Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17. The agreement addresses issues spanning enhanced defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, nuclear energy use and cooperation, transportation support and development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and a clause stipulating that neither party shall allow third parties to use their territory to threaten the security of the other among other economic and social areas of partnership. The agreement notably includes the unspecified development of "military-technical cooperation" between the two countries, which could allude to Iran's extensive export of domestically-produced Shahed drones and other military equipment for Russia's use in Ukraine, Iran's assistance in Russia's domestic production of Shahed drones, and possible efforts to expand Russia's use and production of Shaheds.
The bilateral agreement could also lay the groundwork for Russia to establish aircraft refueling hubs and a naval presence in Iran, particularly as the fall of Russian ally Bashar al-Assad's regime and overall waning of Russian influence in the Middle East threatens the presence of key Russian bases and assets in Syria. Russia could use Iranian territory to support some of its operations in North Africa and the Middle East despite Iran's suboptimal geographic location when compared to Syria's proximity to Russia's basing in Libya and the Mediterranean Sea. Russia may also use the agreement to establish a more permanent military presence in Iran in the long term. However, Iran may be reluctant to such efforts due to the possibility of further Western sanctions and retaliation.
Russia may leverage enhanced economic and transportation ties with Iran to further Western sanctions evasion efforts and mitigate economic challenges brought about by sanctions - a broader strategy Russia has established with multiple international partners to circumvent restrictions and alleviate domestic economic pressures.
The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea. Russia likely does not have the military and defense industrial capacity to support any significant military operations apart from its war in Ukraine, especially as Russia continues to suffer high personnel losses and is reportedly struggling to produce and refurbish enough armored vehicles to replace destroyed vehicles. Putin is likely wary of intensified Russian engagements in the Middle East after Russia's strategic political defeat in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and is likely to focus on negotiations with the interim Syrian government to maintain the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim Air Base and the Port of Tartus.
Russia appears to be valuing its ability to mitigate its manpower constraints by leveraging the mutual defense clause within its Strategic Partnership agreement with North Korea to deploy North Korean forces to Kursk Oblast over further military-technical cooperation with Iran. ISW previously assessed that Russia is deploying North Korean forces to operations in Kursk Oblast in order to free up Russian military personnel for operations in Ukraine. Russia is likely to prioritize addressing its manpower issues through defense agreements with North Korea, as Iran is unlikely to provide military personnel to support Russia's war in Ukraine, and Russia has been leveraging its military-technical ties with Iran since 2022 without a strategic partnership agreement.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed the Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement on January 17.
- The Russia-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement lacks a mutual defense clause, however, indicating that Russia likely lacks the bandwidth to support significant operations outside of Ukraine and is prioritizing its manpower needs through its mutual defense treaty with North Korea.
- Russian forces seized Vremivka on January 17 as part of their efforts to envelop Velyka Novosilka and force Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the settlement.
- Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on January 17 indicating the Kremlin's growing concerns over Armenia's deepening ties with the West.
- Recently declassified US documents highlight the integral role of US monetary and technical assistance in expanding Ukraine's domestic drone production capabilities and how US national security is directly benefiting by integrating lessons learned from Ukraine in America’s defense industry.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and the Kharkiv, Kupyansk, Borova, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove directions.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on January 17 authorizing calling up Russian reservists (“personnel mobilization resource” or zapas) for training in 2025.
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