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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 8월 27일

by Summa posted Aug 28, 2024
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```html 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 상황 요약

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 포크로프스크 남동쪽 일부 지역에서 우크라이나군이 철수했다는 보도 속에서 포크로프스크 방면에서 상당한 전술적 진전을 이루었습니다.
  • 러시아의 가장 전투력 있는 부대는 현재 포크로프스크를 향한 러시아의 진격을 지원하고 있으며, 러시아의 공세 작전은 우크라이나에서의 승리에 대한 러시아의 광범위한 이론을 상징하는 것으로, 겉보기에 무기한 전술적 진전에 기반을 두고 있습니다. 포크로프스크 방향에 대한 러시아의 지속적이고 완전한 우선 순위는 포크로프스크 시나리오 이후 우크라이나에서 러시아의 전반적인 전투 역량에 영향을 미칠 가능성이 높습니다. 특히 크렘린이 포크로프스크에서의 이득과 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공에 대한 방어를 조화시키려고 하기 때문입니다.
  • 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키는 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공이 수미 또는 체르니히우 주에 대한 러시아의 공세 작전을 사전에 예방하기 위한 노력의 일환이라고 보고했으며, 이 침공은 국제법의 원칙과 우크라이나 영토 보전의 불가침성에 기반한 전쟁에 대한 정의롭고 지속 가능한 외교적 해결책을 달성하려는 우크라이나의 광범위한 노력의 일환이라고 언급했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 쿠르스크 주에서 우크라이나의 공세 작전이 계속되는 가운데 8월 27일에 벨고로드 주의 두 지역으로 진격을 시도했다고 합니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 국제원자력기구(IAEA) 사무총장 라파엘 마리아노 그로시가 쿠르스크 원자력 발전소(KNPP)를 방문한 것을 이용하여 우크라이나가 방사능 사고를 위협하는 것으로 거짓으로 묘사하여 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공에 대한 근거 없는 두려움을 조장함으로써 우크라이나에 대한 서방의 지원을 훼손하려고 했습니다.
  • 인도 총리 나렌드라 모디는 최근 우크라이나를 방문한 후 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴에게 우크라이나 전쟁을 종식시키겠다는 인도의 의지를 강조했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 크레민나 근처에서 진격했고 러시아군은 최근 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 도네츠크 시 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 쿠르스크 주에 대한 우크라이나의 침공은 러시아 국민들이 러시아 국방부(MoD)와 군 복무 계약을 맺으려는 의지를 높인 것으로 알려졌습니다.

분류:

  • 전쟁 상황 요약

관련된 주요국가:

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 인도

향후 전망:

  • 러시아군은 포크로프스크를 향해 계속 진격할 것으로 예상되며, 우크라이나군은 포크로프스크를 방어하기 위해 추가 병력을 투입할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 쿠르스크 주에서 계속해서 공세 작전을 수행할 것으로 예상되며, 러시아군은 쿠르스크 주를 방어하기 위해 추가 병력을 투입할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 러시아와 우크라이나는 계속해서 외교적 해결책을 모색할 것으로 예상되지만, 단기적으로 전쟁이 종식될 가능성은 낮습니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans,

Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros


August 27, 2024, 8:45pm ET 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.


NEW | Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.


NEW | Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the hundreds of known Russian military objects that are in range of ATACMS

Click here to read the major new report from Drs. Kimberly and Frederick W. Kagan, "Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War."

Russian forces have made significant tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction amid reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from select areas southeast of Pokrovsk. Geolocated footage published on August 27 confirms that Russian forces have advanced over two kilometers from their last confirmed position into northwestern Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk) along Dubinina Street, suggesting that Russian forces additionally hold positions within the central part of the town. A Ukrainian soldier reported in a now-deleted Telegram post that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Novohrodivka, which Russian state media and several Russian milbloggers amplified and used to claim that Russian forces control the majority of the settlement. Additional geolocated footage published on August 27 indicates that Russian forces have marginally advanced in southeastern Hrodivka (east of Pokrovsk and northeast of Novohrodivka) and have seized Kalynove (further southeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Novohrodivka). Russian milbloggers also claimed that Ukrainian forces "lost" Marynivka (directly south of Novohrodivka) and that elements of the 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) seized Memryk (southeast of Novohrodivka), although ISW has not yet observed visual evidence of Russian forces operating in these settlements. Some Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Mykhailivka (south of Novohrodivka) and are attacking into northeastern Selydove (southwest of Novohrodivka).


