Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish. Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22. CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war. Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling. Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.
Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran. Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario. Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024. The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[12] The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026. The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.
Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025. Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023. The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.
Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they have since October 2023. Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months. Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases. Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area. Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.
Key Takeaways:
- Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.
- Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term.
- Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.
- Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine.
- The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.
- Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.
- Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.
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[ISW] 이란 업데이트 특별 보고서, 2025년 6월 22일, 저녁 에디션
[ISW] 이란 업데이트 특별 보고서, 2025년 6월 22일, 모닝 에디션