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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 3월 15일

by Summa posted Mar 16, 2024
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아군은 2024년 여름에 예상되는 새로운 공세를 준비하는 한편, 2024년 봄에 우크라이나 방어선을 불안정화시키기 위한 현재의 공세를 계속할 가능성이 큽니다. 서방의 안보 지원 제공은 우크라이나가 현재 영토를 유지하고 앞으로 몇 달 안에 새로운 러시아 공세를 격퇴하는 데 중요한 역할을 할 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 충분한 보급을 받은 우크라이나군은 대규모 러시아 공세 동안 러시아군이 사소한 이득조차 얻지 못하도록 막을 수 있음을 보여주었으며, 물자 부족이 완화된다면 우크라이나가 전선을 더욱 안정시키고 이번 여름에 보고된 러시아 공세를 격퇴할 준비를 할 수 있다는 데 의심의 여지가 없습니다.
  • 앞으로 몇 달 동안 러시아가 상당한 이득을 거둘 위협이 있다고 해서 이번 봄에 공세 작전을 통해 러시아군이 그러한 이득을 거둘 위협이 없다는 것을 의미하지는 않습니다.
  • 방공 시스템과 미사일에 대한 긴급한 부족은 빠르게 해결되지 않으면 앞으로 몇 주 안에 후방과 전선 지역에서 러시아 공격에 대항하는 우크라이나의 능력을 극적으로 저하시킬 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나에서의 전투에 적응할 수 있는 능력을 보여주었으며, 우크라이나 전쟁에서 얻은 교훈을 확대하여 러시아 군대가 NATO와의 잠재적인 장기적 대결에 대비하도록 지속적으로 노력할 것입니다.
  • 유럽 고위 관리들은 우크라이나에서 러시아가 승리하면 러시아가 NATO 안보에 전략적 위협을 초래할 것이라고 강조했습니다.
  • 러시아 안전 보장 위원회 부의장 드미트리 메드베데프는 NATO 회원국인 라트비아의 주권에 의문을 제기하고 메드베데프의 "평화 공식"에 따라 우크라이나를 완전히 제거하고 우크라이나를 러시아에 편입하라는 메드베데프의 3월 14일 호소에 따라 라트비아 대통령 에드가르스 린케비치를 위협했습니다.
  • 프랑스 대통령 에마뉘엘 마크롱은 3월 15일에 서방군을 우크라이나에 파견하는 것을 배제하지 않지만 현재 상황에서는 필요하지 않다고 말했습니다.
  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 3월 15일에 우크라이나 영토에서 러시아 국경 지역으로 계속되는 제한적인 습격을 일축했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 칼루가 주에 있는 러시아 정유 공장을 드론 공격했으며, 최근 우크라이나의 정유 공장에 대한 공격으로 인해 러시아 국내 유가가 급등했다고 합니다.
  • 몇몇 러시아인들은 3월 15일 러시아 대선 첫날 투표를 방해하려는 제한적인 시도를 했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 쿠피얀스크와 아브디이프카 근처와 서부 자포리자주에서 확실한 진전을 이루었습니다.
  • 우크라이나 전쟁 포로 대응 본부 대표 페트로 야첸코는 러시아가 해외에서 군인을 모집하기 위한 노력을 강화했다고 말했습니다.
  • 우크라이나 소식통과 러시아 야당 언론은 점령 당국이 점령된 우크라이나에서 투표율을 인위적으로 부풀리고 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령에 대한 지지에 대한 인식을 높이기 위한 강압적 노력을 계속하고 있다고 보도했습니다.
### 분류: 국제정세, 군사, 정치 ### 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 ### 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 가능성이 높으며, 서방 국가들의 지원이 우크라이나의 승패를 결정하는 중요한 요소가 될 것으로 예상됩니다.

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward,

Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan

 

March 15, 2024, 8:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive efforts to destabilize Ukrainian defensive lines in Spring 2024 while also preparing for a forecasted new offensive effort in Summer 2024. The provision of Western security assistance will likely play a critical role in Ukraine’s ability to hold territory now and to repel a new Russian offensive effort in the coming months. Russian forces are attempting to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations throughout eastern Ukraine in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from stabilizing their defensive lines. Russian forces are particularly concentrating on pushing as far west of Avdiivka as possible before Ukrainian forces can establish a harder-to-penetrate line in the area. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on March 15 that Russian forces have concentrated their efforts on the Avdiivka direction and have been conducting daily mechanized and infantry assaults in an attempt to break through Ukrainian defenses. Although Ukrainian forces have recently been able to slow Russian advances west of Avdiivka, pervasive materiel shortages caused by delays in Western security assistance appear to be forcing Ukraine to prioritize limited resources to critical sectors of the front, increasing the risk of a Russian breakthrough in other less-well-provisioned sectors and making the frontline overall more fragile than it appears despite the current relatively slow rate of Russian advances. Russian forces will continue to use the advantages provided by possessing the theater-wide initiative to dynamically reweight their offensive efforts this spring and into the summer, likely in hopes of exploiting possible Ukrainian vulnerabilities. Russian forces may be pressing their attempts at a breakthrough before difficult weather and terrain conditions in spring will likely constrain effective mechanized maneuver on both sides of the line and further limit Russian capabilities to make significant tactical advances while the ground is still muddy. Russian forces have intensified offensive operations during similar conditions before, however, and Russian forces may seek to maintain the tempo of their offensive operations through spring regardless of difficult weather and terrain conditions in an effort to exploit Ukrainian materiel shortages before promised Western security assistance arrives in Ukraine.


