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[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 8월 14일

by Summa posted Aug 15, 2025
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```html 주요 내용 요약

주요 내용 요약

핵심 내용:

  • 미국-이란 핵 협상: 이란 최고 지도자 알리 하메네이가 미국과의 핵 협상 재개를 승인한 것으로 알려졌습니다. 이는 이란 정권이 협상을 생존에 필수적인 것으로 여기기 때문입니다. 이란은 우라늄 농축 중단을 요구하는 새로운 핵 협정에 동의할 가능성이 매우 낮습니다.
  • 이란-헤즈볼라 관계: 이란 최고 국가안보회의(SNSC) 사무총장 알리 라리자니와 헤즈볼라 사무총장 나임 카셈은 8월 14일 베이루트 회담에서 이란의 헤즈볼라 지원 수준을 과장했습니다. 라리자니와 카셈의 이란의 헤즈볼라 지원 관련 발언은 이란이 최근 몇 달 동안 헤즈볼라 및 기타 저항의 축 구성원들에게 실질적인 지원을 제공하는 데 어려움을 겪었다는 점을 고려할 때, 주로 과시적인 행위입니다.
  • 시리아 정부 구성: 시리아 내 알 카에다(AQ) 연계 단체들은 하야트 타흐리르 알 샴(HTS)이 이들 단체를 역사적으로 지속적으로 탄압해왔기 때문에 시리아 정부의 방향과 정책에 실질적으로 영향을 미치지 못할 것입니다. 그러나, 수니파 강경파의 집권 연립 참여는 시리아 정부가 목표를 추구하는 데 일부 제약을 가합니다.

분류:

중동 정치, 국제 관계, 핵 협상, 무력 분쟁

관련 주요 국가:

  • 미국
  • 이란
  • 시리아

향후 전망:

핵 협상 관련, 이란과 미국 간의 긴장은 지속될 것으로 예상되며, 현실적인 합의 도출은 어려울 수 있습니다. 이란은 핵 개발을 계속 추진할 가능성이 높습니다. 이란과 헤즈볼라 관계는 지속적인 긴장 관계를 유지할 것으로 예상되며, 이란의 지원 능력에 대한 의문은 계속될 것입니다. 시리아 정부는 국내 정치적 요인과 국제적 압력 속에서 균형을 잡아야 할 것이며, 알 카에다 연계 세력의 영향력은 제한적일 것입니다.

```

[원문]

August 14, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, and Annika Ganzeveld

TOPLINES

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival, according to three Iranian insiders speaking to Reuters on August 14. One source stated that Iranian leaders support negotiations because they have “seen the cost of military confrontation“ and seek to prevent further escalation with Israel and the United States. Moderate and pragmatic officials in the regime have recently signaled openness to resuming negotiations. Moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for example, stated on August 10 that resuming negotiations with the United States ”does not mean we intend to surrender.” The Iranian regime continues to reject the US demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi recently told Japanese media on August 11 that Iran could agree to limit its uranium enrichment levels but will not agree to halt enrichment altogether.


A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph on August 13 that Iran would not be able to “endure” the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback mechanism. Iran’s concern about potential snapback sanctions could push Iran to resume negotiations with the United States, although it is very unlikely that Iran would accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that requires it to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Telegraph report comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31. The E3 has offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, which is currently set to expire in October 2025, in order to provide Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The senior Iranian official also told The Telegraph that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) instructed the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in July to revive negotiations with the United States. The official added that the SNSC asked the Iranian presidential office at an unspecified time to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States before the window for talks closes. It is unclear if the SNSC contacted the presidential office before or after President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed pragmatic hardliner Ali Larijani as SNSC secretary on August 5. Larijani has historically supported negotiations and could accelerate the SNSC’s push for negotiations with the United States. Larijani supported the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and defended it against hardliners in parliament while he was parliament speaker in the mid-2010s.


Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on the Iranian regime to implement reforms and make concessions to the Iranian people to increase popular support for the regime, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West. Rouhani argued on August 13 that “new circumstances,” including Iranian setbacks in the region and a perceived gap between the Iranian regime and people, encouraged Israel and the United States to attack Iran. Rouhani expressed support for reducing tensions and negotiating with the United States and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries. Rouhani called for the formation of strong political parties and implicitly criticized the Guardian Council for disqualifying electoral candidates. The Guardian Council is a 12-member regime body that is responsible for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving legislation. Rouhani stated that Iranian leaders must prioritize Iran over other countries and only provide support to other countries to the extent that the Iranian public approves. Rouhani was likely referring to public demands for the regime to focus on domestic issues rather than sending money and resources abroad, particularly to the Axis of Resistance. Rouhani also stressed that the Iranian armed forces must focus on their inherent duties and not intervene in the economy, propaganda, and domestic and foreign policy. Rouhani has previously criticized the involvement of the armed forces in the economy.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival. Iran is very unlikely to accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that would require it to halt uranium enrichment.


  • Iran-Hezbollah Relations: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah during a meeting in Beirut on August 14. Larijani and Qassem’s statements regarding Iranian support for Hezbollah are largely performative given that Iran has struggled to provide meaningful support to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance in recent months.


  • Government Formation in Syria: Al Qaeda (AQ)-aligned groups in Syria will likely not be able to meaningfully influence the direction and policies of the Syrian government given Hayat Tahrir al Sham’s (HTS) historic and continued suppression of these groups. Sunni hardliners’ presence in the ruling coalition places some constraints on the Syrian government’s ability to pursue its objectives, however.

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