메뉴 건너뛰기

군사국방

국방뉴스

[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 15일

by Summa posted Apr 16, 2025
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄

```html Key Takeaways: 요약

요약

  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령의 측근 2명은 2024년 6월 푸틴의 협상 불가 요구 사항을 반복했는데, 이는 우크라이나 전쟁의 해결책이 체제 변화, 광범위한 영토 양보, 미국의 스티브 위트코프 중동 특사가 푸틴과 4월 11일에 만난 후 우크라이나 군대에 대한 장기적인 제한을 가져와야 한다는 것입니다.
  • 크렘린 관리들은 우크라이나가 러시아가 현재 점령하지 않은 영토를 항복하도록 요구하고 NATO 회원국을 포함한 독립 국가에 대한 통제권을 주장하려는 러시아의 야망을 정당화하기 위해 계속해서 정보적 조건을 설정하고 있습니다.
  • 나리시킨은 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령이 유럽이 자체 방위 역량을 강화하도록 촉구함에 따라 NATO 국가들이 방어력을 강화하는 것에 대한 대응으로 NATO 국가에 대한 러시아의 공격을 위협했습니다.
  • 라브로프는 트럼프의 30일 완전 휴전 제안을 거부한 푸틴의 입장을 거듭 확인했습니다.
  • 러시아는 30일 에너지 인프라 공격 휴전의 종료를 곧 인정하고 우크라이나에 대한 장거리 공격을 강화할 수 있지만 휴전의 정확한 매개변수(종료 날짜 포함)는 불분명합니다.
  • 우크라이나 국가방위대는 4월 15일에 우크라이나가 군단 구조로 전환하려는 노력의 일환으로 기존 여단 2개를 기반으로 새로운 군단 2개를 창설한다고 발표했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 토레츠크와 포크로프스크 근처에서 진격했고, 러시아군은 최근 벨리카 노보실카 근처와 서부 자포리자주에서 진격했습니다.

분류: 정치, 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 계속될 것으로 예상되며, 러시아는 우크라이나의 영토를 더 많이 점령하려 할 것입니다. 우크라이나는 계속 저항할 것이지만, 러시아의 군사력이 우월하기 때문에 우크라이나가 전쟁에서 승리할 가능성은 낮습니다.
```

[원문]

ISW Logo

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter



April 15, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the latest "Russian Occupation Update," a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.


ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet Kommersant on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia "cannot give [Russian speakers living in occupied Ukraine] up" following the illegal and sham referendums Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022. Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.


Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024 speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations. Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and is negotiating with several European states.


Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands. Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have consistently demanded that:


  • Ukraine must demilitarize. Putin named "demilitarization" as one of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024, that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire. Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression. Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400 tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000 National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.

 

  • Ukraine must "denazify" and install a "legitimate" government. Putin named "denazification" as another of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people. Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.

 

  • Ukraine must abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future. Putin's demand for Ukraine's “neutrality” remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel or systems in Ukraine.

 

  • Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and "Novorossiya" to Russia. Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine. Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke the term "Novorossiya" (an amorphous, invented region in Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.

 

  • Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." Lavrov has repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.


Key Takeaways:


  • Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.


  • Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states.


  • Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities.


  • Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.


  • Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.


  • Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Click Here to Read the Full Report

Website | Jobs & Internships


Follow ISW on social media:


Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC, 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.


ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



  1. [공지] 참조 사이트

    Date2023.12.14 BySumma
    read more
  2. [국방부] 6년차 예비군 인터넷 원격교육 첫 시행…개인 휴대폰·PC 등 활용

    Date2025.04.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  3. [국방부] 군 정찰위성 군집운용 능력 보강

    Date2025.04.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  4. [국방부] 2025년 예비군훈련 원격교육 시행

    Date2025.04.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  5. [국방부] 민간 우수 신기술의 국방활용을 촉진하는 「정보통신기술(ICT) 신기술 국방활용 제안 발표회」 개최

    Date2025.04.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  6. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 20일

    Date2025.04.21 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  7. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 19일

    Date2025.04.20 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  8. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 18일

    Date2025.04.19 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  9. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 18일

    Date2025.04.19 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  10. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 17일

    Date2025.04.18 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  11. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 17일

    Date2025.04.18 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  12. [ISW] 러시아 점령 업데이트, 2025년 4월 17일

    Date2025.04.17 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  13. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 16일

    Date2025.04.17 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  14. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 16일

    Date2025.04.17 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  15. [ISW] 러시아군 생성 및 기술 적응 업데이트 2025년 4월 15일

    Date2025.04.16 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  16. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 15일

    Date2025.04.16 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  17. [ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 15일

    Date2025.04.16 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  18. [국방부] 국방부장관 직무대행, 해군 제2함대사령부 방문

    Date2025.04.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  19. [국방부] 미국 B-1B 전략폭격기 전개 하 한미 연합공중훈련 시행

    Date2025.04.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  20. [국방부] "나라가 어려운데 군에 가지 않을 수 없습니다" 학도병 참전 '故 주영진 일병' 신원확인

    Date2025.04.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  21. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 14일

    Date2025.04.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
Board Pagination Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 86 Next
/ 86
위로