메뉴 건너뛰기

군사국방

국방뉴스

[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 12일

by Summa posted Aug 13, 2025
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
?

단축키

Prev이전 문서

Next다음 문서

크게 작게 위로 아래로 댓글로 가기 인쇄
```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약:

  • 러시아군은 8월 12일, 도브로필랴 동쪽과 북동쪽(포크롭스크 북서쪽)의 우크라이나 방어선을 제한적인 파괴 공작 및 정찰 부대를 이용하여 계속 침투했습니다. 러시아군은 이 전술적 침투를 유지하고 활용하기 위한 증원을 아직 배치하지 못했으며, 그렇게 하려는 시도에서 어려움에 직면할 가능성이 큽니다.
  • 러시아의 진격을 종종 과장하는 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아가 이 전술적 침투를 활용할 수 있는 능력에 의문을 제기했습니다.
  • 도브로필랴 방향의 러시아 전술적 침투는 즉각적인 것이 아니라, 새로운 드론 혁신과 전술을 대규모로 사용하여 수개월 간의 러시아 준비와 상황 조성을 거쳐 이루어졌습니다.
  • 포크롭스크 방향으로의 러시아 진격 또한 17개월이 넘는 장기간의 캠페인의 가장 최근 결과일 뿐입니다.
  • 러시아 관리들은 도브로필랴 인근의 전술적 침투를 이용하여 알래스카에서 열릴 예정인 미-러 정상 회담에 영향을 미치려 하고 있지만, 크렘린의 전반적인 전략적 목표는 우크라이나, 미국, 유럽의 의지를 꺾어 러시아의 오랜 요구 사항인 완전한 우크라이나 항복을 달성하는 것입니다.
  • 우크라이나 정보에 따르면 북한은 최근 우크라이나 전쟁에서 러시아의 노력을 지원하기 위해 11,000명의 군인을 러시아에 파견했습니다. 이는 러시아가 반서방 파트너에게 의존하여 우크라이나 전쟁을 장기화하려는 의지를 더욱 잘 보여줍니다.
  • 러시아군은 최근 벨리키 불룩, 보로바, 포크롭스크 인근에서 진격했습니다.

분류:

군사, 정치, 국제 관계

관련 주요 국가:

  1. 러시아
  2. 우크라이나
  3. 미국

향후 전망:

러시아의 전술적 침투가 지속될 경우, 우크라이나 전선에 상당한 압박을 가할 수 있습니다. 러시아와 서방 국가들 간의 긴장은 더욱 고조될 것이며, 특히 다가오는 미-러 정상 회담에서 우크라이나 문제와 관련한 갈등이 예상됩니다. 북한의 군사 지원은 러시아의 전쟁 수행 능력을 강화할 수 있지만, 국제 사회의 비난을 받을 수 있습니다. 장기적으로는 전쟁의 장기화 및 확전 가능성을 배제할 수 없습니다.

```

[원문]

August 12, 2025

Information Cutoff: 12:30 pm ET

Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Justin Young, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

TOPLINES

Russian forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups on August 12. Russian forces have yet to be able to deploy reinforcements to hold and exploit this tactical penetration and will likely face obstacles in trying to do so. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 12 that Russian sabotage groups infiltrated Vesele, Rubizhne, Kucheriv Yar (all three northeast of Dobropillya), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya) and that Ukrainian forces had already destroyed some of these groups. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that several small Russian groups bypassed Ukrainian positions and tried to advance toward Zolotyi Kolodyaz (northeast of Dobropillya). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Ukrainian military command allocated additional forces and means to the area. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on August 12 that the situation is most complicated near Dobropillya and that Russian forces operating without mechanized equipment advanced about 10 kilometers deep. The Ukrainian General Staff's report indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dobropillya to Nove Shakhove and Stepy. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Nove Shakhove, Rubizhne, Ivanivka (both east of Dobropillya), and Dorozhie (southeast of Dobropillya) and advanced near Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Shakhove, Toretske (both east of Dobropillya), and Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya) and in eastern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).


Russian milbloggers, who often overinflate Russian advances, questioned Russia's ability to exploit the tactical penetration. Several Russian milbloggers urged caution on August 12, noting that Russian forces have yet to consolidate their positions and that the penetration is not a full-scale breakthrough yet. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that Russian forces infiltrated Ukrainian defenses in a "splayed" manner and that the depth of the penetration threatens Russia's ability to secure its flanks. The milblogger expressed concern about Russia's ability to close the pocket in the area, given Russia's high losses. The milblogger complained that Russian forces had not adequately integrated strike drone units and assault groups and that the Russian groups infiltrated gaps in Ukrainian defenses, mostly using Russia's "usual" highly attritional, infantry-led assaults. Another milblogger claimed that the penetration has significantly stretched the frontline and that Russian forces will only be able to turn the penetration into a "success" if Russian forces have enough manpower to introduce operational reserves and advance "correctly and in time." A Russian source claimed that infiltration missions have serious risks, as the infantry far from the front can only receive supplies via drones, and the main forces cannot support isolated infiltration groups. The source claimed that Russian forces will likely soon try to launch a subsequent attack with a larger group of forces to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining the tactical initiative. A Ukrainian source stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed several Russian groups that had infiltrated the area and are gradually pushing back Russian forces that were trying to gain a foothold.


