The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. The ceasefire will go into effect at 1:30AM ET on January 19 and the release of Israeli hostages will start at 9:30AM ET on January 19. Unspecified security sources cited by Israeli Army Radio stated that Israel estimates that 25 out of the 33 hostages Hamas will release in the first phase of the deal are alive. Hamas is expected to release three hostages on January 19 and release the other 30 hostages every subsequent Saturday until March 1. An unspecified Israeli official said that Hamas has not provided the names of the three hostages to Israel for the January 19 exchange as stipulated under the agreement. The official warned that Israel would not move forward with the prisoner-hostage exchange if Hamas fails to provide the list prior to the deadline. Israeli media said that Israel will release 1,904 Palestinian prisoners in the first phase of the ceasefire deal. The IDF has begun to withdraw some forces from the Gaza Strip and redeploy others to the buffer zone ahead of the ceasefire implementation. The BBC cited an unspecified senior Palestinian official who claimed that Hamas will be permitted to operate its police force in the Gaza Strip under the ceasefire agreement. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal. Ben Gvir voted against the ceasefire-hostage agreement during the Israeli cabinet vote on January 17. Ben Gvir stated that he would return to his position if the war eventually resumes. Gvir also called on Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich to resign.
The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s office stated on January 17 that the PA holds legal and political jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip as the recognized governing authority of the Palestinian territories and is prepared to deploy administrative and security teams to the Gaza Strip. The ceasefire agreement does not task the PA with governing the Strip, nor does the ceasefire discuss post-war governance in any capacity. PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa separately stated on January 18 that the PA has a “hundred-day plan” for after the ceasefire goes into effect.
IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. These cells are presumably organized on personal, and social ties and not institutionalized in a quasi-military structure like existed immediately after October 7, 2023. The PA and Hamas have repeatedly discussed post-war governance since the October 7 war began, including the formation of an independent civilian committee to manage civilian affairs. Hamas would almost certainly attempt to resist or subvert any PA takeover in the Gaza Strip unless Hamas is prevented by force from doing so. Hamas' cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority. It is unclear if the PA is willing to fight Hamas in a long guerrilla campaign to cement PA rule in the Strip. A senior Palestinian official told BBC on January 18 that uniformed, mostly unarmed Hamas police will operate within designated areas in the Strip to manage the movement of displaced civilians after the ceasefire begins while avoiding areas of IDF presence. This BBC report indicates that some elements of Hamas' authority remain in the Gaza Strip. CTP-ISW is unable to certify the validity of this report, but Hamas police activity throughout the Strip could create more opportunities for friction between Hamas and PA forces.
The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure. A Deir ez Zor-based journalist reported that SDF leadership met with representatives from Raqqa in an attempt to secure their support for a decentralized government in exchange for increased governing authorities. Turkey has threatened to launch a full-scale military operation against the SDF since December 2024 as part of an effort to coerce the SDF to disarm. HTS has supported this Turkish effort. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi has maintained that he seeks a “decentralized” administration and wants the SDF to integrate into the Syrian Defense Ministry as a “military bloc” rather than on an “individual” level.” A decentralized government would enable to SDF to continue operating in its current capacity, which directly contradicts Turkish demands.
The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory. The Raqqa representatives present rejected the SDF’s offer and emphasized the unity and sovereignty of Syrian territory. The representatives called for a conference with other groups in SDF-controlled territory to address popular demands. Arab communities under SDF control in Raqqa, Hasakah, and Deir ez Zor have ”defected” from the SDF and called for an end to SDF rule since the fall of the Assad regime on December 8. CTP-ISW has not observed other Syrian reports about this meeting, which suggests that this source may have unique access.
Key Takeaways:
- Iraqi Sunni Coalition: The newly-formed Iraqi United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) called on the Mohammad Shia al Sudani administration to implement nine long-standing Sunni demands on January 18. It is unlikely that the United Sunni Leadership Coalition (USLC) will be able to achieve most or all of these demands. The coalition therefore likely published these demands to rally support from Iraqi Sunnis ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
- Iraqi Parliamentary Politics: The Iraqi parliamentary leadership placed an amendment that appears to benefit Kurdish political parties on the parliamentary agenda for January 19, likely to try to ensure that Kurdish political parties attend parliament on January 19. The participation of Kurdish parties in parliament on January 19 would make it more difficult for Sunni parties to prevent a quorum.
- Ceasefire-Hostage Deal: The Israeli government approved the Israel-Hamas ceasefire-hostage deal on January 18. It will enter into effect at 0130 ET on January 19. Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir resigned on January 18 after the Israeli government approved the ceasefire deal.
- Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip: The Palestinian Authority (PA) seeks to lead post-war governance in the Gaza Strip, but assuming governing authority will almost certainly require a military confrontation with Hamas. IDF operations have destroyed Hamas as a military organization, but small Hamas cells will remain capable of resisting a PA takeover after the IDF leaves. Hamas‘ cells cannot defeat PA security forces in battles at this time, but the PA would need to seek out and destroy these Hamas cells to prevent Hamas from gradually rebuilding and overthrowing the PA’s new authority.
- Syrian Democratic Forces: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) is reportedly continuing to pursue a decentralized government against Turkish and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) pressure. The SDF’s outreach to Raqqa may be an attempt to secure local Arab support ahead of a potential Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) attack into SDF territory.
- Assassination in Iran: An unidentified individual, likely an Iranian Judicial office service employee, killed two senior Iranian Supreme Court judges, Mohammad Moghiseh and Ali Razini, at the Iranian Supreme Court in Tehran on January 18. The official Iranian response to this attack has not yet materialized, but incidents like this often trigger paranoia about infiltration and foreign plots. The way Iran responds to the incident will indicate whether it perceives a broader security threat.
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