People’s Republic of China (PRC) Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi reportedly told the top EU diplomat that the PRC does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, confirming ISW’s longstanding assessment that Beijing is invested in Russian success in the war. Wang met with Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission, on July 2 for the 13th EU-PRC High-level Strategic Dialogue in Brussels. Hong Kong-based outlet South China Morning Post reported that Wang told Kallas that Beijing does not want Russia to lose the war in Ukraine because the United States could then shift its focus entirely to countering the PRC, according to several unnamed “people familiar with the exchange.” Wang reportedly denied that Beijing is financially or militarily supporting Russia’s war effort, however, and implied that Russia would have already won if that were the case. These comments were not present in the official EU and PRC readouts of the meeting. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning neither confirmed nor denied whether Wang made the comments but reiterated standard rhetoric that “China is not a party to the Ukrainian issue” and that Beijing has consistently advocated for peace, dialogue, and an “early political solution to the crisis through diplomatic efforts.” Mao claimed that “the prolongation of the Ukrainian crisis is not in the interests of any party,” contradicting the implication from Wang’s comments that Beijing may seek to use the war in Ukraine to keep the West distracted as long as possible.
Wang’s unusually frank comments to Kallas are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Beijing views a Russian defeat in Ukraine as the worst-case scenario for PRC interests and that the PRC supports Russia in holding NATO at risk. A definitive Russian battlefield defeat that involves pushing Russia out of occupied Ukrainian lands would likely create a severe political crisis in Russia and thus weaken one of the PRC’s most reliable partners. Political turmoil in Russia, the depletion of Russian resources and manpower in the war, and the reputational humiliation of a costly defeat will make Russia less able to threaten NATO in the short to medium term, allowing the collective West to refocus its attention on building security and alliances in the Indo-Pacific. This outcome would also greatly bolster confidence in the strength of US and Western security commitments, which is particularly relevant in the case of potential PRC aggression towards Taiwan. Wang’s comments suggest that Beijing sees Russia’s war in Ukraine as a way to distract the West from the Indo-Pacific, which Russia can achieve either by continuing the war or by decisively winning and threatening NATO from a new position of strength on a more preferable frontline. PRC officials have strongly objected to the expansion of Western-aligned coalitions in East Asia, including NATO.
The PRC has attempted to balance its interests in supporting Russia and in maintaining good trade relations with Western countries. The PRC has echoed some Russian rhetoric in blaming NATO for instigating or prolonging the war in Ukraine, defending Russia’s “legitimate security interests,” and opposing sanctions on Russia. It has also increased its trade with Russia since 2022, providing Moscow with a key economic lifeline amid international sanctions and supplying critical dual-use components and equipment for Russia’s defense-industrial base. Beijing has framed the sale of dual-use goods as “normal trade,” however, and has claimed that it is not sending Russia complete military equipment, instead portraying itself as a neutral party and advocate for peace. Wang’s comments undercut Beijing’s claims of neutrality in the Ukraine war, as do increasing recent reports that Ukraine is finding PRC-origin equipment and components on the battlefield in Ukraine. Wang’s statements make it clear that Beijing and Moscow see their futures as intertwined, which emphasizes the infeasibility of policy premised on splitting Russia away from the PRC for the purpose of focusing on the Indo-Pacific.
Key takeaways:
- PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi stated that the PRC does not want Russia to lose in Ukraine, supporting ISW’s assessment that Beijing and Moscow’s fates are intertwined in the war in Ukraine.
- Unspecified Arab officials told Middle East Eye that the PRC has sent surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries to Iran within the past two weeks to replenish Iran’s degraded air defense capabilities, further suggesting that Iran is turning to the PRC its predominant defensive partner due to Russia’s lack of concrete response or support for Iran. PRC officials have since denied this report, however.
- Russia may intend to recruit North Koreans to sign contracts directly with the Russian military.
- North Korea reportedly has already integrated Russian-provided Pantsir air defense systems into its domestic air defense umbrella.
- The PRC reportedly intends to increase its economic support of North Korea to bolster North Korea's ability to serve as a hub for bilateral PRC-North Korea and trilateral PRC-Russia-North Korea cooperation.
- Differing views and priorities among members of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are impeding Russia and the PRC from using these organizations as vehicles to advance their respective geopolitical interests.
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