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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 4월 16일

by Summa posted Apr 17, 2025
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요약

요약

  • 이란은 우라늄 농축을 전혀 하지 않고 핵 프로그램을 완전히 해체할 가능성이 낮다. 이란 외무부 장관인 아바스 아라그치는 4월 16일에 우라늄 농축이 "실질적이고 부인할 수 없는 권리"이며 "협상 대상이 아니다"라고 말했다.
  • 미국 관리들의 최근 발언에 따르면, 시리아에서 미군이 철수하면 미군 병력은 최소 1,000명으로 줄어들 것으로 보이며, 이는 2024년에 최근 증가하기 전 시리아에 있던 미군 병력과 거의 같은 수준이다.
  • 최소 25개 아랍 부족이 4월 14일 이후 미국이 지원하는 시리아 민주군(SDF)을 비난했는데, 아마도 SDF가 시리아 북동부에서 다마스쿠스의 통제를 분산시키라는 요구를 계속했기 때문일 것이다.
  • 아랍에미레이트(UAE)는 아마도 후티에 대한 예멘 정부의 공세 가능성을 모색하고 있지만, UAE는 또한 에미레이트에 대한 후티의 공격을 유발하지 않으려 하고 있다. 한 고위 에미레이트 관리가 UAE가 지상 작전 계획에 관여하고 있다는 보도를 부인했는데, 아마도 에미레이트가 예멘 정부의 공세에 개입하면 공격을 유발할 것이라는 우려 때문일 것이다.
  • 예멘 언론의 조사에 따르면, 오만에 있는 후티 대변인이자 수석 협상가인 모하메드 압둘살람은 후티 정권 내에서 밀수와 정보 작전을 포함한 다양한 책임을 맡고 있다. 이란의 지원을 받는 후티는 오랫동안 통신 장비를 사용하여 내부 통제를 유지하고 예멘 국민을 억압해 왔다.

분류: 중동 정세 관련된 주요국가: 이란, 시리아, 예멘 향후 전망: 이란 핵 협상의 미래, 시리아에서의 미군 철수, 예멘 내전의 전개 등이 주요 관심사이다.

[원문]

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Iran is unlikely to accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on April 16 that uranium enrichment is a “real and undeniable right” and “not subject to negotiation.” Araghchi stated that “contradictory” US positions do not help the negotiations and emphasized that “Iran must hear Washington’s real stance” to assess whether a framework agreement is possible. Araghchi likely referred to recent remarks by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff regarding "zero uranium enrichment," in which Witkoff originally said Iran could enrich uranium to 3.67 percent before clarifying that any nuclear deal must “stop and eliminate” Iranian nuclear enrichment. Iranian officials have consistently rejected the concept of zero uranium enrichment and stated that Iran may reduce enrichment to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels. Iranian Expediency Discernment Council member and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezaei separately stated on X on April 16 that US statements reflect ”confusion and disarray” within the Trump administration and reinforce Iranian distrust caused by the U S withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. Rezaei’s remarks align with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s guidance in his April 15 speech. Khamenei said Iran must “proceed carefully” in the US-Iran talks and signaled deep skepticism toward the United States while supporting negotiations to mitigate pressure and preserve regime stability. Khamenei will likely remain skeptical of any agreement with the Trump administration, given Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA.


Recent statements by unspecified US officials suggested the reported US drawdown in Syria will decrease US forces to no less than 1,000, roughly the same amount of US forces present in Syria before the recent increase in 2024. An unspecified US official told Reuters on April 15 that the United States may decide to reduce its force presence in Syria by half, which would be consistent with the size of previous US deployments in Syria. The official said that the US plans to reduce its presence in Syria and that this could reduce US troops to approximately 1,000 personnel. A second unspecified US official said that the size of the US withdrawal is uncertain but was ”skeptical of a decrease of that scale, suggesting that the drawdown will be no less than 1,000 personnel. Earlier reports in Israeli media lacked this context and reported that the United States will begin to withdraw from Syria by mid-June 20255. The Trump administration ordered the US Defense Department to begin preparing plans for the withdrawal of US service members from Syria in early February 2025. The United States maintained roughly 900 US personnel in Syria between 2019 and 2024, when the United States increased the number of troops to 2,000 US personnel to meet CENTCOM requirements. It is unclear if the October 7 War or the fall of Assad increased CENTCOM’s force requirements.


The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is probably exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government offensive against the Houthis, while the UAE also attempts to avoid triggering Houthi attacks on the Emirates. The UAE has discussed a ground offensive with US officials in recent weeks. US private security contractors are also reportedly advising Yemeni factions backed by the UAE to support a ground offensive, suggesting possible Emirati involvement. The UAE has extensively used private contractors in Yemen, and it is doubtful that UAE-backed factions could hire private contractors without Emirati approval. Bloomberg separately reported on April 16 that the Yemeni Armed Forces are discussing a potential ground offensive with the United States and Gulf Arab allies to remove the Houthis from the Red Sea coast, citing people involved in the discussions.


Key Takeaways:


  • Iran is unlikely to accept zero uranium enrichment and full dismantlement of its nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on April 16 that uranium enrichment is a “real and undeniable right” and “not subject to negotiation.”


  • Recent statements by unspecified US officials suggested the reported US drawdown in Syria will decrease US forces to no less than 1,000, which is roughly the same amount of US forces present in Syria prior to the recent increase in 2024.


  • At least 25 Arab tribes have condemned the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since April 14, probably in reaction to continued SDF demands to decentralize Damascus’s control in northeastern Syria.


  • The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is probably exploring the possibility of a Yemeni government offensive against the Houthis while the UAE also attempts to avoid triggering Houthi attacks on the Emirates. A senior Emirati official denied reports that the UAE is involved in a ground campaign plan, probably out of concern that Emirati involvement in a Yemeni government offensive would trigger attacks.


  • Oman-based Houthi spokesperson and chief negotiator Mohammed Abdulsalam has a multitude of different responsibilities within the Houthi regime, including smuggling and intelligence operations, according to Yemeni media investigations. The Houthis, supported by Iran, have long used communications equipment to maintain internal control and oppress the Yemeni population.

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