Authors: Karolina Hird, Daniel Shats, and Grace Mappes, with Nicholas Carl



Data cutoff: 9 am ET, June 24

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is launching a task force that will examine the strategic interactions between the United States’ main adversaries: Russia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Iran, and North Korea. The new Adversary Entente Task Force will produce weekly products providing assessments on major developments between these adversaries in order to more holistically examine the evolution of the Entente, assess prospects of cooperation, and determine exploitable vulnerabilities within these adversary relationships. Adversary Entente Task Force publications will supplement the regional expertise in ISW’s existing Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, Iran Update, and China-Taiwan Weekly Update.

Some Russian responses to the June 22 US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities directly or indirectly accused the United States of being untrustworthy. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a statement on June 22 condemning the US strikes as violating the UN charter and international law, undermining the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and threatening regional security. The Russian MFA claimed that Russia is obligated to respond to the US strikes and called for an "end to aggression" and a return to diplomacy regarding the situation in Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that “chaos" will result if every country is "allowed" to interpret the UN Charter's right to self-defense individually. Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, who frequently makes statements on his English-language social media accounts aimed at frightening the West, claimed that the US strikes only caused minimal damage to Iranian nuclear sites, that Iran will continue developing toward a nuclear weapons program and that a "number of countries" are willing to supply Iran with nuclear warheads. Medvedev criticized US President Donald Trump directly and accused Trump of pushing the United States "into another war." Medvedev later walked his statements back, claiming that “Russia has no intention of supplying nuclear weapons to Iran” after Trump criticized Medvedev for “casually” using nuclear rhetoric.

Other Russian commentators responded to the strikes to criticize the United States. A prominent Russian ultranationalist milblogger accused the United States of conducting bilateral negotiations with Russia in recent months only to "soften" Russia's position regarding Iran ahead of the June 12 US strikes. The milblogger claimed that the United States had been preparing for these strikes for months and accused the United States of attempting to mislead Iran on the timing of the strikes. Russian ultranationalists are Russian President Vladimir Putin's main constituency and a population that the Kremlin has undertaken significant efforts to placate and coopt. Their statements often reflect either the constituency's expectations of the Kremlin or the Kremlin's own information operations.

The Kremlin likely remains unwilling to take military action in support of Iran itself, however, despite rhetorical posturing and diplomatic overtures. Putin met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Moscow on June 23. Lavrov, Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov also attended the meeting. Putin claimed that the aggression against Iran has "no basis and no justification" and that the Russian MFA stated Russia's position clearly. Putin and other Russian officials have not publicly offered Iran any military or defense assistance. Iranian sources told Reuters in an article published on June 23 that Iran has not been impressed with Russia's support thus far in the Israel-Iran war. A senior source told Reuters that Araghchi would deliver a letter to Putin from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei requesting additional support. Iran very likely does not expect Russia to join the war on its behalf or allocate significant military assets to Iran, as the Russian-Iranian strategic partnership agreement does not include a mutual defense clause.

Key takeaways:

• Continued entente responses to the Israel-Iran war: Russian, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and North Korean officials condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities for violating Iran’s sovereignty, exacerbating tensions, and targeting nuclear facilities, and accused the United States of being untrustworthy. None of these countries are likely to provide Iran with significant military aid to help ensure the regime’s survival or operational success against Israel, despite rhetorical support. Russia may provide Iran with regime stability assets or a small number of Shahed drones, but both of these contingencies are low probability in the near to medium-term.



• United States sanctions elements of the PRC-Iranian relationship: The United States sanctioned four PRC-based companies, one individual, and one ship for shipping “sensitive goods” to Iran for its ballistic missile, drone, and asymmetric weapons programs in late 2024.

• Entente support for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB): 25,000 North Korean workers may deploy to produce Iranian-origin drones in Russia, underscoring the intertwined nature of the adversary entente. Russia will likely leverage North Korean workers to drastically increase its drone production numbers, and North Korean workers will have the opportunity to learn and export valuable drone development, manufacture, and operation lessons. Meanwhile, Sino-Russian cooperation in the realm of consumer electronics may set conditions for intensified collaboration on dual-use products that could benefit both the PRC’s and Russia’s domestic DIBs.

• Continued PRC-Russian intelligence tensions: The New York Times (NYT) reported on that several groups with likely PRC links have conducted cyberattacks against Russia in order to obtain information about Russian nuclear submarines, drone warfare and software, satellite communications, radar, and electronic warfare (EW). This follows previous NYT reporting that. This follows reports that Russia has been concerned that the PRC would exploit Russia's focus on Ukraine to increase intelligence operations to acquire Russian military secrets.

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