메뉴 건너뛰기

군사국방

국방뉴스

[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 2월 25일

by Summa posted Feb 26, 2025
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

ESC닫기

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

ESC닫기

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄

```html Key Takeaways: 핵심 요점

핵심 요점:

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 우크라이나 대통령 볼로디미르 젤렌스키를 우크라이나의 합법적 대통령이자 러시아의 미래 협상 상대방으로 암묵적으로 인정하면서 우크라이나 사회와 우크라이나 군대를 내부에서 불안정하게 만들기 위한 새로운 정보 작전을 홍보했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 2021년부터 요구해 온 우크라이나 정권 교체에 대한 요구를 재포장하기 위해 새로운 언어를 사용하려고 했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 우크라이나에 대한 이 문제에서 우크라이나를 앞지르고 미국이 우크라이나에 대한 실질적인 러시아 양보 대신 러시아의 경제적 조치 제안을 받아들이도록 하기 위한 노력의 일환으로 미국과 러시아 희토류 광물에 대한 거래를 제안했습니다.
  • 푸틴은 양보할 의향이 없다는 것을 계속 보여주고 러시아 동맹국을 미래의 잠재적 협상 당사자로 제안하면서도 유럽이 우크라이나 협상에 참여하는 것을 지지한다고 주장하려고 했습니다.
  • 크렘린 관리들은 러시아의 동맹국들과의 외교적 교류를 계속 활용하여 러시아가 우크라이나의 러시아어 사용 소수 민족을 보호하기 위해 우크라이나를 침공했다는 모스크바의 주장을 강화하고 있습니다.
  • 조선로동당 대표단이 러시아 여당인 통합러시아의 초청으로 2월 25일 모스크바에 도착했으며, 북한이 러시아에 더 많은 물자를 보낼 것이라는 보도가 나왔습니다.
  • 서방 관리들은 우크라이나에 대한 유럽 군사 지원의 규모를 계속 강조하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠르스크주와 쿠피얀스크, 리만, 벨리카 노보실카 근처에서 진격했고, 우크라이나군은 최근 쿠피얀스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.
  • 사마라주 당국은 2025년 1월에 이러한 지급을 일시적으로 늘린 후 러시아 국방부(MoD)와 군 복무 계약을 맺는 군인에 대한 일회성 지급을 줄였습니다.
  • BBC 러시아어 서비스는 2월 25일 다양한 부패 혐의로 기소되고 유죄 판결을 받은 100명 이상의 러시아 정부, 군, 보안 관리들이 우크라이나에서 싸우고 있다고 보도했습니다.
  • 크렘린은 우크라이나 전쟁 참전 용사를 정부 직책에 배치하는 "영웅의 시간" 프로그램을 사용하여 장기적으로 러시아 사회를 계속 군사화할 충성스럽고 극우적 참전 용사로 구성된 새로운 러시아 엘리트를 형성하기 위한 노력을 계속하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 점령된 크림반도에 소련 시대 잠수함 기지를 다시 열고 있을 수 있습니다.

분류:

  • 정치
  • 군사
  • 외교

관련된 주요국가:

  • 러시아
  • 우크라이나
  • 미국

향후 전망:

  • 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 러시아는 우크라이나에 대한 군사적 압력을 계속 가할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 우크라이나는 서방 국가들의 지원을 받아 러시아에 저항할 것으로 예상됩니다.
  • 전쟁은 우크라이나와 러시아 모두에 큰 피해를 입힐 것으로 예상됩니다.
```

[원문]

ISW Logo

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Christina Harward, Davit Gasparyan, Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter


February 25, 2025, 10:00pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2024.

Click here to read a new special report from ISW Russia Analyst Grace Mappes: "Russia Has Failed to Break Ukraine."


Click here to read a new special report by ISW Russia Analyst Christina Harward: "Russia's Weakness Offers Leverage."


Click here to read a new fact sheet on Ukraine.


Click here to read a new factsheet on the Istanbul Protocol Draft Document of April 15, 2022.

Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within. Putin gave an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 24 in which Putin stated that "elections in Ukraine are not held under the pretext of martial law" — Putin's first acknowledgment that Ukrainian law prohibits elections during martial law. Putin claimed that Zelensky is "toxic" for Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military and that Zelensky would lose any future presidential election to other Ukrainian political and military leaders. Putin's statements are likely aimed at Ukrainian and Russian audiences. Putin's claims that Zelensky is unpopular and harmful to Ukraine are attempts to drive a wedge between the legitimate government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military and population. Putin has repeatedly claimed that Zelensky is not the legitimate leader of Ukraine after Ukraine did not hold elections in 2024 — in accordance with Ukrainian law — as part of Russian efforts to claim that Russia cannot negotiate with Zelensky. US President Donald Trump has stated that Putin and Zelensky must engage in negotiations, and Putin is likely shifting his rhetoric in order to explain to Russian domestic audiences his decision to engage in any future negotiations with Zelensky. Putin and other Kremlin officials will likely attempt to exploit any Ukrainian military setbacks or differing opinions among Ukrainian officials to intensify this information operation and sow discord in Ukraine.


Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021. Putin stated during the interview with Zarubin that Russia "has nothing against" the preservation of Ukrainian statehood but wants Ukraine to "turn into a friendly neighboring state" and for Ukrainian territory to "not be used as a springboard for an attack against Russia" in the future. Putin's calls for Ukraine to "turn" into a "friendly" state demonstrate that Putin is still calling for the removal of the democratically elected government in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Kremlin government. The Kremlin has previously used thinly veiled calls for "denazification" to demand regime change in Ukraine, and Putin appears to be using new language to make these same demands. Putin has demanded Ukrainian regime change since Summer 2021.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin implicitly acknowledged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as the legitimate president of Ukraine and Russia's future negotiating partner while promoting a new information operation that aims to destabilize Ukrainian society and the Ukrainian military from within.


  • Putin attempted to use new language to repackage the calls for regime change in Ukraine that he has demanded since 2021.


  • Putin offered to make a deal with the United States on Russian rare earth minerals as part of efforts to outbid Ukraine on this matter and to push the United States to accept Russian offers of economic measures in lieu of any actual Russian concessions on Ukraine.


  • Putin attempted to claim that he supports Europe's participation in negotiations on Ukraine while continuing to show his unwillingness to make concessions and seemingly proposing Russian allies as possible future negotiating parties.


  • Kremlin officials continue to exploit diplomatic engagements with Russia's allies to reinforce Moscow's narrative that Russia invaded Ukraine to protect Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine.


  • A delegation from North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) arrived in Moscow on February 25 at the invitation of Russia's ruling party, United Russia, amid reports that North Korea may be shipping more material to Russia.


  • Western officials continue to highlight the scale of European military aid to Ukraine.


  • Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Lyman, and Velyka Novosilka, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk.


  • Samara Oblast authorities reduced one-time payments to soldiers who sign military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after temporarily increasing these payments in January 2025.


  • The BBC Russian Service reported on February 25 that over 100 Russian government, military, and security officials accused and convicted of various corruption charges are fighting in Ukraine.


  • The Kremlin continues efforts to use its "Time of Heroes" program, which places veterans of the war in Ukraine in government positions, to form a new Russian elite composed of loyal and ultranationalist veterans that will continue to militarize Russian society over the long term.


  • Russia may be reopening a Soviet-era submarine base in occupied Crimea.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

Website | Jobs & Internships


Follow ISW on social media:


Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.


ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



위로