Ukrainian forces continue to pressure the Russian penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 25 that Ukrainian forces seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya and the western bound of the base of the Russian penetration). Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed out Russian forces from positions near the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway and south of Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya). Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces have almost completely cleared Kucheriv Yar (east of Dobropillya). Mashovets' August 25 report follows reports from Ukrainian military officials since August 15 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear settlements at both the northern extent of the Russian penetration and along the base of the penetration. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces had seized Volodymyrivka, (southeast of Dobropillya and the eastern bound of the base of the Russian penetration), and Ukrainian advances along the western and eastern bases of the penetration indicate that Russian forces are failing to expand the width of the penetration to the extent necessary to sustain the depth of the penetration. Mashovets reported on August 25 that these Ukrainian counterattacks threatened to encircle elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating within the penetration north of the Zapovidne-Mayak-Volodymyrivka line. Mashovets reported that the command of the 51st CAA created an assault group that aimed to break through Ukrainian forces and reach the Russian forces within the penetration. Mashovets added that elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) had regrouped and attempted to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks at the western part of the base near Zapovidne. Mashovets had reported on August 18 that elements of the Russian 8th CAA (SMD) had been attempting to outflank and threaten Ukrainian forces counterattacking at the eastern part of the base near Volodymyrivka. These various recent reports of Ukrainian advances in the area, coupled with the lack of reporting about Russian advances or successful reinforcement missions within the penetration, indicate that the efforts of both the 51st CAA and 8th CAA to defend the base of the penetration may have failed at this time.
The Russian military command has reportedly given up efforts to exploit the penetration toward Dobropillya, after Russia's infiltration tactics appear to have been unsuccessful in establishing enduring positions within this penetration. Mashovets stated on August 25 that the command of the 51st CAA is now preparing for assaults directly against Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), indicating that the 51st CAA has reverted back to its original plan following a brief shift in focus on exploiting the penetration northeast of Dobropillya. Mashovets' report and the recent Ukrainian advances within the penetration indicate that Russian forces likely have not established enduring positions within the salient. Russian milbloggers' reporting about the penetration near Dobropillya has also significantly decreased in recent days and shifted back to focusing on activity north, east, and southwest of Pokrovsk instead — further suggesting that Russian forces have been unsuccessful in consolidating and exploiting the penetration and are shifting their focus back on Pokrovsk directly. Russian milbloggers have warned in the past week that the penetration near Dobropillya was too narrow relative to its depth, creating vulnerabilities to Ukrainian counterattacks and interdiction. Russian milbloggers also previously warned that Russian forces had to widen the penetration's flanks to sustain the penetration, which Russian forces have failed to do so far. ISW previously assessed that Russian infiltration tactics and a low manpower density along the front in the Pokrovsk direction seemed to have allowed Russian forces to temporarily restore limited, tactical maneuver east and southeast of Dobropillya, but Russia's inability to establish logistics to support and reinforce the forward units operating within the penetration have degraded Russia's ability to widen and exploit the penetration.
Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov is likely to become the Chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, reportedly after Investigative Committee (Sledkom) Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin refused the Kremlin's offer to assume this position. The Russian Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges (which oversees the selection of candidates for judicial positions) announced on August 25 that it completed accepting applications for the vacant position of Chairperson of the Supreme Court and that Krasnov was the sole candidate who submitted an application. Moscow-based business newspaper Vedomosti reported on August 21 that the Higher Qualification Collegium of Judges cancelled the required qualification examination for the position due to a lack of candidates and reported on August 22 that Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded Krasnov the title Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, exempting Krasnov from the qualification examination. A Russian insider source claimed on August 25 that Bastrykin, whom Vedomosti previously reported was a candidate for the Supreme Court vacancy, recently refused the position for unknown reasons during a closed-door meeting with Putin. Bastrykin reportedly asked to remain in his position at the Russian Investigative Committee for another year before moving to become the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Russian President in the Northwestern Federal Okrug. Putin previously allowed Bastrykin to remain in office past the age of 70 in September 2024, and ISW assessed on August 20 that the Kremlin may have attempted to appoint Bastrykin to serve as Chairperson of the Supreme Court to open the Sledkom chairperson position to a younger official without firing or retiring Bastrykin.[13] The Russian insider source claimed that the current plenipotentiary representative, Alexander Gutsan, will succeed Krasnov as Prosecutor General and that current Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko will replace Bastrykin as Investigative Committee chairperson. Krasnov has held his position as Prosecutor General since 2020 and is notably 49 years old; and Chuychenko is 60 years old — significantly younger than the nearly-72-year-old Bastrykin, reflecting the Kremlin’s introduction of younger officials to senior positions. | 
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