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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 1월 4일

by Summa posted Jan 05, 2025
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 우크라이나군은 2024년에 3,000대 이상의 러시아 전차와 9,000대에 가까운 장갑차를 파괴하거나 손상시킨 것으로 알려졌으며, 러시아는 중기적으로는 지속 불가능할 것으로 보이는 차량 손실을 계속 겪고 있다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 몇 주 동안 최전선에서 가장 활발한 지역에서 장갑차를 덜 사용하고 있는 것으로 알려졌으며, 이는 소련의 재고가 줄어들면서 이러한 차량을 보존하기 위한 것일 수 있다.
  • 우크라이나군은 1월 3일에서 4일 밤 레닌그라드주 우스트루가 항구의 가스 터미널을 공격했다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 크레민나 근처의 상실된 진지를 탈환했으며, 쿠라호베 근처의 진지를 유지하고 있을 가능성이 크다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 크레민나, 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 쿠라호베 근처에서 진격했다.
  • 러시아 정부는 군인 모집을 촉진하기 위해 재정적 인센티브를 계속 증가시키고 있다.
### 분류: 군사 ### 관련된 주요국가: 우크라이나, 러시아 ### 향후 전망: 러시아는 우크라이나에서 계속해서 차량 손실을 겪고 있으며, 이는 중기적으로는 지속 불가능할 것으로 보인다. 러시아군은 최근 몇 주 동안 최전선에서 가장 활발한 지역에서 장갑차를 덜 사용하고 있는 것으로 알려졌으며, 이는 소련의 재고가 줄어들면서 이러한 차량을 보존하기 위한 것일 수 있다. 우크라이나군은 최근 크레민나 근처의 상실된 진지를 탈환했으며, 쿠라호베 근처의 진지를 유지하고 있을 가능성이 크다. 러시아군은 최근 크레민나, 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 쿠라호베 근처에서 진격했다. 러시아 정부는 군인 모집을 촉진하기 위해 재정적 인센티브를 계속 증가시키고 있다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Nate Trotter, William Runkel, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan


January 4, 2025, 4:00 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.

Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces destroyed or damaged 3,689 tanks, 8,956 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 13,050 artillery systems, and 407 air defense systems between January 1, 2024 and January 1, 2025. Russian forces reportedly lost at least 197 tanks, 661 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 65 artillery systems larger than 100mm throughout the frontline during a period of intensified offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast in September and October 2024 and likely sustained a higher rate of tank and armored vehicle losses in June and July 2024 when Russian forces were conducting mechanized assaults in western Donetsk Oblast several times a week that often resulted in armored vehicle losses.


Russia's current armored vehicle and tank production rates indicate that such losses will likely be prohibitive over the longer term, particularly as Russia continues to dip into its Soviet-era stocks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated in February 2024 that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) can produce 250-300 "new and thoroughly modernized" tanks per year and can repair roughly 250-300 additional damaged tanks per year, far below Ukraine's estimate of 3,600 Russian tanks lost in 2024. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) think tank also reported in February 2024 that Russia is likely able to sustain its rate of vehicle losses at that time (over 3,000 armored fighting vehicles including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles annually as of 2023 and nearly 8,800 between February 2022 and February 2024) for at least two to three years (until about February 2026 or 2027) by mainly refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities. A social media source tracking Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on December 22 and assessed that Russian forces have 47 percent of their pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of pre-war infantry fighting vehicle reserves, and 45 percent of pre-war armored personnel carrier reserves remaining in storage as of a recent unspecified date. The social media source noted that Russian forces have used most of their newer T-90 and T-80 tanks but still have a majority of their older tanks in storage, although some of these tanks have likely been heavily degraded by weather and time. It appears increasingly unlikely that the Russian military can sustain its current annual rate of almost 9,000 armored vehicle losses through 2025. This loss rate is nearly three times the annual loss rate of the first two years of the war according to IISS, suggesting that the February 2024 IISS estimate that Russia can sustain its vehicle losses through 2025 and possibly 2026 is no longer valid.


Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle. Ukrainian military sources have recently noted that Russian forces have been using fewer armored vehicles and conducting fewer mechanized assaults in the Kurakhove direction after suffering significant vehicle losses in October and November 2024. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction stated on January 3 that Russian forces have switched to mainly using infantry to conduct assaults in the area over the past few weeks and are only using armored vehicles as fire support for infantry assaults. The New York Times reported on December 31 that a Ukrainian lieutenant colonel stated that Russian forces are increasingly using electric scooters, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during assaults in eastern Ukraine, possibly as part of ongoing Russian efforts to offset armored vehicle losses. Russian attacks near more mid-sized, urban settlements such as Kurakhove and Pokrovsk may also be less conducive to mechanized assaults than the small settlements and open fields where Russian forces advanced in most of 2024. Russian forces may be using fewer armored vehicles in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions if the Russian military is struggling to reequip frontline Russian units and formations and if Russian military command does not want to withdraw Russian units for rest and reconstitution and risk further slowing Russian advances in high-priority frontline sectors.


Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024 as Russia continues to accrue vehicle losses that are likely unsustainable in the medium-term.


  • Russian forces have reportedly been using fewer armored vehicles in assaults in the most active areas of the frontline in recent weeks, possibly in order to conserve these vehicles as Soviet stocks dwindle.


  • Ukrainian forces struck a gas terminal at the Ust-Luga port in Leningrad Oblast on the night of January 3 to 4.


  • Ukrainian forces recently regained lost positions near Kreminna and likely maintain positions near Kurakhove.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.



  • The Russian government continues to increase financial incentives in order to boost the recruitment of military personnel.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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