Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast. Putin met with municipal leaders in Kursk Oblast on May 20, during which the head of Glushkovsky Raion, Pavel Zolotarev, asked Putin to create a buffer zone in Sumy Oblast. Putin asked how many kilometers deep this buffer zone should be, and Zolotarev claimed that Russia should seize "at least Sumy (City)" and implied that Russia should be "bigger." Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein later responded to the interaction on his Telegram channel, claiming that his grandfather was from Sumy Oblast, so "this land is not foreign to [him]." Sumy City is roughly 25 kilometers from the international border, and a buffer zone deep enough to include Sumy City would prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery and tactical drone strikes against Russian territory. Western and Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian delegation at the May 16 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul threatened to seize Sumy Oblast in order to create a "security zone." ISW continues to assess that Russia has territorial aims beyond the oblasts that Russia has already illegally occupied or annexed and that Putin may intend to leverage further advances in Sumy Oblast to demand that Ukraine cede part of Sumy Oblast to Russia during future peace negotiations.
The Kremlin likely arranged the interaction at the May 20 meeting in order to frame Putin as an effective and engaged wartime leader by responding to Russian requests to further advance in Sumy Oblast and suggesting that Russia lay claim to more territory within Ukraine. Putin's visit to Kursk Oblast on May 20 for the first time since Russia claimed military victory in the oblast on April 26. ISW has observed reports that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Kursk Oblast as fighting continues, despite official Kremlin claims that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the oblast entirely. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 21 that Ukrainian forces continue active combat operations in Kursk Oblast. Putin also met with Acting Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein and agreed to continue providing federal funding for local residents and to increase demining operations. Putin's meeting with Khinshtein is part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to portray Putin as an effective and caring wartime leader and to downplay Russian failures in the Ukraine theater.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin likely orchestrated a meeting with Kursk Oblast officials on May 20 to set conditions to justify the renewal of Russian plans to seize Sumy City and illegally annex Sumy Oblast.
- Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to seize Sumy City in the near- to medium-term given Russia's demonstrated inability to rapidly seize even much smaller settlements in Ukraine in the past three years.
- Russia continues to promote the false narrative accusing Ukrainian forces of "neo-Nazism" as part of dual Kremlin efforts to justify continued Russian offensive operations in Ukraine despite ongoing peace talks, and to prepare the Russian population for a Russian rejection of any future peace agreement.
- Russia continues to reject American proposals to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine before starting negotiations to end the war.
- Russian officials are setting conditions to refuse Western involvement in peace negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine and for Russia to deny the independence and sovereignty of other former Soviet states.
- Russian security services continue to conduct hybrid operations against the United States and its allies in preparation for a larger future war with NATO.
- The recent establishment of the first formal motorcycle unit within the Ukrainian military demonstrates the rapid technical adaptation cycle that has become typical in Ukraine and that will become a key characteristic of future wars.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka.
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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 5월 21일
[ISW] 러시아군 생성 및 기술 적응 업데이트 2025년 5월 21일