The Russian tactical penetration in the Dobropillya direction was not immediate but came rather after months of Russian preparation and condition setting using new drone innovations and tactics at scale. ISW recently assessed that Russia's integration of combined drone strike tactics and adaptations in recent months has facilitated Russian advances on key Ukrainian towns. Russian strike and reconnaissance drone adaptations are likely achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) - the use of airpower to strike targets in the near rear of the frontline to impact battlefield operations in the near term. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 12 that Russian forces in the Dobropillya area have "systematically" knocked out Ukrainian drone crews and had taken Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) northwest of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) under fire control with drones. The milblogger claimed that these Russian efforts isolated the combat zone. Another milblogger claimed on August 12 that Russian infantry infiltrated the Ukrainian near rear along previously reconnoitered routes.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian forces continued to infiltrate Ukrainian defenses east and northeast of Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk) using limited sabotage and reconnaissance groups on August 12. Russian forces have yet to be able to deploy reinforcements to hold and exploit this tactical penetration and will likely face obstacles in trying to do so.


  • Russian milbloggers, who often overinflate Russian advances, questioned Russia's ability to exploit the tactical penetration.


  • The Russian tactical penetration in the Dobropillya direction was not immediate but came rather after months of Russian preparation and condition setting using new drone innovations and tactics at scale.



  • Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction are also only the most recent result of over 17 months’ worth of protracted campaigning.


  • Russian officials are attempting to exploit the tactical penetration near Dobropillya to influence the upcoming US-Russia summit in Alaska, but the Kremlin's overall strategic objective is to break the will of Ukraine, the United States, and Europe to achieve Russia's longstanding demand for full Ukrainian capitulation.


  • Ukrainian intelligence indicated that North Korea recently deployed 11,000 soldiers to Russia to facilitate Russia's war effort in Ukraine, further demonstrating Russia's commitment to leaning on its anti-Western partners to protract the war in Ukraine.


  • Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Borova, and Pokrovsk.

NEW EMAIL SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS


ISW has launched newly customizable email subscription options. Existing subscribers have been auto enrolled in all lists. Click below to learn more about these options and customize your preferences.

ISW is powered by the support of individuals like you.

Help us stay independent and impactful.

Website | Jobs & Internships


Follow ISW on social media:


FacebookXYouTube | InstagramLinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.


ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.


ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

TAG •

  1. [공지] 참조 사이트

    Date2023.12.14 BySumma
    read more
  2. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 14일

    Date2025.08.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  3. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 14일

    Date2025.08.15 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  4. [국방부] 국방부장관, 미국 하원의원단 면담

    Date2025.08.14 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  5. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 13일

    Date2025.08.14 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  6. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 13일

    Date2025.08.14 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  7. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 12일

    Date2025.08.13 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  8. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 12일

    Date2025.08.13 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  9. [ISW] 러시아 점령 업데이트, 2025년 8월 12일

    Date2025.08.13 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  10. [국방부] 국방부 「한-호주 국방·방산협력 컨퍼런스」 개최

    Date2025.08.13 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  11. [ISW] 러시아 점령 업데이트, 2025년 8월 12일

    Date2025.08.12 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  12. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 11일

    Date2025.08.12 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  13. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 10일

    Date2025.08.11 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  14. [국방부] 국방부유해발굴단장 방미, 한미 유해발굴 협력 강화

    Date2025.08.11 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  15. [국방부] 예비군 훈련 자율신청 체계 도입 사례, 2025년 국방부 적극행정 1등

    Date2025.08.08 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  16. [국방부] 한-아랍에미리트연합국(UAE) 국방차관 운영위원회 개최 결과

    Date2025.08.06 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  17. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 3일

    Date2025.08.04 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  18. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 2일

    Date2025.08.03 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  19. [ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 8월 1일

    Date2025.08.02 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  20. [ISW] 러시아 점령 업데이트, 2025년 7월 31일

    Date2025.07.31 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
  21. [ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 7월 30일

    Date2025.07.31 Category국방뉴스 BySumma
    Read More
Board Pagination Prev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ... 83 Next
/ 83
위로