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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 2월 2일

by 맘씨 posted Feb 03, 2024
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[요약]

주요 요점:

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 러시아가 방위 산업 기반(DIB)을 훨씬 더 점진적이지만 효과적으로 동원하고 있음에도 불구하고 2월 2일 연설에서 제2차 세계 대전 중 소련의 총동원을 연상시키는 광범위한 러시아 사회 및 경제 동원을 촉구했습니다.

  • 러시아 국방부 장관 세르게이 쇼이구는 2월 2일 러시아군이 우크라이나 전선 전체에서 "전략적 주도권"을 유지하고 있다고 밝혔는데, 이는 쇼이구가 이전에 러시아 작전을 "능동적 방어"로 묘사한 것과 현저히 다른 것입니다.

  • 오픈 소스 조사에 따르면 러시아군은 우크라이나의 탄약 부족과 충분한 대포병 전쟁을 수행할 수 없는 능력으로부터 이익을 얻고 있습니다.

  • 미국 국무부 대변인 매튜 밀러는 2월 1일 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴이 우크라이나를 점령하고 복종시키겠다는 목표를 바꾸지 않았다고 거듭 강조했습니다.

  • 러시아 군사 블로거와 초민족주의 인물들은 러시아 정보 공간에서 공식 크렘린 소식통과 대조적으로 자신을 러시아 군대의 공정하고 건설적인 비평가로 제시하고 있습니다.

  • 크렘린 계열사는 유명한 소셜 미디어 인플루언서들이 러시아 정교회를 홍보하는 정보 캠페인을 시작했다고 보도했습니다.

  • 러시아군은 2월 2일 아브디이프카 근처와 도네츠크-자포리지아 주 경계 지역에서 확인된 진전을 이루었습니다.




[원문]
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Riley Bailey, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes,

George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan

 

February 2, 2024, 7:50pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russian President Vladimir Putin evoked a wide Russian social and economic mobilization reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s total mobilization during the Second World War during a February 2 speech despite the fact that Russia is undertaking a far more gradual but nonetheless effective mobilization of its defense industrial base (DIB). Putin attended the “Everything for Victory” event at the Tulatochmash plant in Tula Oblast on February 2 and promoted Russian efforts to expand its DIB to an audience of 600 representatives of various professions from across Russia. “Everything for Victory” is a Soviet-era slogan that Soviet authorities first used during the Russian Civil War and then extensively during the Second World War to promote the widespread mobilization of Soviet industry and society. Putin stated that defense industrial workers in Tula Oblast are currently working under this slogan just as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers did. Putin asserted that modern Russian defense industrial workers have proven themselves worthy of these ”ancestors,” who won the industrial battle against Nazi Germany and Europe‘s defense industry to create the Soviet victory of 1945. Putin followed his Soviet predecessors in ignoring the critical role the US defense industry played in facilitating the Soviet victory through the Lend-Lease program. The Kremlin has previously appealed to the mythos of the Great Patriotic War (Second World War) to reassure the Russian public that the Russin war effort will bring to bear overwhelming manpower and materiel for victory in Ukraine as the Soviet Union did for the Red Army against Nazi Germany. Putin’s allusion to the Soviet Union’s total mobilization during the Second World War does not necessarily indicate that he intends to bring Russia to such a wartime footing, although he may be engaging in such rhetorical overtures to gauge domestic reactions and prepare the Russian public for a wider economic or military mobilization.


Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated on February 2 that Russian forces retain the “strategic initiative” along the entire frontline in Ukraine, a notable departure from Shoigu’s previous characterization of Russian operations as “active defense.” Shoigu claimed during a conference call with the Russian military leadership that Russian forces are advancing and improving their positions along the frontline. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed on January 16 that Russian forces “completely” have the initiative in Ukraine following a failed Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu and Putin consistently downplayed localized Russian offensive operations in October and December 2023, characterizing Russian operations in Ukraine as “active defense.” ISW assessed at that time that Russian authorities may have been attempting to temper expectations about the Russian military’s ability to make operationally significant advances, particularly around Avdiivka where Russian forces launched a localized offensive in October 2023. Putin’s and Shoigu’s rhetorical shift suggests that Russian authorities may be gaining confidence in the Russian military’s ability to achieve operationally significant advances. Russian authorities could also be rhetorically posturing ahead of the March 2024 Russian presidential elections. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have regained the initiative throughout most of the Ukrainian theater but have not seized the battlefield initiative in Kherson Oblast.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin evoked a wide Russian social and economic mobilization reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s total mobilization during the Second World War during a February 2 speech despite the fact that Russia is undertaking a far more gradual but nonetheless effective mobilization of its defense industrial base (DIB).


  • Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stated on February 2 that Russian forces retain the “strategic initiative” along the entire frontline in Ukraine, a notable departure from Shoigu’s previous characterization of Russian operations as “active defense.”


  • Open-source investigations indicate that Russian forces are benefitting from Ukraine’s ammunition shortage and inability to conduct sufficient counterbattery warfare.


  • US State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller reiterated on February 1 that Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly indicated that he has not changed his aims to capture and subjugate Ukraine.


  • Russian milbloggers and ultranationalist figures continue to present themselves as impartial and constructive critics of the Russian military in juxtaposition to official Kremlin sources in the Russian information space.


  • Kremlin affiliates reportedly launched an information campaign wherein prominent social media influencers promote the Russian Orthodox Church.


  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on February 2.


  • Russian outlet Izvestiya stated on February 2, citing sources within the Russian military, that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is forming air defense units as part of assault units to defend Russian infantry against Ukrainian drones, frontline air strikes, and shelling.



  • Ukrainian and Canadian officials announced a new coalition to return Ukrainian children from Russia to Ukraine.

Click here to read the full assessment.

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ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation's ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

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