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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 17일

by Summa posted Aug 18, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약

* 미국 관리들은 푸틴이 평화 협정을 맺기 위해 필요한 양보를 아직 보여주지 않았음을 인정했습니다.

* 러시아는 러시아군이 10년 이상 실패해왔기 때문에 도네츠크주의 남은 부분을 무력으로 빠르게 점령할 수 없을 것입니다. 러시아는 우크라이나가 푸틴의 요구에 굴복하고 주의 나머지 지역에서 철수할 경우에만 도네츠크주 전체를 신속하게 점령할 수 있을 것입니다.

* 러시아군은 역사적으로 우크라이나 동부의 요새화된 지역이나 도시 지역을 점령하기 위해 비용이 많이 드는 작전에 투입되었으며, 이는 푸틴이 주장하는 빠른 진격과는 거리가 멉니다.

* 포크로프스크 북동쪽에서 있었던 최근 러시아의 진격은 러시아가 요새화된 지역이나 도시 지역을 빠르게 점령할 수 있다는 것을 나타내지 않습니다.

* 러시아는 계속해서 우크라이나의 주권을 부인하고 우크라이나 국내 문제에 대한 지시 권한을 요구하고 있습니다.

* 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴이 평화 협정은 러시아가 인식하는 전쟁의 "근본 원인"을 해결해야 한다고 주장하는 것은 "근본 원인"의 복잡성을 감안할 때 트럼프가 원하는 만큼 빠르게 평화 협정에 도달하는 것을 어렵게 만들 것입니다.

* 러시아의 "근본 원인"은 우크라이나를 넘어 확장되며 이를 제거하려면 NATO와의 상당한 협상이 필요할 것입니다.

* 푸틴이 우크라이나의 미래 침공을 금지하는 러시아 법안을 제안하는 것은 신뢰할 수 없습니다. 러시아는 이미 침공하지 않겠다는 이전의 구속력 있는 국제적 약속을 두 번이나 어겼고, 푸틴은 자신이 원하는 대로 러시아 법을 자유롭게 변경할 수 있음을 보여주었기 때문입니다.

* 푸틴이 동의했을 수도 있는 우크라이나 안보 보장에 대한 세부 사항은 현재 불분명하지만, 크렘린은 그러한 보장을 무력화했을 2022년 4월의 안보 보증인에 대한 요구를 부활시키려 시도할 수 있습니다.

* 우크라이나군은 최근 수미주의 북부와 토레츠 근처에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 포크로프스크 근처에서 진격했습니다.

