Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region. Syrian government reinforcements deployed across to Tartous and Latakia on March 6 in response to coordinated attacks by Assadist insurgents on Syrian military checkpoints and patrols in Jableh, Latakia Province. Clashes between Syrian government forces and insurgents spread overnight to other parts of Latakia and Tartous provinces. The Syrian government deployed armored units, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area. Insurgents attempted to take control of hospitals across the coastal region and continued to attack security personnel as government forces advanced into coastal cities. The Syrian government deployed armor, helicopters, and drone units to locate and target insurgents in the area. Syrian government forces have killed or captured over 150 pro-Assad insurgents captured since March 6.
The heaviest bouts of fighting between insurgent cells and government forces took place in Jableh, south of Latakia City, where insurgent cells launched coordinated attacks on March 6. Insurgents attacked security forces as government forces advanced north on the coastal highway towards Jableh and targeted security forces with mortars and small arms within the city. Security forces prevented pro-Assad insurgents from besieging a hospital on the Jableh outskirts and re-secured the Naval College in Jableh after several hours of clashes. It does not appear that government forces have fully re-secured the city, however. Likely insurgents continued to conduct attacks in the city, including an attack that sabotaged a high voltage line that caused a power outage in Latakia Province.
Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. Syrian government forces have secured most of the region’s larger towns but still have not fully eliminated insurgent cells in Tartous and Latakia’s Alawite-majority mountainous countryside. Insurgents also do not wear uniforms and can quickly blend back into the population when they come under pressure from security forces, making them very difficult to defeat in one clearing operation. Security forces advanced into some towns in the Latakia countryside and engaged insurgents, including Qardaha—Assad’s hometown—in order to free dozens of security personnel that insurgents had taken hostage. Security personnel expanded the campaign to pursue insurgents into the southern Hama countryside, suggesting that these insurgent cells have a presence outside of coastal heartland or that insurgents have fled the area.
Government control over most populated areas will not necessarily prevent insurgents from returning, however. That cells of pro-Assad fighters were able to organize amongst themselves and respond quickly to the initial clashes in Jableh suggests that anti-government sentiment is relatively strong. Hardcore Assadists have been able to successfully exploit a variety of grievances against the Syrian interim government to recruit new members who may or may not be initially motivated by a desire to restore Assad. A Syrian near Beit Ana in Latakia said that many young men volunteered to shoot at government personnel after an unknown individual provided them with rifles. Insurgencies against the interim government will likely continue to emerge in these areas until the government addresses the root causes of the Alawite community’s feelings of disenfranchisement and secures the population against abuses from incompetent government security forces.
It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells, however. Syrian government forces captured several well-known Assad-era commanders, including Assad’s former head of Air Force Intelligence Ibrahim Huwaija, but there is no clear evidence that they were involved in the inception or planning of coordinated attacks. Several organized insurgent groups have also been tied to the current clashes, including Assadist groups like the Syrian Popular Resistance, ex-Republican Guard commander Muqdad Fataha’s Shield of the Coast Brigade, and ex-Fourth Division member Ghiath Dalah’s recently-announced Military Council for the Liberation of Syria. Dalah called for restraint from his followers in a statement on March 7, condemning instances of sectarian-motivated violence and stating that he seeks to negotiate with the government.[19] It does not appear that Dalah or any other former regime elements fully control the coastal insurgents, despite his call to his followers. Interim government forces have conducted near-constant raids and searches for former Assad regime members in former regime strongholds since coming to power in December 2024. It is unlikely that a single large, organized, unified insurgent organization has been able to form and coordinate the majority of the targeted attacks against government forces on March 6.
Key Takeaways:
- Insurgency in Syria: Insurgent cells continued to attack Syrian interim government personnel across Latakia and Tartous provinces as Syrian forces deployed to re-impose security over the coastal region. Government forces have secured most populated areas, but this does not mean that government forces have defeated the insurgency in these areas. It does not appear that any one actor or group controls these Assadist insurgent cells.
- Sectarianism in Syria: Emerging reports of massacres in coastal Alawite communities perpetrated by interim government forces increase the likelihood that insurgent cells will expand in size, geographic distribution, and Alawite support.
- Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: US President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on March 5 that proposed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian political and religious officials rejected negotiations with the United States in the immediate hours following the announcement of Trump’s letter. It is unclear how the Supreme Leader will respond in the days and weeks ahead.
- Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program: Senior Iranian military advisors, IRGC officials, and parliamentarians are increasingly lobbying the Supreme Leader to pursue a nuclear weapon. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov stated that Iranian production of 60 percent enriched uranium has “no weapons risk." Ulyanov’s statement further demonstrates that Russia would not help secure US interests as a mediator between the United States and Iran in nuclear negotiations.
- Houthis and the Red Sea: Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi threatened on March 7 to resume attacks on maritime shipping in the Red Sea on March 7 if Israel does not restart aid deliveries into the Gaza Strip by March 11.
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