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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 12월 19일

by Summa posted Dec 20, 2024
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```html Key Takeaways: 푸틴의 연설 요점

Key Takeaways: 푸틴의 연설 요점

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 2022년 우크라이나 침공 결정을 되돌아보며 2014년 우크라이나에 부과한 휴전을 더 일찍 위반하여 본격적인 침공을 시작했어야 했다고 말했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 우크라이나가 키이우를 확보하고 당시 러시아군이 점령했던 많은 영토를 해방했음에도 불구하고 우크라이나와의 협상은 침공 전과 러시아가 가장 많은 영토를 확보했을 때와 같은 요구 사항을 기반으로 해야 한다고 주장했습니다.
  • 푸틴이 우크라이나의 완전 항복을 주장하는 것은 러시아가 승리하고 있으며 우크라이나와 서방의 의지를 능가할 것이라는 그의 믿음을 반영합니다. 푸틴은 우크라이나군이 러시아에 다른 중대한 전장 좌절을 안겨주고 그가 군사적으로 이길 수 없다는 것을 보여주지 않는 한 더 낮은 합의를 받아들이지 않을 것입니다.
  • 푸틴은 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키의 대통령직이 불법이라는 거짓 이야기를 되풀이하여 부분적으로 우크라이나를 협상 지연에 대한 책임을 물리고 전쟁을 끝내기를 갈망하는 러시아 국민들 사이에서 우크라이나의 완전 항복에 대한 지지를 얻었습니다.
  • 푸틴은 쿠르스크주에서 우크라이나군을 몰아내는 것보다 도네츠크주에서 러시아 공세 작전을 우선시하기로 한 결정을 계속 정당화합니다.
  • 푸틴은 러시아-북한 관계에 대해 공개적으로 언급했음에도 불구하고 북한군이 러시아 영토에서 우크라이나군을 몰아내는 데 필요하다는 것을 인정하는 것이 부끄러운 듯합니다.
  • 푸틴은 러시아의 "오레슈니크" 탄도 미사일을 러시아에 유리한 결정을 내리도록 서방을 강요하고 푸틴에게 실패한 핵 위협 이야기에서 벗어날 수 있는 비핵 억제력의 일환으로 계속 고수하고 있습니다.
  • 푸틴이 러시아의 군사력을 자랑하는 것은 최근 몇 달 동안 도네츠크주에서 비교적 더 빠르게 진격하기 위해 러시아가 겪은 심각하고 지속 불가능한 손실의 현실을 무시합니다.
  • 푸틴은 경제 문제에 대한 책임을 러시아 중앙은행으로 돌리면서 러시아 경제가 강하고 안정적이라고 계속 거짓으로 자세를 취하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크, 토레츠크, 쿠라호베, 부흘레다르, 벨리카 노보실카, 로보티네 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 12월 19일 연례 직통 전화 텔레비전 기자 회견에서 마리우폴 점령 관리들에게 불법으로 압수한 우크라이나 아파트를 재분배하라고 촉구하여 러시아가 우크라이나의 점령 지역에 러시아인을 강제로 재정착시켜 우크라이나의 인구 통계를 근본적으로 바꾸려는 노력을 계속하고 있음을 보여주었습니다.
분류: 정치, 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 북한 향후 전망: 푸틴은 우크라이나에서의 전쟁을 계속 확대할 가능성이 높으며, 이는 더 많은 사상자와 파괴로 이어질 것입니다. 푸틴은 또한 러시아 경제를 더욱 악화시킬 수 있는 경제 정책을 계속할 가능성이 높습니다.
```

[원문]

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter,

Olivia Gibson, William Runkel, and Frederick W. Kagan


December 19, 2024, 10:20 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack. Putin responded to a media question during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19 on whether he would change his decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine if he had it to do over again, stating that he should have made this decision earlier. Putin added that Russia should have systematically prepared ahead of the full-scale invasion and falsely claimed that Russia "spontaneously" invaded Ukraine in 2022 after Ukraine "directly" announced that it would not abide by the Minsk II Accords.


The Minsk II Accords were extremely favorable to Russia, imposing a set of commitments on Ukraine that surrendered core elements of Ukrainian sovereignty and allowing Russian proxies supported by Russian military forces to continue to occupy the areas they had seized during their initial invasions in 2014. The accords imposed no obligations on Russia — which was party to the negotiations as an alleged neutral mediator. They established a "ceasefire" that Russian proxies continually violated with Russian support. The Minsk II Accords also accepted the false Russian narrative that Russian proxies in Ukraine were independent of Moscow, and Putin insisted that Ukraine uphold its commitments even as the proxies, operating directly on orders from Moscow, violated their own obligations. The Minsk II Accords did not require Russia to withdraw its armed forces from occupied areas of Ukraine, and Russia used positions in the occupied areas as staging areas for the 2022 full-scale invasion.


Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time. Putin said during Direct Line that he is ready to hold talks with Ukraine without preconditions, that any talks must be based on what Russia and Ukraine had agreed upon during negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022, when Russian troops were advancing on Kyiv and throughout eastern and southern Ukraine, and on "the realities that are developing on the ground today." Putin reiterated that the demands he made at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in June 2024 — that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before Russia can agree to a ceasefire or peace negotiations — still stand. The draft treaty that resulted from the Ukraine-Russia negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022 stated that Ukraine would be a permanently neutral state that could not join NATO, and imposed limitations on the Ukrainian military similar to those imposed by the Treaty of Versailles on Germany after World War I, restricting Ukraine's armed forces to 85,000 soldiers. Russia's demands at Istanbul were mainly more detailed versions of the demands that Putin made in the months before he launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022, including Ukraine's "demilitarization" and neutrality.


