Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. Geolocated footage published on July 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault. The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that Russian forces used six tanks, three armored personnel carriers (APCs), six MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), an armored recovery vehicle, 12 civilian vehicles, two buggies, and 41 motorcycles. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault comprised of up to 80 unspecified pieces of armored and motorized vehicles northeast of Siversk, and the July 27 geolocated footage likely shows one wave of the July 26 assault. Russian forces have long attempted to seize Siversk and have consistently attacked along the front line in the Siversk direction since at least Summer 2024. Russian forces conducted a series of battalion-sized mechanized assaults in the Siversk direction in November and December 2024 but have otherwise largely conducted slow, grinding infantry assaults in this direction. Russian forces re-intensified offensive operations in the Siversk direction in early Summer 2025, and Russian milbloggers began claiming in late June 2025 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating in the eastern outskirts of Siversk.Recent Russian advances northeast of Siversk indicate that Russian forces are within several kilometers of Siversk, and Russian forces may begin to launch more concerted attacks into the town in the near future.
Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025. Publicly available combat footage indicates that Russian forces have not conducted a company-sized or larger mechanized assault in Ukraine since April 2025 and have largely leveraged motorcycles and buggies to attack throughout Summer 2025. Russian forces have recently marginally increased their use of armored vehicles against Ukrainian positions and have conducted a series of smaller platoon-sized mechanized assaults in Donetsk and Zaporizhia Oblast since early July 2025. ISW has recently observed indications that Russia temporarily decreased its consumption of tanks and armored vehicles over the last six months, and that Russia appears to be slowly increasing its ability to refurbish Soviet-era armored vehicles while also replenishing armored vehicle supplies by not committing armored vehicles to highly attritional attacks. Russian forces may be temporarily increasing their use of armor to test for weaknesses in Ukraine's drone-based defense in different frontline areas, or the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be able to sufficiently repair damaged frontline armor or resupply frontline Russian units with armor. Russian forces may have also recently increased their risk tolerance to use and lose armored vehicles, possibly as part of testing a new tactic or concept of operations, although it is unclear why Russian forces would recalculate this risk. ISW will continue to study the evolution of combat in Ukraine and provide an updated assessment of Russian armor usage.
The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 27 that Russia must first fulfill the tasks of its war in Ukraine before renewing bilateral relations with Ukraine. Peskov claimed that Ukraine and the West have rejected Russia's proposals for dialogue. Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have continually rejected US, Ukrainian, and European overtures to progress the peace imitative through dialogue and comprehensive ceasefire agreements. Russia unilaterally imposed short-term ceasefires in Spring 2025 that disproportionately benefited Russia during prominent political events that the Kremlin then weaponized to accuse Ukraine of ceasefire violations. Russia has repeatedly articulated that it seeks regime change in Ukraine, a fundamental restructuring of NATO's open-door policy, and the reduction of Ukraine's military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future. ISW continues to assess that Russia aims to continue delaying the negotiation process so as to make additional gains on the battlefield and extract concessions from Ukraine and the West.
Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces killed Russian Colonel Lebedev (first name not reported), commander of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction. ISW recently observed reports of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment redeploying likely from northwestern Belgorod Oblast to the Velykyi Burluk area.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Siversk during a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault.
- Russian forces appear to be using armored vehicles more frequently in some tactical attacks after a decrease in the use of armor since Winter 2024-2025.
- The Kremlin reasserted its unchanged commitment to achieving its long-standing war aims in Ukraine that amount to nothing short of Ukraine's full capitulation, undermining Russia's diplomatic posturing.
- Ukrainian forces recently killed a Russian commander in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
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[국방부] '변함없는 우정' 2025 한미 친선 태권도대회
[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 7월 26일