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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 1일

by Summa posted Apr 02, 2025
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```html 요약

요약

  • 러시아군은 에너지 인프라에 대한 폭격을 계속하고 있으며, 이는 러시아가 짧은 사거리 포병으로 우크라이나 에너지 인프라를 공격하기 위해 폭격 중단 협정의 모호하거나 확정되지 않은 조건을 이용하고 있음을 시사한다.
  • 러시아 고위 관리들은 우크라이나 전쟁의 "근본 원인"을 제거하는 것이 평화 협정의 전제 조건이라고 계속해서 반복하고 있다. 이는 러시아의 초기 전쟁 요구 사항을 언급한 것으로, 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령의 우크라이나에서 지속 가능한 평화를 달성하려는 목표와 직접적으로 상충된다.
  • 러시아군은 앞으로 몇 개월 안에 보로바와 리만을 점령하기 위한 조건을 조성하기 위한 상호 보완적 노력의 일환으로 리만 북동쪽의 교두보를 확장하고 있다.
  • 러시아군은 앞으로 몇 개월 안에 보로바 또는 리만을 점령하기 위해 리만 북동쪽의 확장된 교두보를 활용할 수 있다.
  • 러시아군은 또한 리만 북동쪽의 교두보를 활용하여 우크라이나가 통제하는 루한스크주의 나머지 1%를 점령하고 루한스크주 전체를 점령하려는 러시아의 오랜 목표를 달성할 수 있다.
  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 2026년 1월부터 러시아 주지사의 급여를 인상하여 러시아 부총리의 급여와 동일하게 하는 법령에 서명했다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠르스크와 벨고로드 주, 리만, 포크로프스크, 쿠라호베 방향으로 진격했다.

분류: 군사, 정치 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 향후 전망: 러시아군은 앞으로 몇 개월 안에 보로바 또는 리만을 점령하기 위해 리만 북동쪽의 확장된 교두보를 활용할 가능성이 높다. 러시아군은 또한 리만 북동쪽의 교두보를 활용하여 우크라이나가 통제하는 루한스크주의 나머지 1%를 점령하고 루한스크주 전체를 점령하려는 러시아의 오랜 목표를 달성할 수 있다.
```

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Angelica Evans, Daria Novikov, Nicole Wolkov, Davit Gasparyan,

Anna Harvey, Karolina Hird, and George Barros

with William Runkel and Nate Trotter



April 1, 2025, 5:45 pm ET

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Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire's vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery, but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin stated on April 1 that Russian forces shelled energy infrastructure in Kherson City on the morning of April 1, leaving at least 45,000 Kherson residents without electricity. Sybiha stated on April 1 that Russian forces have recently violated the energy infrastructure ceasefire several times. The ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes is reportedly a moratorium on long-range strikes, but it remains unclear whether the moratorium's terms prohibit striking energy infrastructure with shorter-range tube or rocket artillery. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 11 that Ukraine proposed a "temporary ceasefire in the sky" that would include "missile, bomb, and long-range drone" strikes. US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached some agreements for a temporary ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure on March 25 but not provide details on whether the ceasefire is exclusively limited to longer-range weapons. Russian forces will likely continue to leverage their positions along the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and other frontline areas to shell and destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure in near rear areas unless the energy infrastructure ceasefire includes provisions against such shelling. Russian shelling against Ukrainian energy infrastructure violates the spirit of the ceasefire and US President Donald Trump's intention to utilize the energy infrastructure ceasefire as a confidence-building measure to work towards a general ceasefire in the future. Ukrainian, Russian, and US officials have yet to formalize the ceasefire or present its exact terms.


Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement — a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on April 1 that the Trump administration is attempting "some kind of scheme" to first achieve a ceasefire and then move to "other models and schemes" to end the war. Ryabkov further claimed that the Trump administration's plan to resolve the war in Ukraine does not address the "root causes" of the war and that Russia, therefore, cannot accept the US proposal. Senior Russian officials have repeatedly defined these root causes as NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and Ukraine's alleged violations of the rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine. The Kremlin's demands to address these so-called "root causes" amount to a demand for the full capitulation of Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian government in Ukraine and long-term commitments of Ukrainian neutrality — the same demands Putin has made since before the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin recently intensified efforts to portray the current Ukrainian government as illegitimate and unable to engage in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine's role as a legitimate participant in discussions about the resolution of the war. Putin and Russian diplomats made thinly veiled demands in late March 2025 for regime change in Ukraine by having external parties establish a “temporary international administration” in Ukraine under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). US Department of State Spokesperson Tammy Bruce stated on March 31 that Trump did not appreciate Russia's suggestion to establish a "temporary administration" in Ukraine. Bruce also noted that Trump understands that negotiations will "require both Russia and Ukraine to make tough decisions and compromises." Russia has so far refused to make any concessions and rejected the US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire when Trump called Putin on March 18.


Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months. Footage published on March 28 and geolocated on April 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and likely seized Novolyubivka itself. Russian forces recently made confirmed advances southeast of Nove (west of Novolyubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on March 31 that Russian forces advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novolyubivka). Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right) bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last three months. Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east (left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations. Russian milbloggers and Mashovets have consistently credited elements of the Russian 144th and 3rd motorized rifle divisions (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with making the initial advances onto the west bank and then expanding this bridgehead.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire’s vague or unfinalized terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.


  • Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve a lasting peace in Ukraine.


  • Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.


  • Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months.


  • Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on April 1 to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.


  • Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and in the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.

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