Iranian media reported that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed on November 21. The IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran for failing to fully cooperate with the IAEA. Hardline newspaper Khorasan reported on November 23 that Iran is activating around 5,000 centrifuges, including IR-6, IR-4, and IR-2m centrifuges, by injecting uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into them. The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed but not yet activated eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow. The IAEA also confirmed in August 2024 that Iran had installed 10 cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz. Iran has installed six additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz since August 2024, bringing the total number of cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to 37. Only 15 out of these 37 cascades had been activated as of November 2024. Khorasan reported that activating the 5,000 centrifuges will increase Iranian uranium enrichment at the Natanz and Fordow nuclear facilities to 40,000 separative work units (SWU). SWU measure the effort required to separate U-235 and U-238 isotopes in the uranium enrichment process. Iran currently has a total installed enrichment capacity of around 52,900 SWU per year and an enriching centrifuge capacity of around 31,400 SWU per year, according to the Institute for Science and International Security. Iran currently has around 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.
Iranian hardliners are continuing to lobby Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence against Iran’s “enemies.” The Pardisan, Qom Province, Friday prayer leader “desperately requested” on November 23 that Khamenei “reconsider” his nuclear fatwa because “[Iran’s] enemies have rows of nuclear warheads” and threaten to use nuclear weapons against Iran.[11] The Friday prayer leader argued that possessing nuclear weapons would “bring [Iran] security.” Hardline Parliamentarian Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani separately claimed on November 23 that “a large part” of the Iranian population supports acquiring a nuclear weapon. Ardestani added that possessing a nuclear weapon would increase Iran’s “deterrence power.” These statements implicitly acknowledge that the Iranian drone and missile attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 failed to restore deterrence with Israel and that additional drone and missile attacks would similarly fail to restore deterrence. These statements also come amid numerous indications that Iran has very likely restarted its nuclear weapons research program.
Key Takeaways:
- Iranian Nuclear Program: Iranian media reported that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed on November 21.
- Iranian Nuclear Weaponization: Iranian hardliners are continuing to lobby Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to revoke his fatwa that prohibits the production and use of nuclear weapons to restore deterrence against Iran’s “enemies.” The Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman threatened to withdraw from the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
- Lebanon Ceasefire: Iran has reportedly intervened in Lebanon ceasefire negotiations to ensure any agreement aligns with Iran’s objective to rebuild Hezbollah after the current Israeli campaign. Iran’s intervention aims to secure Hezbollah‘s position and capabilities in Lebanon by ensuring that Iran can rebuild the group after the war, according to regional media. This report is consistent with recent Iranian activity in Lebanon and CTP-ISW's assessment of Iranian intentions.
- US-Israel Discussions: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla spoke with senior Israeli officials about Israeli military operations and objectives in Lebanon on November 23. Kurilla held a situational assessment with IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi at the IDF Northern Command Headquarters in Safed, northern Israel, on November 23.
- Hezbollah Capabilities: Unspecified Israeli defense officials cited by The New York Times reported that Hezbollah has manufactured copies of Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles that it had captured in previous wars. Hezbollah has developed its own Almas manufacturing capabilities since 2006, which would enable it to rebuild its Almas stockpiles after the war with greater ease than if it could only acquire new Almas stocks from Iran via Iraq and Syria.
- Hamas Exploits Israeli Hostages: Hamas blamed Israeli airstrikes for the death of a female hostage in the Gaza Strip, likely to degrade Israeli domestic support for IDF operations in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is also likely setting information conditions to blame Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip for the deaths of other hostages there. Hamas claimed that Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip threatened another hostage in the area.
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[국방부] '24년 후반기 장성급 장교 인사 단행
[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 11월 23일