure that hundreds of Patriot and NASAM munitions produced for the next 16 months would go to Ukraine, regardless of which country ordered them. Kirby stated that Ukraine will receive the first shipments of Patriot missiles by the end of Summer 2024 and that other countries that ordered Patriot missiles will receive them on a "delayed timeline." Kirby stated that other countries impacted by the delay were ”broadly supportive” of the decision to prioritize Ukraine’s air defense needs. The Romanian Supreme National Defense Council announced on June 20 that Romania will donate one Patriot system to Ukraine due to Russia's large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy and civil infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba have recently emphasized Ukraine's need for more Patriot systems. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend itself against devastating Russian glide bomb strikes is heavily contingent on Ukraine's ability to target Russian aircraft within Russian airspace using US-provided air defense systems before Russian aircraft can launch strikes at Ukrainian cities, critical infrastructure, and frontline positions.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin launched a major information operation during his recent visit to North Korea and Vietnam on June 18 and 19 aimed at sabotaging efforts by Ukraine's partners to clearly define a common strategic objective and strategy to decisively defeat Russia’s illegal war of conquest in Ukraine.


  • Putin implicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons if the West enables Ukraine to decisively defeat Russia in order to undermine the international community's cohering strategic vision of support for Ukraine.


  • Putin’s nuclear threat is part of an ongoing Kremlin nuclear blackmail campaign aimed at dissuading Ukraine’s allies from decisively committing to defeating Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and is therefore highly unlikely to result in actual nuclear escalation.


  • South Korea responded to the Russian-North Korean comprehensive strategic partnership agreement on June 20 and stated that it will reconsider its previous ban on sending lethal military assistance to Ukraine.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin simultaneously attempted to downplay aspects of the Russia-North Korea agreement potentially in response to South Korea's concerns during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.


  • Putin also met with Vietnamese President Tô Lâm, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, and General Secretary of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Community Party Nguyễn Phú Trọng during his visit and discussed bilateral relations and the Soviet Union's and Russia's support of Vietnam during the 20th and 21st centuries.


  • Russian forces used the new FAB-3000 M-54 bomb with a unified planning and correction module (UMPC) to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast for the first time, representing a new Russian capability with a high potential for destruction if Russian forces continue to be able to use such weapons uninhibited.


  • The United States made a policy change to prioritize delivering Patriot air defense interceptors to Ukraine against the backdrop of the increasing threat of Russian guided glide bomb use in Ukraine.


  • US policy still prohibits Ukrainian forces from striking military targets with US-provided weapons in the operational and deep rear of Russian territory.


  • The Russian military's increased over-reliance on infantry-heavy frontal assault tactics has greatly degraded the distinctions between various Russian combat services on the battlefield in Ukraine, minimizing the operational efficacy of frontline troops.


  • Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a working visit to the Eastern Military District in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai to create the appearance of a strict but engaged defense minister.


  • Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes against at least two oil facilities in Russia on the night of June 19 to 20.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City.


  • Russian milbloggers complained that the Russian military command is failing to properly incentivize Russian servicemen to fight and explain the purpose of the Russian full-scale invasion to its troops.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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