Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025. Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in limited counterattacks in select sectors of the front, however, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct limited counteroffensive operations even while largely on the defensive depending on the arrival of Western aid. The New York Times (NYT) reported on July 11 that a senior NATO official stated that Ukraine would have to wait for more Western security assistance and deploy more of its forces to the frontline before conducting counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine would likely not be able to conduct these operations until 2025. A senior US defense official stated that Ukrainian forces would remain on the defensive for the next six months (until January 2025) and that Russian forces will be unlikely to gain significant ground during this time. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces currently remain unlikely to achieve operationally significant gains in Ukraine, and Russian President Vladimir Putin's articulated theory of victory aims for Russian forces to make consistent gradual creeping advances instead of pursuing rapid operationally significant maneuver. Ukraine is currently addressing its manpower challenges and forming several new brigades that Ukraine could commit to support contesting the initiative, and the provision of Western security assistance needed for equipping these brigades will determine when and at what scale Ukraine can contest the initiative. The arrival of Western-provided aid to the frontlines has allowed Ukrainian forces to stabilize critical areas of the front, and Ukrainian forces have conducted tactically significant and successful localized counterattacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast and towards Kreminna (in the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border area) starting in mid-May 2024. Ukrainian forces will likely be able to intensify both the scale and regularity of counterattacks over the coming months as further Western security assistance arrives at the frontline and as Ukraine continues to build out reserves and new brigades. Russian forces are currently attempting to maintain consistent offensive pressure on Ukraine to force Ukrainian forces to commit manpower and materiel to defensive operations instead of accumulating these resources for counteroffensive operations. Russian forces are attempting to achieve this effect through consistent offensive operations throughout eastern and northeastern Ukraine that stretch Ukrainian forces, but nevertheless, Ukrainian forces are leveraging their capabilities and exploiting Russian vulnerabilities to conduct tactical counterattacks.
Ukrainian forces have so far conducted several large-scale counteroffensive operations that have been operationally successful throughout the full-scale invasion, but this approach to liberating territory is not the only possible approach for Ukrainian forces. Breaking out of the current positional warfare in Ukraine is a challenging task for both Russian and Ukrainian forces, and smaller-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive operations present opportunities for pursuing operationally significant objectives without the challenges associated with conducting larger-scale counteroffensive operations. Smaller-scale counteroffensive operations would likely allow Ukraine to start degrading Russia's ability to leverage the theater-wide initiative sooner and more quickly reduce some of the theater-wide pressures on Ukrainian forces. Western security assistance that provides Ukrainian forces with the necessary equipment and weapons at the scale, timing, and regularity that Ukrainian forces require for operations that liberate significant swaths of occupied Ukraine remains the only likely path for reducing Putin's current commitment to destroying Ukrainian statehood and identity regardless of time or cost. These Ukrainian operations do not need to be individual, distinct large-scale endeavors, however, and instead can be a series of compounding counteroffensive operations over the course of late 2024 and throughout 2025.
Key Takeaways:
- Western and US officials reportedly assess that Ukrainian forces will continue to be on the defensive for the next six months and will not be able to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive operation until 2025. Ukrainian forces are already attempting to contest the tactical initiative in limited counterattacks in select sectors of the front, however, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct limited counteroffensive operations even while largely on the defensive depending on the arrival of Western aid.
- The Kremlin continues to signal its unwillingness to participate in peace negotiations that do not result in complete Ukrainian and Western capitulation to the Kremlin's demands amid ongoing Ukrainian efforts to form an international consensus for future negotiations.
- Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov used a phone call with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on July 12, his second in three weeks, to reiterate standard Russian threats intended to coerce the US out of supporting Ukraine as part of an ongoing reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-makers.
- The United Kingdom (UK) government has reportedly not permitted Ukraine to use UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles to strike military targets within Russia, despite previous Western reporting and UK official statements to the contrary.
- The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 11 a military aid package for Ukraine worth $225 million.
- Indian state-run oil refineries are reportedly negotiating an oil import deal with Russia, likely as a result of the recent meetings between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin and improving Russo-Indian energy relations in recent months.
- The Kremlin continues to intensify efforts to encourage self-censorship among information space voices and consolidate physical control over internet infrastructure.
- Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Russian infantry units are reportedly assaulting Ukrainian trench positions in single-file columns due to pervasive Ukrainian minefields and poor assault training.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration head Yevgeny Balitsky on July 12 and discussed social and infrastructure projects in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
| 
[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 7월 13일
[ISW] 이스라엘-하마스 전쟁(이란) 업데이트, 2024년 7월 12일