Russia’s withdrawal from bases in northern Syria and its loss of influence in Syria will likely expose the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to continued Turkish attacks in northern Syria. Russia has withdrawn from a series of bases in the Manbij and Kobani areas in northern Syria amid the ongoing Turkish-backed offensive against the SDF. Russia will probably withdraw from its last sizeable base in northern Syria, Qamishli, because Turkey and the groups on the ground in Syria—including HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA)—do not appear to be prepared to allow Russia to remain there. Unspecified actors reportedly agreed to allow Russia to remain in Tartus and Hmeimim but did not mention Qamishli. The Turkish defense minister also offered to ”support” Russia’s consolidation at Hmeimim and Tartus, suggesting Turkey would not support other Russian bases. Russia's presence across northern Syria had previously enabled Russia to oppose and block Turkish-backed offensives in Tel Rifaat and Manbij, two areas that Turkish-backed forces have captured in recent days. The loss of Russia’s physical presence and influence in northern Syria means that the primary barrier against a Turkish or Turkish-backed operation to seize even more SDF-controlled areas—or a Turkish attempt to destroy the SDF outright—no longer exists.
Turkey will likely continue to back the SNA’s ground operation against the SDF to destroy the SDF. The Turkish foreign minister said on December 13 that Turkey’s strategic objective in Syria is to ”destroy” the SDF, meaning that any ceasefire between the SDF and Turkish-backed groups is presumably temporary. It is unclear when large-scale operations will resume, however. Turkish-backed fighters have also executed injured SDF fighters at hospitals in northern Syria and reportedly looted civilian areas in Manbij. These crimes risk triggering ethnically motivated violence and upsetting Syria’s current relative stability, especially if Turkish-backed fighters enter Kurdish areas and begin killing Kurdish civilians.
The SDF’s fight against Turkey and its proxies will render it unable to support US policy objectives in Syria. The SDF is the key US partner in Syria against ISIS. Only the SDF is capable of conducting competent counter-ISIS operations in the areas it controls, given that HTS and other groups are currently preoccupied with securing newly controlled areas. The SDF also controls al Hol IDP camp and a network of prisons that contain thousands of ISIS supporters and fighters. Turkish violence—including the threat of ethnically motivated killing—would almost certainly cause the SDF to mobilize its forces against Turkish-backed groups. The SDF cannot conduct offensive operations against ISIS while contending with the threat from Turkey and its allies in Syria. It is unclear if the SDF would be able to secure these key facilities if it faces a severe threat from Turkish-backed forces to Kurdish civilian areas.
More Key Takeaways:
- Expanding HTS Control in Syria: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) continues to consolidate security control over disparate armed groups in Syria.
- US Carrier Deployment: Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) continues to consolidate security control over disparate armed groups in Syria.
- Israel in Syria: Israeli military officials approved plans for operations further into Syria but have not implemented them. Israeli forces continued to operate in villages in Quneitra and Daraa provinces on December 15.
- Iraqi Reactions to Syria: Iranian-backed Badr Organization Secretary General Hadi al Ameri stated on December 12 that “what happened in Syria is a stain of shame on the foreheads of the Turks.” The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are continuing to bolster security along the Iraq-Syria Border.
| 
[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 12월 15일
[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2024년 12월 14일