The recent rate of Russian advance in the Pokrovsk direction has been relatively rapid, and Russian forces have advanced through most of Novohrodivka in a matter of days. Russian forces appear to be prioritizing advancing along the railway line in Novohrodivka toward Pokrovsk instead of fighting through the entire urban area of the settlement. The comparatively rapid Russian advance into Novohrodivka over the past 24 hours is likely in part enabled by apparent Ukrainian withdrawals from Novohrodivka. Russian forces in theory could advance with relative ease through Novohrodivka despite its relative urban build-up if there are no Ukrainian defenders receiving their advances. ISW previously assessed that it would take Russian forces longer to seize Novohrodivka, but that assessment has been proven as incorrect and was premised on Ukrainian forces maintaining a positional defense within the urbanized areas of Novohrodivka—which does not appear to currently be the case. Urbanized areas without sufficient defending forces are not inherent battlefield obstacles, and the Ukrainian command likely deemed that defending Novohrodivka was not worth the potential losses. Novohrodivka is not an operationally significant town in isolation—its potential capture would in theory open the road to Pokrovsk (Russia's articulated operational objective on this sector of the front), but Pokrovsk is larger, more fortified, and ultimately more significant than Novohrodivka due to its central position as a key logistics node in western Donetsk Oblast, and Ukrainian forces are unlikely to withdraw from Pokrovsk without defending the city. The Russian military command will likely be forced to expend significant manpower and materiel in order to seize the more defendable and significant town of Pokrovsk if the Ukrainian military command chooses to reinforce this direction. Advancing Russian forces are therefore unlikely to be able to sustain the current rate of gains indefinitely, especially if they begin assaults on Pokrovsk itself.


Russia's most combat-capable troops are currently sustaining Russian advances towards Pokrovsk, and Russia's offensive operations are emblematic of the wider Russian theory of victory in Ukraine, premised on seemingly indefinite grinding tactical advances. Russia's continuous and complete prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction will likely impact Russia's overall combat capabilities in Ukraine in the aftermath of any Pokrovsk scenario, especially as the Kremlin tries to balance gains in Pokrovsk with defending against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated during a press conference on August 27 that one of Ukraine's main goals in launching the Kursk incursion was to divert Russian forces from critical areas of the front, and that Russia anticipated this goal and is instead concentrating its main efforts and strengthening its presence in the Pokrovsk direction. Syrskyi also reported that Russia has redeployed over 30,000 troops from other unspecified sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and forecasted that this number will continue to grow while noting that Russia is simultaneously intensifying its efforts in the Pokrovsk direction. Syrskyi's observations cohere with ISW's current assessment that the Russian military command continues to prioritize the Pokrovsk front over pushing Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast. ISW has previously noted that ISW has not observed evidence of Russia redeploying units currently engaged near Pokrovsk to Kursk Oblast but has observed evidence of Russia instead deploying reserve units and units from non-critical sectors of the front, which likely accounts for the bulk of the 30,000 troops redeployed to Kursk Oblast that Syrskyi noted. Syrskyi's statements suggest that the Russian military command remains unwilling to redeploy troops currently fighting near Pokrovsk and will continue to prioritize using these relatively more combat-capable troops to secure tactical gains and maintain the initiative in Donetsk Oblast. The apparent continued Russian prioritization of territorial gains near Pokrovsk is consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory in Ukraine, which assumes that Russian forces maintain the initiative and pursue a constant grinding war of attrition to outlast Ukraine and Ukraine's partners.


