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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 4월 17일

by Summa posted Apr 18, 2025
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Key Takeaways

주요 요점:

  • 러시아 관리들은 우크라이나에 대한 광범위한 영토 양보에 대한 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령의 양보 불가 요구 사항을 계속 반복하면서 현재 진행 중인 평화 협상이 빠르게 결과를 달성할 가능성이 낮다고 언급했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 서부 자포리자주에서 넓은 전선을 가로지르는 대대 규모의 기계화 공격을 수행했으며, 이는 최근 관찰된 러시아 기계화 공격 전술의 변화를 나타냅니다.
  • 크렘린은 유럽이 우크라이나를 지원하고 스스로를 방어하는 것을 막기 위한 목적으로 유럽에 대해 점점 더 위협적인 수사를 채택하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 화학무기 협약(CWC)에 서명한 국가임에도 불구하고 최전선과 우크라이나 후방 지역에 대한 화학무기 공격을 용이하게 하기 위해 드론을 점점 더 많이 활용하고 있습니다.
  • 볼로디미르 젤렌스키 우크라이나 대통령은 미국과 우크라이나가 양자 간 광물 거래에 서명하기 위한 진전을 이루고 있다고 보고했습니다.
  • 유럽 국가들은 우크라이나 지원을 포함하여 국내 방위 생산을 계속 증가시키고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 토레츠크 근처에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 쿠르스크주와 쿠피얀스크, 토레츠크, 포크로프스크, 노보파블리프카, 벨리카 노보실카 근처와 서부 자포리자주에서 진격했습니다.

분류: 국제정치, 군사 관련된 주요국가: 러시아, 우크라이나, 미국 향후 전망: 러시아와 우크라이나 간의 전쟁은 장기화될 것으로 예상되며, 유럽 국가들의 지원이 우크라이나의 승패를 결정하는 중요한 요소가 될 것입니다.

[원문]

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Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel


April 17, 2025, 7:40 pm ET

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Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics. Ukrainian military officials reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a series of mechanized assaults by elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Southern Military District [SMD]) that consisted of roughly a battalion's worth of equipment, including 320 personnel, 40 armored vehicles, three tanks, and about 10 buggies, along the Pyatykhatky-Stepove-Lobkove-Mali Shcherbaky-Mala Tokmachka line (a frontage of roughly 40 kilometers) south and southwest of Orikhiv on the evening of April 16. Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed all three Russian tanks and 29 armored vehicles and killed or wounded 140 Russian soldiers. Geolocated footage of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0515 Orikhiv-Polohy highway south of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv). ISW has not observed any other geolocated footage as of this writing to indicate any further advances along the wide front of attack. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces conducted a similar assault in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 13 — likely in reference to a recent Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Zaporizhia direction. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces spent months preparing for these assaults and have concentrated additional assault groups for possible future assaults. Ukrainian officials have warned of the possibility of intensified Russian offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast since November 2024.


Russian forces fighting in Ukraine since 2023 do not usually conduct mechanized assaults spread out across a wide front. Russian forces typically conduct mechanized assaults in singular frontal assaults in narrower and more limited areas, likely intending to break through Ukrainian defenses with a greater concentration of forces in a single area, or as part of turning movements to outflank and envelop Ukrainian positions. The tactical objective of this battalion-sized attack remains unclear, and the available footage and Ukrainian reporting indicates that Ukrainian forces defeated the attack. Russian forces may have intended for the April 16 mechanized assault to probe Ukrainian defenses to gauge the Ukrainian reaction and to detect possible weak points in Ukrainian positions ahead of future, more concentrated assaults. Elements of the 58th CAA may have been testing a different tactic, alternatively. ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces elsewhere along the frontline recently have implemented similar mechanized assault tactics. The decision to dedicate roughly a battalion's worth of armored vehicles to a broad mechanized assault with likely minimal gains is notable given Russia's extensive armored vehicle losses in the war, dwindling Soviet-era armored vehicle stockpiles, and limited capacity to produce, refurbish, and repair armored vehicles.


Russian forces continue to intensify their usage of armored vehicles across the frontline amid continued negotiations to end the war. Commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko, reported on April 17 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk direction and that preliminary information confirms that Ukrainian forces destroyed 21 armored fighting vehicles, two other vehicles, and 96 motorcycles and killed and wounded over 240 Russian soldiers. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on the evening of April 17 that Russian forces launched an attack in the Pokrovsk direction and that Ukrainian forces destroyed the entire Russian grouping consisting of 115 pieces of equipment (likely including armored vehicles, other vehicles, and motorcycles), killed 200 Russian soldiers, and wounded 30 more. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russia's use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025. This intensification may be related to changing weather conditions and hardening terrain as Ukraine is coming out of its muddy rasputitsa season, the spring period in which melting frozen winter ground and spring rains degrade conditions for mechanized movement. This intensification may also be related to the Kremlin's continued insistence that Ukraine cede all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia and that the four oblasts be recognized as Russian territory.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian officials continue to reiterate Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for extensive territorial concessions from Ukraine while noting that ongoing peace negotiations are unlikely to achieve results quickly.


  • Russian forces recently conducted a roughly battalion-sized mechanized assault across a wide front in western Zaporizhia Oblast, representing an inflection in recently observed Russian mechanized assault tactics.


  • The Kremlin is adopting increasingly threatening rhetoric towards Europe aimed at preventing Europe from supporting Ukraine and defending itself.


  • Russia is increasingly adapting its drones to facilitate chemical weapons strikes against the frontline and rear areas of Ukraine — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.


  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that the United States and Ukraine are making progress towards signing a bilateral mineral deal.
  • European countries continue to increase their domestic defense production, including in support of Ukraine.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Kupyansk, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Novopavlivka, and Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. 

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The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.



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