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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 1월 11일

by 맘씨 posted Jan 12, 2024
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan



January 11, 2024, 7:25pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on January 11 that Russian forces have 462,000 personnel in Ukraine and that this represents the entire land component of the Russian military. Skibitskyi stated that most Russian units in Ukraine are manned at between 92 and 95 percent of their intended end strength and that the size of the Russian grouping in Ukraine allows Russian forces to conduct rotations throughout the theater. Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces withdraw units that are at 50 percent or less of their intended end strength to rear areas and return them to the front following recovery and replenishment. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 11 that the Russian military has successfully replenished Russian forces in Ukraine through an ongoing crypto-mobilization effort that generated over 500,000 new personnel in 2023.


ISW previously observed routine Russian struggles to conduct operational level rotations from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 through Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive. The apparent Russian ability to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses likely provides Russian forces the ability to replenish units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the line due to degradation and later return these replenished units to the front. Russian forces maintain the initiative throughout eastern Ukraine, and the absence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations likely removes pressure on operational deployments that had previously partially restrained the Russians‘ ability to conduct rotations. Russian forces have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast, however, and appear to be degrading units and formations operating near the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River without making apparent efforts to conduct operational level rotations (although they do appear to conduct tactical-level rotations). Russian forces have conducted several regroupings during localized offensive operations in the Avdiivka, Bakhmut, Lyman, and Kupyansk directions since early October 2023, which likely provided Russian forces time to conduct the rotations Skibitskyi described. ISW has not observed widespread Russian complaints about a lack of rotations throughout the theater since summer 2023, and the overall tempo of Russian operations is consistent with Skibitskyi’s reporting.


Key Takeaways:


  • The reported concentration of the Russian military’s entire combat-capable ground force in Ukraine and ongoing Russian force generation efforts appear to allow Russian forces to conduct routine operational level rotations in Ukraine.


  • Russia’s ability to conduct operational level rotations will likely allow Russian forces to maintain the overall tempo of their localized offensive operations in eastern Ukraine in the near term, but it is unclear if Russian forces will be able to conduct effective rotations in the long term or in the event of intensified Russian offensive efforts or a significant Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.


  • Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian efforts to expand Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) have yet to fulfill operational requirements in Ukraine and that munitions shortages will continue to prompt Russia to source supplies from abroad.


  • Freezing temperatures in Ukraine are likely constraining operations along the front but will likely create more favorable terrain for mechanized maneuver warfare as the ground freezes in the coming weeks.


  • Latvia and Estonia announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on January 11.


  • Russia may be setting information conditions for future escalations against Latvia by threatening to punish Latvia for closing a likely base of Russian informational influence in Latvia.


  • European Commission (EC) Defense Industry Spokesperson Johanna Bernsel clarified on January 11 that European Union (EU) member states will be able to produce a million shells per year by spring 2024 but that the delivery of the shells to Ukraine will depend on individual member states.


  • The US Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Inspector General published a report on January 11 that states that the failure to document certain aid provided to Ukraine in a timely manner is largely due to DoD limitations but that does not suggest that any of the material aid has been misappropriated.


  • Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Speaker Ruslan Stefanchuk announced on January 11 that the Verkhovna Rada withdrew a draft law on mobilization for revisions after discussions between Ukrainian legislators and political and military leadership.


  • A Ukrainian official indicated that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) may struggle to compensate for the loss of base infrastructure after allocating naval assets away from the BSF’s main base of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea.


  • Ukrainian and Russian forces continued positional engagements along the entire front.


  • Kremlin newswire TASS reported on January 10 that Russian forces will deploy additional aircraft and vessels and increase the production of hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles in 2024.



  • The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated on January 10 that it sponsored a trip for 35 Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine to Mogilev for the New Year holiday during which soldiers taught children “the basics of life safety” and how to behave in “extreme situations.”


Click here to read the full assessment.

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[요약]

**러시아 공세 작전 평가** ISW 지원 Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Frederick W. Kagan 2024년 1월 11일 오후 7시 25분 ET ISW의 러시아의 우크라이나 침공 대화형 지도를 보려면 여기를 클릭하세요. 이 지도는 이 보고서에 있는 정적 지도와 함께 매일 업데이트됩니다. ISW의 우크라이나 지형 지형 3D 제어 지도를 보려면 여기를 클릭하세요. 이 데이터가 많은 도구에 액세스하려면 컴퓨터(모바일 장치 아님)를 사용하는 것이 좋습니다. ISW의 러시아의 우크라이나 침공 대화형 타임랩스 지도 아카이브에 액세스하려면 여기를 클릭하세요. 이 지도는 ISW가 매일 제작하는 정적 지형 제어 지도를 보완하여 동적 전선을 보여줍니다. 우크라이나에서 러시아 군대의 전체 전투 가능 지상군이 집중되어 있고 러시아 군대가 우크라이나에서 일상적인 작전 수준 로테이션을 수행할 수 있도록 하는 것으로 보입니다. 우크라이나 주요 군사 정보국(GUR) 부국장 바딤 스키비츠키 소장은 1월 11일 러시아군이 우크라이나에 462,000명의 병력을 보유하고 있으며 이는 러시아 군대의 전체 지상 구성 요소를 나타낸다고 밝혔습니다. 스키비츠키는 우크라이나의 대부분 러시아군이 의도한 최종 병력의 92~95%로 구성되어 있으며 우크라이나의 러시아 군 집단의 규모로 인해 러시아군이 전역에서 로테이션을 수행할 수 있다고 말했습니다. 스키비츠키는 러시아군이 의도한 최종 병력의 50% 이하인 부대를 후방 지역으로 철수시키고 회복 및 보충 후 전선으로 복귀시킨다고 말했습니다. 드미트리 메드베데프 러시아 안전보장위원회 부의장은 1월 11일 러시아 군대가 2023년에 50만 명 이상의 신규 인력을 창출한 지속적인 암호 동원을 통해 우크라이나에서 러시아군을 성공적으로 보충했다고 밝혔습니다. ISW는 이전에 러시아가 2022년 2월에 본격적인 침공을 시작한 이후 우크라이나의


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