Ukrainian and Western officials are increasingly warning about both significant Ukrainian materiel shortages and a new large-scale Russian offensive this summer. The intent and design of the Russian Summer 2024 offensive effort is not immediately clear and likely will not be until Russian forces launch it, but the Russian military command likely intends to capitalize on any gains it makes in the coming weeks as well as on forecasts that the Ukrainian military may be even less-well-provisioned this summer than it is now. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have shown that they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts, and there is no reason to doubt that Ukraine could further stabilize the frontline and prepare for repelling the reported Russian offensive effort this summer if materiel shortages abated.


Western and Ukrainian officials are expressing concerns about delays in Western security assistance to Ukraine ahead of this expected Russian offensive effort. EU High Commissioner Josep Borrell stated on March 14 that the West must increase and speed up its support for Ukraine as the next months will be “decisive” ahead of the expected major Russian offensive in the summer of 2024. Borrell stated in an interview with PBS published on March 14 that Europe alone cannot, however, make up for the lack of US aid as the US has a much stronger and larger military capacity, as ISW has previously assessed. The Washington Post reported on March 15 that a senior US official stated that there is no “bright” future for Ukraine if the US does not pass the supplemental aid package for Ukraine. A senior advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly told the Washington Post that Russian forces are highly likely to make significant territorial gains in Summer 2024 if the US does not provide aid to Ukraine. The Washington Post reported that Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Michael Kofman assessed that the US supplemental aid package would allow Ukrainian forces to “buy time” but that Ukraine must also fix the ”structural problem” related to its limited manpower resources.

 

The threat of significant Russian gains in the coming months does not mean that there is no threat of Russian forces making such gains through offensive operations this spring. Relative Russian successes this spring, even tactical, may set conditions for Russian forces to pursue operationally significant gains in the summer. Neither would a Ukrainian ability to further stabilize the current frontlines this spring preclude Russia from pursuing a breakthrough this summer. Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces will likely be able to prevent any significant Russian advances both in Spring and Summer 2024 as long as sufficient Western security assistance arrives in the next months in a manner that allows Ukrainian forces to address current materiel shortages and prepare for and sustain future defensive operations.



Key Takeaways:


  • Russian forces will likely continue ongoing offensive efforts to destabilize Ukrainian defensive lines in Spring 2024 while also preparing for a forecasted new offensive effort in Summer 2024. The provision of Western security assistance will likely play a critical role in Ukraine’s ability to hold territory now and to repel a new Russian offensive effort in the coming months.


  • Well-provisioned Ukrainian forces have shown that they can prevent Russian forces from making even marginal gains during large-scale Russian offensive efforts, and there is no reason to doubt that Ukraine could further stabilize the frontline and prepare for repelling the reported Russian offensive effort this summer if materiel shortages abated.


  • The threat of significant Russian gains in the coming months does not mean that there is no threat of Russian forces making such gains through offensive operations this spring.


  • Pressing shortages in air defense systems and missiles will likely dramatically reduce Ukraine’s ability to defend against Russian strikes both in rear and frontline areas in the coming weeks if not addressed rapidly.


  • Russian forces have shown the capacity to adapt to fighting in Ukraine and will likely aim to scale lessons learned from the war in Ukraine to ongoing efforts to prepare the Russian military for a potential long-term confrontation with NATO.


  • Senior European officials stressed that a Russian victory in Ukraine would result in Russia posing a strategic threat to NATO security.


  • Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev questioned the sovereignty of Latvia, a NATO member state, and threatened Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs following Medvedev’s March 14 call for the total elimination of Ukraine and Ukraine's absorption into Russia under Medvedev's “peace formula.” 


  • French President Emmanuel Macron stated on March 15 that he is not ruling out sending Western troops to Ukraine but that the current situation does not require it.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed continued limited raids from Ukrainian territory into Russia’s border region on March 15.


  • Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Kaluga Oblast, and recent Ukrainian strikes against oil refineries reportedly caused a spike in Russian domestic oil prices.


  • Several Russians made limited attempts to disrupt the first day of voting in the Russian presidential election on March 15.


  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kupyansk and Avdiivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.


  • Ukrainian Treatment of Prisoners of War Coordinating Headquarters Representative Petro Yatsenko stated that Russia has intensified its efforts to recruit military personnel from abroad.


  • Ukrainian sources and Russian opposition media reported that occupation officials continue coercive efforts to artificially inflate voter turnout and perceptions of support for Russian President Vladimir Putin in occupied Ukraine.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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