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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 13일

by Summa posted Feb 14, 2025
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```html 주요 사항

주요 사항:

  • 우크라이나의 유럽 파트너들은 2월 12일 우크라이나 방위 연락 그룹(람슈타인 형식) 회의에서 우크라이나에 새로운 군사 지원을 발표했습니다.
  • 러시아는 2023년에 3,000대에 비해 2024년에 5,000대가 조금 넘는 전차와 장갑차를 잃은 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • IISS는 러시아가 현재 장비 부족 문제를 해결하기 위해 일부 전술을 변경했으며 전선을 따라 진격하기 위해 보병 주도 공격에 점점 더 의존하고 있다고 지적했습니다.
  • 러시아가 우크라이나에서의 손실을 대체하고 새로운 러시아 부대를 장비하기에 충분한 수의 전차와 장갑차를 수리하고 새로 생산할 수 있는지는 여전히 불분명합니다.
  • 에스토니아 외교정보국(EFIS)은 러시아가 우크라이나에서의 러시아 전쟁 노력을 지원할 뿐만 아니라 NATO와의 잠재적인 미래 전쟁에 대비하기 위해 역량을 구축하려 하고 있다고 평가했습니다. 이는 ISW가 중장기적으로 NATO와의 미래 갈등에 대비하여 러시아 군대와 사회를 준비하기 위한 러시아의 현재 노력에 대한 평가와 일치합니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 러시아 국방 산업 기업에 대한 지속적인 공격 캠페인의 일환으로 러시아의 에너지 및 군사 인프라를 계속 공격하고 있습니다.
  • 몰도바 외무부(MFA)는 2월 13일 몰도바 영공을 침범한 러시아 드론에 대한 지속적인 보고에 대응하여 몰도바에 러시아 문화 센터를 설립하고 운영하는 몰도바-러시아 정부간 협정을 종료한다고 발표했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 보로바와 시베르스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 "BARS-브랸스크" 자원 봉사 영토 방위 분리대에 대한 모집을 늘리기 위한 노력을 계속하고 있습니다.

분류:

  • 군사
  • 정치
  • 외교

관련된 주요국가:

  • 우크라이나
  • 러시아
  • 미국

향후 전망:

  • 러시아는 우크라이나에서의 손실을 대체하기 위해 충분한 수의 전차와 장갑차를 수리하고 새로 생산할 수 있을지 여부가 불분명합니다.
  • 러시아는 우크라이나에서의 전쟁 노력을 지원할 뿐만 아니라 NATO와의 잠재적인 미래 전쟁에 대비하기 위해 역량을 구축하려 하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 러시아 국방 산업 기업에 대한 지속적인 공격 캠페인을 계속할 것입니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나 동부에서 계속 진격할 것입니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 "BARS-브랸스크" 자원 봉사 영토 방위 분리대에 대한 모집을 늘리기 위한 노력을 계속할 것입니다.
```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Angelica Evans, Davit Gasparyan, Nicole Wolkov,

Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan


February 13, 2025, 5:30pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.


Click here to read a new special report by ISW Russia Fellow Nataliya Bugayova: "Lessons of the Minsk Deal: Breaking the Cycle of Russia's War in Ukraine."

Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting. The United Kingdom (UK) pledged 150 million pounds (about $188 million) in military support, including drones, "dozens" of battle tanks and armored vehicles, and air defense systems, and confirmed plans to provide Ukraine with an additional 4.5 billion pounds (about $5.6 billion) worth of military assistance in 2025. The UK stated that it will provide Ukraine will over 50 armored and protective vehicles, including modernized T-72 tanks, by the end of Spring 2025. Germany committed to supplying 100 IRIS-T air defense system missiles to Ukraine in the near future, and German defense company Helsing announced the delivery of 6,000 AI-equipped drones to Ukraine. Norway joined the Ukrainian Drone Coalition and revealed plans to establish and equip Ukraine's "Northern Brigade" as part of a broader Nordic initiative in which the Nordic countries will equip and train one Ukrainian battalion each. The Netherlands announced the delivery of 25 YPR armored infantry vehicles, Latvia announced the donation of 42 armored personnel carriers, and Estonia also pledged to allocate 0.25 percent of its GDP for military assistance to Ukraine in 2025.


Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023. The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated on February 10 that Russia lost 1,400 main battle tanks (roughly four tank divisions' worth) and over 3,700 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) — totaling 5,100 lost tanks and armored vehicles in 2024. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024, and IISS' estimates likely only account for destroyed tanks and armored vehicles. IISS assessed in February 2024 that Russia would be able to sustain its then-rate of vehicle losses (over 3,000 tanks, APCs, and IFVs annually as of 2023) until February 2026 or 2027 by refurbishing vehicles from Soviet-era storage facilities. It remains unclear if the Russian military command will remain willing or able to sustain this increased rate of armored vehicle losses in 2025, as Russian forces appear to be adapting their tactics to limit such losses.


Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) announced on February 13 that Ukrainian drones destroyed two Valdai radar complexes in Dolgoprudny, Moscow Oblast and noted that Russian forces used the radar complexes to detect and down drones over the airspace near Moscow City. Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on February 13 that Ukrainian drones targeted the Lipetsk water aeration station in Lipetsk City, and a Russian source claimed that Ukrainian drones targeted the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Plant, which is located near the station and produces about 20 percent of Russia's steel output. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne, citing sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU), reported on February 13 that the SBU struck the Andreapol oil pumping station in Tver Oblast, causing a fire at the boiler equipment warehouse and a closed switchgear.


Key Takeaways:


  • Ukraine's European partners announced new military assistance to Ukraine amid the February 12 Ukraine Defense Contact Group (the Ramstein format) meeting.


  • Russia reportedly lost just over 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles during 2024 compared with 3,000 in 2023.


  • IISS noted that Russia has adapted some of its tactics to address ongoing equipment shortages and is increasingly relying on infantry-led assaults to advance along the frontline.


  • It remains unclear if Russia can repair and newly-produce a sufficient number of tanks and armored vehicles to replace losses in Ukraine and equip new Russian units.


  • Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service (EFIS) assessed that Russia is attempting to build its capabilities not only to support Russia's war effort in Ukraine but also to prepare for a potential future war with NATO, which is consistent with ISW's assessments about ongoing Russian efforts to prepare its military and society for a future conflict with NATO in the medium to long-term.


  • Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian energy and military infrastructure as part of an ongoing strike campaign against Russian defense industrial enterprises.


  • The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) announced on February 13 the termination of the Moldovan-Russian Intergovernmental Agreement on the establishment and functioning of Russian cultural centers in Moldova in response to ongoing reports of Russian drones violating Moldovan airspace.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Siversk.


  • Russian officials continue efforts to increase recruitment for the "BARS-Bryansk" volunteer territorial defense detachment.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

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