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[ISW] 러시아의 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 6월 2일

by Summa posted Jun 03, 2025
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```html 주요 내용

주요 내용:

  • 우크라이나와 러시아 대표단은 6월 2일 이스탄불에서 만났으며, 전쟁 포로(POW, 전쟁 포로) 교환에 대해서만 합의에 도달했습니다. 러시아가 회담 전에 평화 협정을 위한 조건이 담긴 각서를 우크라이나에 제공하는 것을 거부하여 회담이 대부분 비생산적이었고, 협상 과정을 더욱 지연시켰습니다.
  • 우크라이나 및 러시아 언론은 각각 6월 1일과 2일에 양측의 주요 메모 내용을 발표했습니다.
  • 러시아의 각서는 러시아가 어떠한 양보도 하지 않으면서, 우크라이나에 상당한 영토 및 정치적 양보를 요구하는 크렘린의 오랜 요구를 반영합니다.
  • 러시아 대표단은 러시아의 우크라이나 어린이 조직적 납치 행위를 일축했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 수미시티 북쪽과 북동쪽으로 세 방향으로 진격하면서 수미주 북부의 전선을 확대하려는 노력을 강화하는 것으로 보입니다.
  • 오픈소스 분석가들은 6월 1일 우크라이나 장거리 드론 공격 시리즈 이후의 전장 피해를 계속해서 명확히 하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 벨리카 노보실카 부근에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 리만, 차시우 야르, 토레츠크 부근에서 진격했습니다.

분류:

러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 관련 군사 및 외교 동향

관련 주요 국가:

  • 우크라이나
  • 러시아
  • 튀르키예 (이스탄불 회담 개최)

향후 전망:

러시아와 우크라이나 간의 평화 협상은 여전히 교착 상태에 있으며, 러시아의 강경한 입장은 협상을 더욱 어렵게 만들 것으로 예상됩니다. 전선에서의 지속적인 교전과 영토 획득을 위한 시도는 계속될 것으로 보이며, 전쟁 포로 교환과 같은 제한적인 합의는 지속될 수 있지만, 전반적인 평화 합의는 상당한 시간이 소요될 것으로 예상됩니다. 추가적인 국제적 중재 노력에도 불구하고, 양측의 입장 차이로 인해 단기적인 해결책을 찾기는 어려울 것으로 전망됩니다.

```

[원문]

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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter


June 2, 2025, 7:15pm ET

Click here to view our Russia-Ukraine interactive maps.


Click here to view our special reports since 2025.

Click here to read the biweekly "Russian Occupation Update."


Click here to read the weekly "Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update."

Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul for roughly one hour. Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, who led the Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul, stated that Ukraine proposed a 90-day ceasefire, the release of all prisoners of war (POWs), the return of Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities have abducted, and another round of Ukrainian-Russian talks between June 20 and 30 to prepare for a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian delegation appears to have rejected Ukraine's proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. The Ukrainian and Russian delegations agreed to conduct an "all for all" exchange of seriously ill and wounded POWs and POWs aged 18 to 25, which the Russian delegation later claimed would involve at least 1,000 total POWs. The delegations also agreed to exchange the bodies of dead servicemembers in a “6,000 for 6,000” format. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, who led the Russian delegation, stated that Russia proposed a two-to-three-day ceasefire on unspecified areas of the front to allow both sides to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. Medinsky stated that Ukraine and Russia will create permanent medical commissions to conduct regular exchanges of seriously wounded POWs without having to wait for ”political decisions." Umerov noted that Russia first gave its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement to Ukraine during the meeting and that Ukraine will study the document for a week before deciding on further action. Umerov stated on May 28 that Ukraine, in contrast, had already presented its memorandum to Russia — well ahead of the June 2 talks. ISW continues to assess that Russia is trying to disrupt the peace process and prolong the war in order to make additional battlefield gains.


Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively. Ukranian outlet Suspilne published the full text of Ukraine's memorandum on June 1, which reflected Umerov's statements about Ukraine's proposals during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks. Ukraine's memorandum calls for:


  • A complete and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land, and at sea as a precondition to peace negotiations;
  • Confidence building measures, including the return of all Ukrainian children and civilians and the exchange of all POWs;
  • The goal of negotiations to be a permanent, lasting peace agreement, as part of which Ukraine receives reliable security guarantees and maintains its territorial integrity and ability to join any security alliance, including NATO;
  • And for Russia and Ukraine to continue negotiations after the June 2 Istanbul meeting, work towards confidence building measures, and prepare for a future Zelensky-Putin meeting.


Kremlin newswire TASS published photos of Russia's memorandum following the Ukrainian-Russian talks on June 2. Russia's memorandum is divided into three sections: the first section defines Russia's demands for the "final settlement" of the war; the second section proposes two different sets of pre-conditions that Russia would accept as part of a ceasefire; and the third section outlines Russia's ideal timeline for negotiations. The first section of Russia's memorandum lists demands that Ukraine should concede to as part of a long-term peace agreement, including:


  • International recognition of Russia's occupation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea and the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from these oblasts;
  • Indefinite Ukrainian commitment to neutrality (a promise to never join military alliances and coalitions), a ban on future foreign military deployments and infrastructure in Ukraine, termination of all of Ukraine's existing security agreements, and a permanent ban on Ukraine having nuclear weapons;
  • And protection of the "full rights, freedoms, and interests" of Russians and Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine and legislation against the "glorification and propaganda of Nazism."


The second section of Russia's memorandum demands that Ukraine and Russia pursue one of two paths toward a ceasefire. The first path requires Ukraine to completely withdraw from the unoccupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts up to an unspecified distance beyond the oblasts' borders. The second path requires Ukraine to agree a different set of Russian demands, including:


  • Ban redeployments of all its units, except as part of withdrawals from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts;
  • End all Ukrainian force generation efforts, begin demobilization, end martial law, and organize presidential elections within 100 days of ending martial law, and elect a new government;
  • And terminate all foreign military assistance, including the supply of satellite imagery and intelligence, and ban all foreign military deployments to Ukraine.


The third section of Russia's memorandum recommends that Russia and Ukraine sign a longer-term ceasefire agreement after exchanging the bodies of dead servicemembers and a two-to-three-day general ceasefire to retrieve bodies from the battlefield. The memorandum demands that Ukraine completely withdraw from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts within 30 days of the beginning of the ceasefire and that Ukraine elect a new government before Russia and Ukraine sign a formal peace agreement.


Key Takeaways:


  • Ukrainian and Russian delegations met in Istanbul on June 2 and only reached agreements about prisoner of war (POW) exchanges. Russia's refusal to give Ukraine its memorandum with its terms for a peace settlement before the meeting ensured that the meeting was largely unproductive and further protracted the negotiation process.


  • Ukrainian and Russian media published the major points of both sides' memorandums on June 1 and 2, respectively.


  • Russia's memorandum reflects the Kremlin's long-standing public demands for Ukraine to make significant territorial and political concessions while Russia offers no concessions of its own.


  • The Russian delegation dismissed Russia's systemic kidnapping of Ukrainian children.


  • Russian forces appear to be intensifying efforts to widen the frontline in northern Sumy Oblast along three axes of advance north and northeast of Sumy City.


  • Open-source analysts continue to clarify the battlefield damage following the Ukrainian long-range drone strike series on June 1.


  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka. Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk.

Click Here to Read the Full Update

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