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[ISW] 정정 - 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 25일

by Summa posted Aug 26, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약

  • 이라크, 바그다드: 이란이 지원하는 이라크 민병대 아사이브 아흘 알 하크(Asaib Ahl al Haq)의 지도자 카이스 알 카잘리(Qais al Khazali)는 이슬람 국가(ISIS)의 부활에 대한 대중의 두려움을 이용하여 이란이 지원하는 대중 동원군(PMF)의 존재를 정당화하려 했습니다. 미국이 이라크 연방 정부에 이란의 영향력을 줄이라고 정치적, 경제적 압력을 가하면서 이라크 정치 공간에서 PMF의 미래와 해산 가능성에 대한 논쟁이 촉발되었습니다.
    관련 자료 및 링크:
  • 이란, 테헤란: 이란 정권은 8월 31일, E3 (영국, 프랑스, 독일)가 핵 문제에 대한 외교적 해결을 위해 이란의 진전을 요구하는 시한을 앞두고 미국과의 핵 협상을 재개하라는 압력을 받고 있습니다. 이란 최고 국가 안보 위원회 (SNSC) 서기 알리 라리자니(Ali Larijani)는 스냅백 제재 및 미국의 추가 공격을 피하기 위해 이란의 우라늄 농축 수준을 60%에서 20%로 줄이도록 이란 정권을 설득하려 노력하고 있는 것으로 알려졌습니다.
    관련 자료 및 링크:
  • 시리아, 수웨이다: 8월 23일 드루즈 지도자 히크마트 알 히지리(Hikmat al Hijri)가 수웨이다 주(Suwayda Province)를 방어하기 위해 약 40개의 드루즈 민병대를 "국가 경비대"로 통합한 것은 시리아 과도 정부의 중앙 집권적 시리아 국가 건설 노력을 훼손하는 행위입니다. 새로 창설된 "국가 경비대"와 "최고 법률 위원회"에는 아사드 시대의 여러 전직 장교가 포함되어 있습니다.
    관련 자료 및 링크:
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[원문]

August 25, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Avery Borens, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Ben Schmida, Katherine Wells, Johanna Moore, and Annika Ganzeveld

Correction: The previous correspondence contained outdated toplines and key takeaways. Please see the correct August 25 Iran Update below.

TOPLINES

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected recent calls by Iranian reformist officials to reform Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. Khamenei delivered a speech on August 24 in which he claimed that “Iran’s enemies” failed to defeat Iran during the Israel-Iran War and are now trying to do so by “creating discord in the country.” Khamenei claimed that agents of the United States and Israel, along with “heedless speakers and writers,” are creating division. Khamenei may have used the term “heedless speakers and writers” to refer to reformist officials who have recently called on the regime to reform its domestic and foreign policies. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on August 13 for the regime to make concessions to the Iranian people, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West. The Iranian Reformist Front separately issued a statement on August 17 that called for political reforms and foreign policy shifts, including suspending uranium enrichment under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. Khamenei rejected this and similar calls to engage with the United States in his speech on August 24, stating that the conflict between Iran and the United States is “unsolvable.” Khamenei additionally rejected direct talks with the United States but did not explicitly rule out the possibility of indirect negotiations.


The Iranian regime is facing increasing pressure to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) August 31 deadline for Iran to make progress toward a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. An Iranian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi will meet with E3 officials in Geneva, Switzerland, on August 26 to continue talks over potential snapback sanctions. British Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated on August 22 that the E3 will activate the snapback mechanism to reimpose United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran unless Iran agrees to a “verifiable, durable deal.” A senior French diplomat told Saudi media on August 25 that the meeting in Geneva would be the “last window open to the Iranian side.” The E3 imposed a deadline of August 31 on Iran to make meaningful progress toward a nuclear deal, such as by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resuming negotiations with the United States. The E3 offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism to allow Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire in October 2025. Iranian officials have rejected postponing the deadline because extending the deadline would provide the E3 with more time to trigger the snapback mechanism. The E3 would need to initiate the snapback process by September 3 in order to complete the process by the current October deadline. The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran's missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.


Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani is reportedly trying to convince the Iranian regime to reduce Iran’s level of uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to avoid snapback sanctions and further US and Israeli strikes, according to a senior Iranian official speaking to The Telegraph on August 24. The senior official stated that Larijani is concerned that another war with the United States or Israel could present a major challenge to the regime. Larijani reportedly faces the most opposition from Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) members. The official also stated that Iranian leaders appear “willing to comply” with Larijani's call to reduce enrichment levels and re-engage with Western countries. The Washington Post similarly reported on July 13 that there is a “consensus” among Iran’s political class that Iran needs to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States, citing political observers inside and outside of Iran. These reports suggest that Iranian moderates who support nuclear negotiations with the United States are continuing to prevail over Iranian hardliners who reject negotiations. Larijani replaced Ali Akbar Ahmadian as SNSC secretary on August 5 as part of a broader restructuring of Iranian defense and security institutions after the Israel-Iran War. Larijani is a moderate politician who supported the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Baghdad, Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali used popular fears about an Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) resurgence to try to justify the existence of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). Recent US political and economic pressure on the Iraqi federal government to curb Iranian influence in Iraq has sparked a debate in the Iraqi political space about the future and possible dissolution of the PMF.


  • Tehran, Iran: The Iranian regime is facing increasing pressure to resume nuclear negotiations with the United States ahead of the E3’s (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) August 31 deadline for Iran to make progress toward a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani is reportedly trying to convince the Iranian regime to reduce Iran’s level of uranium enrichment from 60 percent to 20 percent to avoid snapback sanctions and further US and Israeli strikes.


  • Suwayda, Syria: Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri’s unification of around 40 Druze militias into the “National Guard” to defend Suwayda Province on August 23 undermines the Syrian transitional government’s efforts to establish a centralized Syrian state. The newly-formed “National Guard” and “Supreme Legal Committee” include several former Assad-era officers.


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