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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 4일

by Summa posted Feb 05, 2025
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```html Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 국제원자력기구(IAEA) 사무총장 라파엘 마리아노 그로시는 2월 4일 키이우주 키이우스카 변전소를 방문하여 러시아의 장거리 공격으로 인해 우크라이나의 원자력 발전소(NPPs)와 에너지 생산 능력이 위협받고 있는 가운데 변전소의 피해를 평가했습니다.
  • 러시아 군이 많은 사상자를 대체할 새로운 인력을 충분히 모집하는 데 어려움을 겪고 있다는 징후에도 불구하고 러시아 관리들은 현재 비자발적 예비군 소집을 실시하지 않기로 한 크렘린의 결정을 계속 정당화하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 점령 당국은 하르키우주의 러시아 불법 합병 가능성에 대해 계속 논의하고 있지만 2022년 9월 하르키우주에서 우크라이나의 반격으로 인해 당시 해당 지역에서 "국민투표"를 실시하려는 러시아의 계획이 망가졌다고 주장했습니다.
  • 최근 몇 주 동안 타르투스 항구에 있었던 상당수의 러시아 선박이 러시아와 시리아 간의 러시아 기지 접근 지속에 대한 협상이 계속되고 있다는 보도에 따라 시리아에서 러시아로 떠났을 수 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나 해군 드론 공격으로 인해 러시아는 러시아와 시리아 사이의 러시아 선박 경로를 극적으로 변경해야 했을 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아는 또한 국방부의 오보론로기스티카 회사 소속 선박을 사용하여 발트해에서 NATO 선박을 감시한 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 크렘린과 제휴한 러시아 군사 블로거는 시베르스크 방향의 러시아군이 최근 사령부 변경에도 불구하고 현장 지휘관들이 거짓 진행 보고서를 제출하는 시스템적 문제로 계속 어려움을 겪고 있다고 주장했습니다.

분류: 군사, 정치
관련 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 시리아
향후 전망: 러시아는 우크라이나에서 계속해서 군사적 진전을 이루기 위해 노력할 것이며, 우크라이나는 러시아의 공격에 저항하기 위해 계속해서 국제 사회의 지원을 요청할 것입니다. 러시아와 시리아 간의 협상은 러시아가 시리아에 있는 기지에 대한 접근을 계속 유지할 수 있는지 여부를 결정하는 데 중요할 것입니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros,

and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter



February 4, 2025, 7:15 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue to threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPs) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities. Grossi did not specify when Russian forces damaged the Kyviska Electrical Substation but emphasized that a direct strike on the substation or a power supply disruption could cause a nuclear accident. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne noted that the Kyivska Electrical Substation is connected to the Rivne NPP and supplies Kyiv City and central and northern Ukraine with power. Russian forces launched a large series of missile and drone strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure connected to Ukrainian NPPs on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024. Grossi reported that the November 2024 Russian strikes damaged several unspecified electrical substations that are connected to the Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Pivdennoukrainsk NPPs but that the strikes did not damage the NPPs themselves. Russian strikes against Ukrainian electrical substations — not just NPPs — continue to threaten Ukraine's energy generation abilities and can cause long-term damage. Artur Lorkowski, the director of the Energy Community (an international organization that manages Ukraine’s energy procurement), told Politico in November 2024 that repairing damaged Ukrainian energy infrastructure may require a significant amount of time because it can take up to one year for Ukraine to find and reinstall specialized equipment, including auto transformers. Another Ukrainian energy expert told Politico that Ukraine needs an expedited supply of spare parts for energy infrastructure.


Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed on February 4 that Russia does not need to conduct another partial involuntary reserve call up because Russia currently has the battlefield "advantage." Duma Defense Committee member Viktor Sobolev added that 740,000 people have signed Russian military service contracts — presumably since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 — and claimed that mobilization would "only make things worse" because it would send people without any previous military experience or specialized skills to the frontline. Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Andrei Krasov also claimed that mobilization is unnecessary because Russian military registration and enlistment officers are successfully recruiting new personnel. These Russian Duma deputies are likely claiming that Russian recruitment rates are sufficient in order to assuage fears among the Russian public of a widely unpopular potential new partial involuntary reserve call up.


A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on February 3 that Russian and Syrian authorities will continue contacts on "all issues," including about Russia's continued access to the Port of Tartus. Data from MarineTraffic.com showed that the Russian Sparta and Sparta II cargo ships were off the coast of Tunisia on February 4. OSINT analyst MT Anderson posted satellite imagery from the morning of February 4 showing thе Sparta and Sparta II, as well as potentially the Alexander Otrakovsky Ropucha-class landing ship, the Admiral Golovko Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate, and the Admiral Grigorovich Grigorovich-class frigate off the coast of Tunisia. Satellite imagery and reports from Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) indicated that all these vessels had been at the Port of Tartus in December 2024 and January 2025. The departure of a significant number of vessels from the Port of Tartus suggests that the Kremlin is not optimistic about the results of ongoing Russian-Syrian negotiations. The location of the vessels off the coast of Tunisia also suggests that these ships are not bound for Libya despite the fact that Russia sent some assets from Syria to Libya by air in December 2024 and January 2025 - as the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) Africa File previously reported. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense's Resistance Center reported on February 4 that Russian ships began evacuating weapons from the Port of Tartus on January 27, and satellite imagery collected on January 18 and 27 showed that the Russian military had loaded equipment onto the Sparta and Sparta II at Tartus. The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that the Sparta II turned off its automatic identification system (AIS) after leaving Syria - a common practice among ships in Russia's "shadow fleet."


Key Takeaways:


  • International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the Kyivska Electrical Substation in Kyiv Oblast on February 4 to assess damage to the substation as Russian long-range strikes targeting energy infrastructure continue threaten Ukraine's nuclear power plants (NPPS) and Ukraine's energy production capabilities.


  • Russian officials continue to justify the Kremlin's decision to not conduct an involuntary reserve call up at this time despite indications that the Russian military is struggling to recruit enough new personnel to replace its high casualties.


  • Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss Russia's possible illegal annexation of Kharkiv Oblast but claimed that Ukraine's September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast spoiled Russia's plans to hold a "referendum" in the region at that time.


  • A significant number of Russian vessels that had been at the Port of Tartus in recent weeks may have left Syria for Russia as Russian-Syrian negotiations about Russia's continued access to its bases in Syria reportedly continue.


  • Ukrainian naval drone strikes have likely forced Russia to dramatically alter Russian ships' routes between Russia and Syria.


  • Russia has also reportedly used vessels belong to the MoD's Oboronlogistika company to monitor NATO vessels in the Baltic Sea.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.


  • A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces in the Siversk direction continue to struggle with systemic issues with field commanders filing false progress reports despite recent command changes.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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