The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria. Russia intervened on behalf of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad in 2015 in order to secure Assad's regime after mass protests began in 2011 as part of the larger Arab Spring movement, which triggered the Syrian Civil War and threatened to oust Assad. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long viewed the "color revolutions" that ushered in new democratic governments in former Soviet states as a threat to his own regime's stability and security. Putin has also more widely opposed democratic movements to oust Kremlin-allied authoritarian rulers worldwide as he views these movements as hindering his efforts to create his envisioned multipolar world where Russia and Russia's key authoritarian allies and partners play a major role. Russia's inability or decision to not reinforce Assad's regime as the Syrian opposition offensive made rapid gains throughout the country will also hurt Russia's credibility as a reliable and effective security partner throughout the world, which will in turn negatively affect Putin's ability to garner support throughout the world for his desired multipolar world.
Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 8 that a Kremlin source stated that Assad and his family fled to Moscow and that Russian authorities granted them asylum. Putin has been able to ensure the survivability of Assad himself, but Putin intervened in the Syrian Civil War with the primary objective of bolstering Assad's regime and preventing his loss of power – an objective that the Kremlin has failed to achieve. Putin also intervened on behalf of Assad in 2015 to secure Russian military bases in Syria, support Russia's wider efforts to project power in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, increase its global footprint in the Middle East and Africa, and threaten NATO's southern flank. Russia is attempting to secure its bases in Syria as opposition forces come to power, but Russia's continued military presence in the country is not guaranteed, especially as Russia's actions in support of Assad over the past nine years have likely undermined Moscow's ability to form a lasting, positive relationship with ruling Syrian opposition groups.
Key Takeaways:
- The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria – a regime that the Kremlin helped prop up since 2015 – is a strategic political defeat for Moscow and has thrown the Kremlin into a crisis as it seeks to retain its strategic military basing in Syria.
- The Kremlin reportedly secured an agreement on December 8 with unspecified Syrian opposition leaders to ensure the security of Russian military bases in Syria, but the contours of this arrangement and its longevity remain unclear given a volatile and rapidly evolving political situation on the ground in Syria.
- ISW has collected strong indicators that Russia has been setting conditions to evacuate its military assets from Syria and that Russian military basing is not secure.
- The loss of Russian bases in Syria will have major implications for Russia’s global military footprint and ability to operate in Africa.
- Russian ultranationalist milbloggers – many of whom fought in or covered the Syrian war – are upset about the fall of the Assad regime, criticizing it as yet another failure of Russian foreign policy to exert and maintain influence in areas of strategic importance.
- The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on December 7 an additional military aid package for Ukraine worth $988 million.
- Russian authorities detained alleged terrorists in the Republic of Dagestan on December 7 amid growing Russian milblogger claims that the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime in Syria will foster terrorism in Russia.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Pokrovsk and Vuhledar directions.
- One of Russia's largest microchip manufacturers has reportedly begun bankruptcy proceedings.
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