The Russian offensive effort around Pokrovsk will eventually culminate, although the timeline for which Russian forces will reach culmination remains unclear. ISW is not prepared to forecast an imminent culmination, especially as Russian forces escalate the rate of advances in this area and Ukrainian forces retreat to prepared defensive positions west of Hrodivka that in principle should be more advantageous to defend. The redeployment of 30,000 Russian troops to Kursk Oblast could eventually degrade Russian capabilities in the Ukrainian theater writ large, however, following the culmination of the Pokrovsk offensive. ISW has previously assessed that Ukraine's operations in Kursk Oblast have already had theater-wide operational and strategic effects on Russian forces, and Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has challenged Putin's theory of victory by seizing the initiative in a new area of operations while degrading Russia's ability to maintain the long-term initiative in certain sectors of the front within Ukraine. The Russian command is clearly currently prioritizing Pokrovsk, but that calculus will likely change depending on when Russian forces culminate in the area, and the command will eventually need to fully reckon with reorienting its priorities to repelling Ukrainian troops from Kursk Oblast. Russian forces have notably advanced fewer than 10 km east of Bakhmut following Russia’s pyrrhic seizure of Bakhmut in May 2023 and Russian forces that expend themselves in the Pokrovsk direction may face similar exhaustion following their culmination. ISW maintains that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions on the long-term effects of the Kursk operation but offers an assessment of the implications of Syrskyi's statements to provide an analysis of how and to what effect Russian battlefield priorities may impact their future offensive capacity.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast was in part an effort to preempt a Russian offensive operation into Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts and noted that the incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's wider efforts to achieve a just and lasting diplomatic solution to the war based on the principles of international law and the inviolability of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Zelensky stated on August 27 that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast stalled Russia's ongoing offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and preempted an apparent Russian plan to conduct cross-border attacks into either Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have defeated a large number of Russian troops during the incursion into Kursk Oblast. Zelensky added that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast is one aspect of Ukraine's plan to resolve the war and that Ukraine's plan also includes aspects of "Ukraine's strategic place in the global security architecture," "powerful coercion" against Russia, and unspecific economic policies aimed at bringing Russia to the negotiating table. Zelensky stated that he will present Ukraine's plan to US policymakers in September 2024. Pentagon Spokesperson Major General Patrick Ryder reiterated US support for the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast during a press conference on August 26 and noted that Ukraine has the right to conduct its own operations and hold its own calculus regarding the incursion.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces have made significant tactical advances in the Pokrovsk direction amid reports that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from select areas southeast of Pokrovsk.


  • Russia's most combat-capable troops are currently sustaining Russian advances towards Pokrovsk, and Russia's offensive operations are emblematic of the wider Russian theory of victory in Ukraine, premised on seemingly indefinite grinding tactical advances. Russia's continuous and complete prioritization of the Pokrovsk direction will likely impact Russia's overall combat capabilities in Ukraine in the aftermath of any Pokrovsk scenario, especially as the Kremlin tries to balance gains in Pokrovsk with defending against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast.


  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast was in part an effort to preempt a Russian offensive operation into Sumy or Chernihiv oblasts and noted that the incursion is an aspect of Ukraine's wider efforts to achieve a just and lasting diplomatic solution to the war based on the principles of international law and the inviolability of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.


  • Ukrainian forces reportedly attempted to advance into two areas of Belgorod Oblast on August 27 amid continued Ukrainian offensive operations in Kursk Oblast.


  • Russian officials attempted to use International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi's visit to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) to falsely portray Ukraine as threatening a radiological incident, likely to undermine Western support for Ukraine by stoking unfounded fears about Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast.


  • Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized India's commitment to ending the war in Ukraine to Russian President Vladimir Putin following Modi's recent visit to Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kreminna and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Donetsk City.


  • The Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast has reportedly heightened willingness among Russian citizens to sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).


Click here to read the full assessment.

NEW: Interactive Map: Hundreds of Known Russian Military Objects Are in Range of ATACMS

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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