분류

국제 관계, 군사, 정치

관련 주요 국가

  1. 러시아
  2. 우크라이나
  3. 미국

향후 전망

러시아와 우크라이나 간의 평화 협상은 푸틴의 입장 변화, "근본 원인"에 대한 복잡한 문제, NATO와의 추가적인 협상 필요성으로 인해 당분간 어려울 것으로 예상됩니다. 러시아의 군사적 진격은 계속될 수 있지만, 빠른 영토 점령은 쉽지 않을 것으로 보입니다.

```

[원문]

August 17, 2025

Information Cutoff: 9:00 pm ET

Olivia Gibson, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter

TOPLINES

US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in an interview with Face the Nation on August 17 that both Russia and Ukraine need to make concessions in order to achieve a peace agreement. Rubio noted that any agreement in which only one side makes concessions would be a surrender, not a peace agreement. Rubio stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin offered "a couple" of unspecified concessions at the August 15 Alaska summit but did not offer enough concessions to reach a just peace agreement immediately. Rubio reiterated Trump's August 13 statement that the United States is not in a position to accept or reject a deal on behalf of Ukraine and that Ukraine must decide for itself what conditions it will accept for a peace deal. Rubio stated that the Trump administration wants a deal that allows Ukraine to rebuild its country and to "be assured" a Russian invasion "never happens again." Rubio stated that harsher US sanctions against Russia would end the peace talks and continue the war for at least another year to year and a half. ISW continues to assess that Putin has not moderated his original war aims throughout the full-scale invasion and has offered no indication that he intends to change or compromise on these aims in any peace talks with Ukraine.


Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast. Axios reported on August 16, citing a source with direct knowledge of Trump's August 16 call with Zelensky and European leaders, that Trump stated that Putin told him that Russia could seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Putin so desired. Putin's claim that Russian forces will inevitably seize all of Donetsk Oblast if the war continues is false. The Russian campaign to seize all of Donetsk Oblast has been ongoing since Russia's first invasion in 2014 and remains incomplete. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 17 that Russia has tried and failed to seize all of Donetsk Oblast in the past 12 years of fighting in eastern Ukraine. Russian forces have been bogged down in campaigns to seize multiple towns and cities in Donetsk Oblast since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, and Russian forces are still struggling to achieve the objectives of several of these campaigns today. Seizing the remainder of Donetsk Oblast will very likely take Russian forces multiple years to complete after several difficult campaigns.


Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances. Russian forces undertook four notable campaigns in eastern Ukraine in 2024 into 2025 that illustrate how difficult it will likely be for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast through force. Russian forces first began efforts to retake Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast in October 2023 and have conducted multiple separate campaigns aimed at seizing the town in the nearly two years since. Russian forces are currently struggling to complete the encirclement or envelopment of Kupyansk from the northwest and have not yet seized the settlement despite 22 months of offensive operations. Russian forces began a dedicated effort to seize Toretsk, Donetsk Oblast in mid-June 2024. Russian forces started this effort not far from the positions that Russian forces held prior to the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Russian forces seized Toretsk by August 1, 2025, taking 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk.


The Russian campaign for Chasiv Yar, Donetsk Oblast began in May 2023 after Russian forces seized Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar), and Russian forces intensified efforts to seize Chasiv Yar in April 2024. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the seizure of Chasiv Yar on July 31, 2025, although ISW has yet to observe evidence that Russian forces have seized the entirety of the settlement. It has taken Russian forces 26 months to advance about 6.8 miles (roughly 11 kilometers) from western Bakhmut to the western edge of Chasiv Yar.


Russian forces began efforts to seize Pokrovsk, Donetsk Oblast in February 2024 after the seizure of Avdiivka and have dedicated multiple efforts to seizing Pokrovsk through frontal assaults, envelopment, or encirclement – all of which have thus far yet to be successful after more than 18 months.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • US officials acknowledged that Putin has yet to demonstrate a willingness to offer the concessions necessary to reach a peace agreement.


  • Russia will be unable to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast rapidly through force as Russian forces have failed to do for over a decade. Russia could only rapidly seize all of Donetsk Oblast if Ukraine concedes to Putin's demand and withdraws from the remainder of the oblast.


  • Russian forces have historically thrown themselves into costly campaigns to seize fortified or urban areas in eastern Ukraine, a reality far from Putin's claims of rapid advances.


  • Recent Russian advances northeast of Pokrovsk do not indicate that Russia can rapidly seize fortified or urban areas.


  • Russia continues to deny Ukraine's sovereignty and to demand the right to dictate Ukrainian domestic affairs.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin's insistence that any peace agreement must address Russia's perceived "root causes" of the war will make it difficult to reach a peace agreement as rapidly as Trump desires given the complexity of the "root causes."


  • Russia's "root causes" extend beyond Ukraine and eliminating them would require substantial negotiations with NATO.


  • Putin's offer of a Russian law forbidding a future invasion of Ukraine is not credible because Russia has already twice broken previous binding international commitments to not invade and as Putin has shown that he can freely change Russian law as he desires.


  • The details about Ukrainian security guarantees to which Putin may have agreed remain unclear at this time, but the Kremlin may be attempting to resurrect its demands about security guarantors from April 2022 that would have neutered such guarantees.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

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