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[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2024년 2월 4일

by 맘씨 posted Feb 05, 2024
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[요약]

주요 요점:

  • 러시아의 보고된 예비군 집중은 전선을 따라 러시아의 평가된 우선순위와 대체로 일치하지만, 반드시 미래 러시아 작전을 나타내는 것은 아니다.

  • 러시아 국방 산업 기반(DIB)은 러시아가 현재의 작전 템포를 유지하고 러시아 DIB를 확장하기 위한 지속적인 노력에도 불구하고 러시아의 예비 인력을 완전히 지원할 수 없을 것으로 보인다.

  • 볼로디미르 젤렌스키 우크라이나 대통령은 2월 4일 자포리자주 로보티네 전선과 드니프로페트로프스크주 우크라이나 동부 항공사령부를 방문했다.

  • 러시아 군사 블로거들은 최근 도네츠크주 노보미하일리프카 근처에서 실패한 러시아 기계화 공격에 대응하여 러시아 당국이 드론과 전자전(EW) 시스템을 러시아군에 제대로 제공하지 못한 것을 계속 비판했다.

  • 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령은 권위주의자의 딜레마에 계속 직면하고 있으며, 그의 권위주의 정권 자체가 그가 러시아의 군사-정치적 현실에 대한 정확한 정보를 받는 것을 체계적으로 방해하고 있다.

  • 러시아군은 바흐무트, 아브디이프카, 마린카 근처에서 확인된 진전을 이루었고, 전선 전체에 걸쳐 계속되는 위치 교전이 있었다.

  • 크렘린 통신사 TASS는 2월 4일 블라디미르주가 새로운 크냐즈 포자르스키 보레이-A급 핵잠수함의 후원자가 될 것이라고 보도했다.

  • 우크라이나 당국은 러시아 당국이 불법으로 러시아로 추방한 우크라이나 시민들을 귀환시키기 위한 국제적 노력을 계속하고 있다.




[원문]
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Support ISW

Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Fredrick W. Kagan



February 4, 2024, 6:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.


Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.


Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline.

Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces currently have 17 regiments, 16 battalions, and two regiment-battalion level tactical detachments in reserve. Mashovets stated that there are about 60,000-62,000 total Russian personnel in reserve units, but Russian forces have only equipped about 20,000 tactical and operational-tactical level reserve personnel with weapons and equipment. Mashovets stated that Russia’s reserves are concentrated in the greatest numbers in the operational zone of the Southern Grouping of Forces, followed by the Western Grouping of Forces, Dnepr Grouping of Forces, the Zaporizhia Grouping of Forces, the Eastern Grouping of Forces, and the Central Grouping of Forces. The Southern Grouping of Forces is responsible for the Bakhmut and Avdiivka directions, and Mashovets noted that the reserve concentration in this area aligns with the areas where Russian forces are concentrating their offensive efforts. Mashovets observed that it is not surprising that the Dnepr Grouping of Forces — which operates in occupied Kherson Oblast — has the third highest number of reserves given that Russian forces may be concerned over a Ukrainian threat in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials have recently indicated that Russian forces have more than 70,000 personnel on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but that many are concentrated deeper in the rear. The Dnipro Grouping of Forces’ reserves would likely be able to easily move to the Zaporizhia direction if circumstances so required. Mashovets assessed that the Central Grouping of Forces, which is responsible for the Lyman direction, has the lowest concentration of reserves due to its smaller operational zone that requires fewer troops. ISW additionally assesses that the Central Grouping of Forces has a lower concentration of reserves because Russian operations in the Lyman direction are likely meant to support the Western Grouping of Forces’ operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, as ISW will soon outline in an upcoming operational analysis of the Russian offensive on the Kharkiv-Luhansk axis. Russian forces will be able to move their reserve concentrations freely between different sectors of the front as long as Russia holds the strategic initiative across the theater. ISW continues to assess that an active Ukrainian defense throughout the theater in 2024 would cede the strategic initiative to Russia allowing Moscow to determine where, when, and at what scale fighting occurs in Ukraine and to allocate Russian resources appropriately while forcing Ukraine to respond. Ukraine would be able to deny Russia this ability, however, if Ukraine were able to contest the initiative.


Key Takeaways:


  • Russia's reported reserve concentrations throughout Ukraine largely align with Russia’s assessed priorities along the front, although they are not necessarily indicative of future Russian operations.


  • The Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is unlikely able to fully support Russia’s reserve manpower despite Russia’s ability to sustain its current tempo of operations and ongoing efforts to expand the Russian DIB.


  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the frontline near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast and the Ukrainian Eastern Air Command in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 4.


  • Russian milbloggers continued to criticize Russian authorities’ failure to properly equip Russian forces with drones and electronic warfare (EW) systems in response to a recent unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault near Novomykhailivka, Donetsk Oblast.


  • Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to face the authoritarian’s dilemma, whereby his authoritarian regime is itself systematically preventing him from receiving accurate information about military-political realities in Russia.


  • Russian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline.


  • Kremlin newswire TASS reported on February 4 that Vladimir Oblast will be a patron of the new Knyaz Pozharsky Borei-A class nuclear submarine.


  • Ukrainian officials continue international efforts aimed at returning Ukrainian citizens whom Russian authorities illegally deported to Russia.



Click here to read the full assessment.

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