Putin's reference to conditions he attempted to impose on Ukraine when he believed his invasion could succeed in a few days and then, later, as his forces were still driving on Kyiv, reflects his projected confidence that he can completely defeat Ukraine militarily despite the tremendous setbacks Ukraine has inflicted on Russian forces since then. Russian forces were driving on Kyiv and advancing in southern, eastern, and northern Ukraine while the Istanbul negotiations were ongoing in March 2022. Ukrainian forces have since pushed Russian forces away from Kyiv and secured the city and its environs from ground attack while conducting counteroffensives that pushed Russian forces away from Kharkiv City and liberated Kherson as well as much other territory. Kremlin officials have repeatedly invoked the concept of the "realities on the ground" in reference to Russian gains on the battleground, but realities on the ground reflect Ukraine's demonstrated ability to stop Russian advances and reverse them.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin said that he should have violated the ceasefire he had imposed on Ukraine in 2014 by launching a full-scale invasion even earlier when asked to reflect on his 2022 decision to attack.


  • Putin insisted that negotiations with Ukraine must be based on the same demands he made before the invasion and at the moment of Russia's greatest territorial gains, despite the fact that Ukraine has secured Kyiv and liberated much of the territory his forces held at that time.


  • Putin's insistence on Ukraine's complete surrender reflects his belief that Russia is winning and will outlast Ukrainian and Western resolve. Putin will not likely accept a lesser settlement unless Ukrainian forces inflict other significant battlefield setbacks on Russia and demonstrate to him that he cannot win militarily.


  • Putin reiterated the false narrative that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency is illegitimate, in part, to blame Ukraine for delaying negotiations and garner support for full Ukrainian capitulation among a Russian population that increasingly wants the war to end.


  • Putin continues to justify his decision to prioritize Russian offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast over expelling Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast.


  • Putin is apparently embarrassed to admit his need for North Korean forces to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory, despite his openness about the Russia-North Korea relationship.


  • Putin continues to fixate on the Russian "Oreshnik" ballistic missile as part of his non-nuclear deterrent aimed at simultaneously forcing the West to make decisions favorable to Russia and providing Putin with an off-ramp from his failed nuclear saber-rattling narrative.


  • Putin's boasting about Russia's military capabilities ignores the reality of the serious and unsustainable losses that Russia has suffered to advance relatively more rapidly in Donetsk Oblast in recent months.


  • Putin continues to falsely posture the Russian economy as strong and stable while deflecting blame for economic issues onto the Russian Central Bank.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, Velyka Novosilka, and Robotyne.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to evade blame for ongoing systemic payment issues impacting Russian servicemembers fighting in Kursk Oblast caused by his decision to downplay Ukraine's incursion into the region as a "counterterrorism operation" by scapegoating the Russian Ministry of Defense.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin called on Mariupol occupation officials to redistribute illegally confiscated Ukrainian apartments during his annual Direct Line televised press conference on December 19, signaling Russia's continued efforts to forcibly repopulate occupied areas of Ukraine with Russians to fundamentally alter Ukraine's demographics.


Click Here to Read the Full Report

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