The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice. The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Preparatory Committee started sending invitations to over one thousand Syrians nationwide and internationally on February 23 calling for attendees to report the next day to Damascus. The Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim said that over 600 invitees arrived in Damascus on February 24. The short notice prevented the attendance of invitees from outside of Syria and likely decreased participation from remote provinces like Hasakah and Raqqa, given the travel and planning requirements inherent for international travel and travel through lines of control within Syria. The conference will hold simultaneous 4.5-hour sessions touching on transitional justice, constitutional structure, institutional reform, personal freedoms, civil society, and economic principles on February 25. Syrian interim president Ahmed al Shara will also speak to the conference attendees.
The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. The interim government, the Preparatory Committee, and Shara had framed the conference as a chance for Syrians to meaningfully impact the direction of post-Assad Syria and as a gesture of good will to minority groups that HTS would not assume authoritarian power over the state. The failure to give proper advance notice for the conference is unlikely to achieve these lofty expectations, however. The lack of advance notice means that many Syrians—both inside and outside Syria—will not be able to attend owing to logistical constraints. The conference’s short time frame will similarly not allow for any meaningful discussion on plans for Syria’s future. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.
Some minority leaders in Syria are already expressing their concerns over the short notice, limited scope, and short duration of the talks. A Druze leader, the Syrian Kurdish National Council (KNC) and other Kurdish minority party representatives expressed frustrations with the conference. The KNC condemned the haste, scope, and choice of representatives. Damascus excluded the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is heavily influential within the SDF. None of these groups or leaders are representative of the entirety of their minority groups. Their frustrations and concerns do underscore the significant shortcomings inherent in the rapid execution of the conference, however.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria. Netanyahu said that Israel would not allow any Syrian government forces to deploy south of Damascus and demanded “full demilitarization” of Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra provinces. Daraa, Suwayda, and Quneitra make up 11,241 square kilometers. Netanyahu added that Israel will “not tolerate any threat to the Syrian Druze community.” Syrians demonstrated against Netanyahu’s statement in several locations across Daraa Province. The Syrian interim government has not publicly responded to Netanyahu’s statement at the time of this writing.
Israel has also offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry)—will launch a pilot program to provide job opportunities to members of the Syrian Druze community to work in Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. Local Syrian media claimed on February 22 that Israel conducted a census in Quneitra Province as a part of this program. Residents of Quneitra reportedly rejected Israeli job opportunities, labeling any acceptance of the opportunities as “normalization with Israel.” Local Syrian media quoted unspecified Quneitra residents who suggested that these moves demonstrated Israel’s “intention to remain [in Syria] for a long time.”
The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syria will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF. Interim Syrian President Ahmed al Shara said on January 23 that Damascus does not seek a fight with Israel, but Shara has only limited control over southwestern Syria as of February 2025. A pro-Assad Syrian militia claimed an attack targeting Israeli forces in Quneitra in early 2025. These regime remnants currently have very limited capabilities, but a continued Israeli presence could engender increased hostility in southern Israel and enable other anti-Israeli groups to recruit more fighters.
Key Takeaways:
- Syrian Constitution: The Syrian interim government began a two-day National Dialogue Conference on February 24 on 24-hour notice. The conference has not yet met the expectations that the HTS-led interim government initially set due to the 24-hour notice given to participants, which will constrain the ability of many Syrians to attend the conference. This may result in a conference that makes few decisions and does not represent large swathes of Syrians.
- Israel in Syria: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanded on February 23 that Syria fully demilitarize southern Syria. Israel has simultaneously offered other opportunities to small numbers of Syrian Druze and reportedly conducted a census of Quneitra Province. The continued Israeli presence in southwestern Syrian will provide opportunities for anti-Israeli Syrian groups to attack the IDF.
- Hezbollah in Lebanon: Hezbollah officials said that they will “support” the Lebanese army’s efforts to expel Israel from Lebanon, which reflects the group’s severe degradation and prioritization of reconstitution. Hezbollah’s activities on the ground also indicate that Hezbollah is willing to shift more security responsibilities to the Lebanese army, even in Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon.
- Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan: Iran reportedly threatened to strike Iraqi Kurdistan with unspecified systems if Iraq fails to implement the March 2023 Iran-Iraq security agreement. A flurry of meetings between the Kurdistan Regional Government, federal Iraqi government, and Iranian government to discuss border security suggests that Iran may be increasingly concerned about its border security along the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. CTP-ISW cannot verify the reports of an Iranian threat to strike, however.
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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 24일
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